Amiri v. Dyncorp Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CV-03333 SC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | FERDAWS AMIRI, ILYAS YONISI Plaintiffs, v. DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al. Defendants. |
Now before the Court is Defendants DynCorp International Inc. ("DII"), DynCorp International LLC ("DI LLC"), Worldwide Recruiting and Staffing Services LLC, and DTS Aviation Services, LLC's1 (collectively, "Defendants" or "DynCorp") motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Ferdaws Amiri and Ilyas Yonisi's second amendedcomplaint ("SAC"), ECF No. 22, for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. ECF No. 32 ("Mot."). The motion is opposed, ECF No. 40 ("Opp'n"), and Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 42 ("Reply"). The motion is appropriate for resolution without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED and the Court DIRECTS the clerk to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a).
This is a personal injury case alleging claims for battery, assault, and various forms of negligence that arose from a car accident in Afghanistan.
Plaintiffs worked for a company called AECOM Government Services as military contractors, and were in Afghanistan to participate in human intelligence gathering in support of United States military operations. Among many other nationwide and worldwide activities, Defendants provide an array of military contracting services including transportation, security, training, advising, and mentoring for the Afghan National Police.
Plaintiffs allege that, while driving military informants from Camp Phoenix (a military installation in Kabul maintained by the United States Army) two DynCorp vehicles driven by DynCorp employees repeatedly tried to run Plaintiffs off the road. Plaintiffs' vehicle was struck several times, and both Plaintiffs suffered serious injuries as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that DynCorp was aware of other similar acts by its driversbut, rather than attempt to prevent such conduct, encouraged its employees to act aggressively.
Plaintiffs are citizens of California. DII is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia. DI LLC is organized in Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia, and is wholly owned by DII. DTS Aviation Services, LLC ("DTS Aviation") is organized in Nevada with its principal place of business in Texas, and DI LLC is its sole member. Worldwide Recruiting and Staffing Services LLC ("Worldwide") is organized in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas, and DI LLC is its sole member.
Now Defendants move to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants and that venue is improper in this district. Plaintiffs oppose.
Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). "[T]his demonstration requires that the plaintiff make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). "[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff . . . ." Id. (quotations omitted).
The Court follows state law in determining the bounds ofpersonal jurisdiction. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). California's long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of federal due process. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004). "Although a nonresident's physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have 'certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the relevant forum, personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs in this case rely solely on general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists only when the defendant's contacts "'are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.'" Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant to move to dismiss an action for improper venue. On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, "the pleadings need not be accepted as true, and the court may consider facts outside of the pleadings," but the court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs do not argue that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendants. Instead, they argue that personal jurisdiction here is founded on general jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege venue is proper in this district solely on the basis of the Court's personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(3) ().
Because the Court concludes it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court finds venue improper as well.
In order to exercise general (sometimes called "all-purpose") jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court must conclude that Defendants have "certain minimum contacts with [California] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Even if Plaintiffs can satisfy that test, the exercise of general jurisdiction also requires a showing that Defendants' contacts with California are "'so continuous and systematic as to render [Defendants] essentially at home'" in California. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, to be "essentially at home in the forum [s]tate," a company must be "comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State." Id. at 758 n.11.
Some have called this the "home-state test," and outside acorporation's place of incorporation or principal place of business it is rarely satisfied. See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 81, 83 (2013). In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has termed these two forums -- the place of incorporation and principal place of business -- the "paradigm all-purpose forums . . . ." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did not restrict general jurisdiction to only those two forums. Instead, the Court pointed out "that in an exceptional case . . . a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that state." Daimler, at 761 n.19 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). While the Court did not define what an "exceptional case" is, its treatment of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), indicates the bar for such a finding is very high.
In Perkins, the defendant was a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. During the Japanese occupation in World War II, the defendant's president moved to Ohio where he maintained an office, the company's files, and organized the company's activities. Id. at 448. The plaintiff sued the company in Ohio on a claim that had no connection to Ohio. Id. at 438. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that exercising general jurisdiction over the defendant was appropriate because "Ohio was the corporation's principal, if temporary, place of business." Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780, n.11 (1984)."This presumably is the type of situation that [Daimler] envisioned as the 'exceptional case' in which a defendant's affiliations with the forum are 'comparable' to those of a domestic company." Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) at 20, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417040 (last accessed January 9, 2015). Yet "in the overwhelming majority of cases there will be no occasion to explore whether a Perkins-type exception might apply" because the Supreme Court's analysis in Daimler focused almost exclusively on the paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction -- the corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business. Id. (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761)).
None of the paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction are present in this case. Defendants are not incorporated in California, and none have their principal place of business here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must show that this is the kind of "exceptional case" in which Defendants' operations in California are "so substantial and of such a nature as to render [Defendants] at home in" California. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
Plaintiffs argue that five sets of contacts between Defendants and California are sufficient to create general jurisdiction: (1) DI LLC's contracts to do business...
To continue reading
Request your trial