Amin v. Barr
| Decision Date | 20 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 19-3418 (RC) |
| Parties | ALI SHUKRI AMIN, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Before the Court is Petitioner Ali Shukri Amin's pro se "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person Detained in Federal Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241," ECF No. 1. At the time of his filing, Mr. Amin was serving out the final months of his sentence at a halfway house in Washington, D.C. He has since completed his sentence and now resides in Virginia on supervised release. Mr. Amin's petition is styled as one under § 2241 and, if this Court were to characterize it as such, Mr. Amin correctly listed his immediate custodian as a proper respondent. Respondent has moved to transfer for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that although Mr. Amin filed under § 2241 and listed a proper respondent, his petition should be construed instead under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent argues that pro se motions should be characterized by the nature of the relief sought and not the caption that petitioners attach to their pleadings. Because Mr. Amin's arguments challenge his underlying conviction rather than the manner in which his sentence is being executed, this Court construes Mr. Amin's pleading under § 2255, and therefore concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Amin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, this Court notifies Mr. Amin of the consequences of having his motion recharacterized as one under § 2255 and will allow him an opportunity to withdraw the petition before granting Respondent's motion to transfer.
On June 11, 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Mr. Amin pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to designated terrorist organizations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. United States v. Amin, Case No. 1:15-cr-164-CMH, ECF No. 6 (June 11, 2015). On August 28, 2015, Mr. Amin was sentenced to one hundred and thirty-six (136) months in prison with a lifetime of supervised release. Id. at ECF No. 20 (Aug. 28, 2015). Several years later, the government filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), which was granted on April 27, 2018, and Mr. Amin's sentence was reduced to seventy-two (72) months with a continued lifetime of supervised release. Id. at ECF No. 26 (Apr. 27, 2018). Mr. Amin was relocated to Hope Village Halfway House in Washington, D.C., and he shortly thereafter submitted this petition. See Pet., ECF No. 1 at 2. Mr. Amin was released from Hope Village Halfway House on May 4, 2020, and now resides in Virginia. Id. at 1, 12; ECF No. 17 at 2.
Mr. Amin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus styled as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. That statute allows a petitioner alleging he is in "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" to challenge the physical conditions of his detention in Federal District Court. Day v. Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting § 2241(c)(3)). Writs of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 are typically used to challenge the manner in which one's sentence is executed. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, No. 11-cr-0290, 2017 WL 1483349, at *1 (D.D.C. 2017) (); Combs v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 260 F. Supp. 2d 53, 54 (D.D.C. 2003) (); Mitchell v. Smith, No. 15-cv-1319, 2016 WL 11607465, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2016) (); Ramsey v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 82 F. Supp. 3d 293, 299 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd, 840 F.3d 853 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (); United States v. Queen, No. 17-cr-58, 2020 WL 2748495, at *5 (); Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 601 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (). Writs pursuant to § 2255, on the other hand, are the proper avenue for petitioners claiming their "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Mr. Amin does not contest the manner in which his sentence is being executed, but rather claims his underlying conviction and sentence were unconstitutional and that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. He appears to make several general arguments. First, he argues that the federal government "did not have the authority . . . to enforce [the underlying] federal criminal offense statute" in the state of Virginia. ECF No. 1 at 9 ¶ 3(b); see also id. at 25 ¶¶ 17-18 (). Second, Mr. Amin asserts that he is entitled to relief on procedural grounds because "he has not, till this day, received a true indictment" and that all documents used in his conviction "are essentially forged to illegally incarcerate him." Id. at 9 ¶ 3(c); ECF No. 22 at 23. Third, he claimshis conviction "was not based upon the supreme law of the land" but was based on "unofficial dicta . . . [that] carry no constitutional weight." ECF No. 1 at 9 ¶ 3(d). And lastly, Mr. Amin states that he is illegally incarcerated as the "the judge presiding over the case, the prosecutor, the defense attorneys, and all other court functionaries," had unconstitutional conflicts of interest as they were incentivized by a financial conspiracy scheme whereby they "receive[d] payments of dividends, annuities, and/or residuals" for sentencing him. Id. at 9, 38-39; ECF No. 22 at 23. These are attacks on the legality of the underlying conviction—not challenges to the means or manner in which Mr. Amin's sentence has been executed.
Although Mr. Amin's petition is not a model of clarity, he appears to have intentionally filed under § 2241 in an attempt to overcome the restriction that a petition pursuant to § 2255 must be filed in the court which sentenced him. He argues that he "does not contest the conviction or sentence, and any arguments which may seem to do so . . . must be construed, as much as possible, to apply only to his detention." Id. at 15 ¶ 7. Mr. Amin further purports to claim he does not "contest the validity of his conviction or sentence" as his arguments all concern issues that began "before the petitioner was detained, before he was charged, and before he was sentenced." ECF No. 22 at 20 ¶ 1. Mr. Amin declares that therefore § 2255 "is plainly inadequate and ineffective to test legality of the petitioner's detention." Id. at 21 ¶ 4. But he seems to misinterpret the restrictions of a § 2255 motion when he states that "petitions designed 'to test the legality of . . . detention' are exempted from being filed in the district of conviction." Id. at 20 ¶ 2. He appears to maintain that while § 2255 is used to challenge convictions, it is inadequate here because he is challenging jurisdictional issues that arose before he was convicted. His assertions that he is not contesting the validity of his conviction directly contradict the substance of his arguments. Mr. Amin argues his detention is illegal andunconstitutional only as a means of attacking his underlying conviction. He presents an interpretation of § 2241 that is neither supported by case law nor the language of the statute. If petitioners could challenge the legality of their underlying sentence by merely attacking the legality of their detention, then there would be little distinction between § 2241 and § 2255.
Contrary to what Mr. Amin suggests, a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the proper way for him to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing court or the constitutionality of his sentence. See Taylor v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 194 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Hairston v. United States, No. 14-cv-0432, 2014 WL 2446071, at *1 (); Gillham v. Holland, No. 11-cv-372, 2011 WL 666898, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2011). The statute states that petitioners filing under § 2255 "may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). This Circuit has reiterated that language and stated that a § 2255 petition must be filed in the sentencing court. See Moleski v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 744 F. App'x 5, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (); Evans v. Samuels, 554 F. App'x 15, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ().
Under rare circumstances, if a petitioner can establish that a proceeding under § 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective then the petitioner "may be permitted to challenge his underlying conviction or sentence under § 2241." Gewin v. Dodrill, 779 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44 n.13(D.D.C. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial