Amick v. Exch. State Bank
| Decision Date | 03 July 1925 |
| Docket Number | No. 24759.,24759. |
| Citation | 164 Minn. 136,204 N.W. 639 |
| Parties | AMICK v. EXCHANGE STATE BANK et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; P. W. Guilford, Judge.
Action by H. G. Amick, as receiver, etc., against the Exchange State Bank and another. From an order denying a motion for new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Chapter 510, Laws 1919, which was repealed by chapter 472, Laws 1921, was not analogous to the recording act, but was for the exclusive benefit of the state, having no reference to the creditors and vendees of the person holding the registered title to a motor vehicle.
Possession of personal property is prima facie proof of ownership. Record examined, and held to compel a finding of ownership by plaintiff.
Failure to find value, under the facts stated in opinion, is harmless. Jesse Van Valkenburg, of Minneapolis, for appellants.
Joss, Ohman, Fryberger & Parker, of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Action for conversion. Defendant appeals from an order denying its motion for a new trial.
The record presents the question as to whether or not, while chapter 510, Laws 1919, was in force (repealed by chapter 472, Laws 1921), title to an automobile could be transferred other than as therein provided. Section 7 thereof reads as follows:
‘All sales, assignments or attempted sales or transfers of motor vehicles in this state, title to which has not been registered or assigned, as herein provided for, shall be voidable and shall be a violation of this act.’
[1] 1. In the absence of this statute, there could be no question as to the corporation, of which plaintiff is receiver, owning the motor truck involved. The attempt was to assign title in a way other than provided by the statute. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to have made such transfer impossible and to have this law in the nature of a recording act, it doubtless would have used definite language showing such meaning. Apparently the Legislature did not intend to follow, in relation to personal property, the analogy of the recording law as to real estate, which, in respect to subsequent purchasers, uses the word ‘void’ and not ‘voidable.’ Section 8226, G. S. 1923. We must infer that the lawmakers appreciated the serious consequences in making a prohibited transfer ‘void,’ hence contented themselves by making it ‘voidable’ only. The purposes of the state are fully accomplished by having the transfer ‘voidable.’ Doubtless the law in question was enacted as a means of a more efficient and certain method of taxation, and as an aid in the prevention and detection of crime, and not for the purpose of putting the proof of title to personal property upon a higher plane than the title to real estate, which may now be established by the ordinary proofs in actions to determine adverse claims. This statute permits the state, for the purpose of taxation, to have such voidable transfers, as to it, declared void. The statute provides penalties for its violation. One who transferred a motor vehicle contrary to this law, not only subjected himself to a penalty, but, as to the state, the transfer being ‘voidable,’ he would not be permitted to say that ...
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