Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 92-134
Decision Date | 08 April 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-134,92-134 |
Citation | 850 P.2d 607 |
Parties | Kenneth R. AMES, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. SUNDANCE STATE BANK, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Joseph E. Darrah, Powell, and Stephen R. Winship, Casper, for appellant.
Robert Berger and Dan R. Riggs, Sheridan, for appellee.
Before THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ; and ROONEY, Ret.J.
This appeal by plaintiff below is from a Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury's Verdict in a matter in which defendant/appellee bank refused to renew appellant's note in 1989 as had been done during several previous years. The annual loans were made to provide operating money to appellant for his ranching business. Appellant's ranching business evolved from a yearling operation into a bred heifer operation and a breeding cattle operation. Each year, appellant would discuss with the bank's officer his budget, expected costs, status of long term debts with required annual payments, e.g., Wyoming Farm Loan debt, previous bank loan carry over, and similar items pertaining to appellant's financial situation. For years, a new note would then be executed, payable in one year. In 1989, appellee refused the renewal, and the existing note was called for payment.
The complaint alleged five claims for relief: breach of loan commitment, promissory estoppel, bad faith, tortious interference with contract and business relationships, and severe emotional distress. The last claim was withdrawn prior to trial. Appellee was granted its motion for summary judgment on the bad faith and tortious interference claims prior to trial (the court finding that there were no issues of material fact relative thereto and appellee to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Subsequently, appellant moved to amend his complaint to again assert these two claims, but the record does not reflect any action taken thereon. The case went to trial on the other two claims, i.e., breach of loan commitment and promissory estoppel.
In its verdict, the jury found that the bank breached its loan agreement of December 5, 1988 with appellant by failing to renew the note, and that it is liable to appellant by reason of promissory estoppel, fixing damages at $375,000.
Appellant words the issues on appeal:
Appellee words them:
(First issue of each party) 1
As appellant recited, we recently repeated the standards for review of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in Wilson v. McMahon, 831 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Wyo.1992) (quoting Inter-Mountain Threading v. Baker Hughes, 812 P.2d 555, 558-59 (Wyo.1991)):
" "
Appellant argues that "one of the principal issues determined by the jury was the intent of the parties." However, the intent of the parties cannot prevail for enforcement of all contracts. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making thereof is void unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the party to be charged with it. Wyo.Stat. § 1-23-105(a) (1988) ( ). In his argument, appellant states that:
"It is the position of Appellant that the loan commitment or contract was at least an oral agreement upon which the specific terms and parameters are represented by all of the documents generated by the parties, and primarily the bank's records, including the important supplementation of those documents by the primarily unrefuted evidence of the course of dealing and practice standards which the Appellee bankers admitted to be bound."
Such did not include any written obligation binding the appellee to finance appellant's business for more than one year in the future. Appellant himself so testified. The written agreements between the parties relating to the terms of the loans consisted only of promissory notes given to appellee by appellant. They were clear and unambiguous. Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary their terms or determine an intent of the parties not expressed therein (the parole evidence rule). Kerper v. Kerper, 780 P.2d 923 (Wyo.1989); Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo.1988).
The district court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the jury verdict was against the weight of properly admissible evidence. If the verdict had been allowed to stand and appeal was taken for error properly reserved on the basis of admission of evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule and of the statute of frauds, we would have to reverse and remand on appeal. The district court corrected the situation as it should. In its opinion letter, it said in part:
Yet to be considered with reference to this issue is appellant's contention that the doctrine of promissory estoppel favors his position. Again, the district court adequately and properly addressed this contention. It said in its opinion letter:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader
...and fair dealing with a breach-of-contract claim, both of which arose from a breach of the same contract term. Cf. Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607 (Wyo.1993) (party asserting a tort claim of bad faith must prove that the contract was In this case, I would not second-guess the tria......
-
Premier Farm Credit, Pca v. W-Cattle, LLC
...(1992) (statement that "something will be worked out" too indefinite to constitute an enforceable agreement); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 610 (Wyo.1993) (promises to "stick with" or "fund [borrower's] operation" too vague to support promissory estoppel or breach of contract 5......
-
Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.
...promissory estoppel may avoid application of the statute of frauds. Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348 (Wyo. 1993); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 610 (Wyo.1993); B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 815 6. Although it is sometimes said that appellate rev......
-
In re Straight, BAP No. WY-96-1
...See, e.g., Patel v. Harless, 926 P.2d 963, 965 (Wyo.1996); Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo.1996); Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 609 (Wyo.1993); see also Mid-West Conveyor Co. v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 92 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir.1996). "`An ambiguous contract is an a......