Ammidon v. Smith Et Al

• Decision Date: 21 March 1816
• Citation: 4 L.Ed. 132,14 U.S. 447,1 Wheat. 447
• Parties: AMMIDON v. SMITH ET AL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

14 U.S. 447

4 L.Ed. 132

1 Wheat. 447

AMMIDON v. SMITH ET AL.

March 21, 1816

THIS was an action of debt brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, in the circuit court of

Rhode-Island, on a bond dated the 31st day of August, 1810, with a condition, that if Simon Smith, a prisoner in jail, at the suit of the said Philip Ammidon, shall 'continue and be a true prisoner in the custody, guard, and safe keeping of Roger Allenton, keeper of the said prison, &c., within the limits of the said prison, until he shall be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape, or escapes, during the term of his restraint, then this obligation to be void,' &c.

The defendants pleaded, severally, two several pleas——

First. That said Simon did remain a true prisoner until lawfully discharged, and made no escape.

Second. That, after notifying his creditors, he did take the oath provided by the law of the state of Rhode-Island, for the relief of poor prisoners confined for debt, before proper authority, which oath is as follows: 'that he had not any estate, real or personal, in possession, remainder, or reversion, over ten dollars, and that he had not, since the commencement of the said suits against him, or at any other time, directly or indirectly, sold, leased, or otherwise conveyed, or disposed of to, or intrusted any person or persons whomsoever with, all, or any part, of the estate, real or personal, whereof he hath been the lawful owner or possessor, with any intent or design to secure the same, or to receive, or to expect any profit or advantage therefrom for himself or any of his family, nor had he caused, or suffered to be done any thing whatsoever whereby any of his creditors may be defrauded.'-

To the first plea the plaintiff replied, that he did not remain a true prisoner until lawfully discharged, &c. To the second he replied, that, after the commencement of the action, on which he was imprisoned, and after the contracting of the debt on which the action was brought, the said Simon was seised and possessed of real estate to the value of 40,000 dollars, and that, fraudulently contriving with his sons Darius and Simon, jun., his sureties in said bond, to defraud him of his said debt, did lease, sell, and convey to said Darius and Simon, jun. and his other children, all his said real estate, and did intrust them with it, for his and their benefit, with intent to defraud the plaintiff, and that he might be admitted to the benefit of the oath mentioned in said plea; that said Simon did intrust with said Darius and Simon, jun. and his other children, all his estate, both real and personal, of the value of $50,000 dollars, with the advice, counsel, and assistance, and under the direction of said Darius and Simon, jun. and his other children, with an intent and design to secure the same to the said Darius and Simon, jun. and his family, to defraud the plaintiff of his said debt; and he avers that the said Simon did falsely and fraudulently take said oath, with intent wilfully, falsely, and fraudulently to hinder, delay, and defraud the plaintiff of his just debt aforesaid, and avoid the payment thereof, and thereby hinder, delay, and defraud the other creditors of the said Simon of their just debts. And this he is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment, &c. In his replication to the pleas of the two sureties, the plaintiff adds an averment, that the said Simon took the said oath, they, the defendants, well knowing that the same was false and fraudulent; and that the said Simon did wilfully, falsely, and fraudulently take the said oath with intent thereby to hinder, delay, and defraud the plaintiff of his just debt aforesaid, and avoid the payment thereof, and thereby hinder and defraud the other creditors of the said Simon of their just debts.

To this replication the defendants demurred, and the plaintiff joined.

On the argument of this demurrer, the judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion, whether the replication was sufficient to avoid the plea, which division of opinion was certified to this court.

Pitkin, for the plaintiff. The question is, whether the fraudulent conduct of the defendants, as stated in the pleadings, can be taken advantage of in a suit on the bond. The laws of Rhode-Island allow persons imprisoned for debt on mesne process, or execution, the limits of the prison, on giving a bond to the creditor to remain true prisoners until lawfully discharged. Debtors, having no estate, who take an oath that they have not any estate over 10 dollars, and that they have not disposed of any part of the estate of which they were possessed, for their own benefit, or that of their families, or with intent to defraud their creditors, may be discharged from jail; but if confined on execution, the debtor must leave with the keeper, to be delivered to his creditor, his promissory note, payable to such creditor, for the amount of the debt, in two years, with interest.^a In this case the debtor was released from prison by the forms of law; but this discharge being obtained by fraud and perjury, is wholly inoperative, and a departure from the liimits under colour of such a discharge, is, in law, an escape, and a breach of the condition of the bond. Fraud vitiates every act; and this axiom of jurisprudence is consecrated by the laws of Rhode-Island, which provide, 'That if any such prisoner aforesaid shall be convicted of having sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of, or intrusted his or her estate, or any part thereof, directly or indirectly, contrary to his or her aforegoing oath, or affirmation, he or she shall not only be liable to the pains and penalties of wilful perjury, but shall receive no benefit from said oath or affirmation.'^b The word 'convicted,' could not have been used here technically, but merely to declare, that if any person should swear falsely as to the disposition of his property, he should not only be liable for perjury, but should receive no benefit from such false swearing. Any other construction would defeat the object of the statute. The laws of the state contain a similar provision respecting debtors obtaining the benefit of the insolvent act; yet it has never been held, that the fraudulent debtor must be first criminally convicted in order to give effect to this provision.

Hunter, contra. 1. The discharge was obtained

^a Digest, p. 227. Supplement, p. 73.

^bDigest, p. 231 by a court of competent jurisdiction, and is, therefore, of complete obligation. The decision in the present case was not only that of a court of competent jurisdiction, and, therefore, conclusive, but it was in terms and effect a decision upon the very point now in controversy, and between the same parties. The statute is solicitous to prevent fraud, and for that purpose allows to the party creditors a right to show the probability that a perjury is intended, and by that means a fraud may be perpetrated, and applying to the conscience of the debtor, imposes on him an oath of detailed, explicit, and unequivocal purgation. The present plaintiff has no right to complain; though duly summoned, he did not appear, and his contumacy has forfeited his right of action. There is no principle of our jurisprudence more firmly settled, more reasonable and salutary, than that a party shall not be permitted to turn his own omissions into a charge upon another. Even a court of chancery will refuse relief against fraud, if it be obvious that it might have been urged by the complainant as matter of defence in a previous suit at law.^c The discharge of the defendant is said to be invalidated by conveyances previously made by him. But of these conveyances the plaintiff had notice; the law requiring them to be recorded, and the plaintiff admitting that he had actual notice. If, then, these deeds constituted the fraud, the defendant had notice of the fraud, and ought to have appeared

^c 1 Johns. Cas. 392. Le Guen v. Gouverneur & Kemble. 2 Burr. 1009. 7 T. R. 269. 2 H. Black. 414 to oppose the discharge. Knowing the defendant not to be entitled to it, he stands by, and permits him to obtain it, with an intention to convert a bond, meant as a substitution for the prison walls, into a pecuniary security for his debt, and 30 per cent. in addition. The plaintiff's conduct is thus analogous to a permissive escape at common law, where neither the creditor nor the sheriff can retake the prisoner even in a fresh suit. 2. Considering this as a question upon the construction of the bond, no breach of its condition can be inferred. Such a breach imports an actual wrongful escape; such as at common law would give the sheriff a right of recaption—such as would subject him to an action, and the prisoner to an indictment. The phraseology of the bond in that of the common law, and the definition of the correlative phrases 'escape' and 'true prisoner,' are exact, invariable, and immemorial. That can never be an escape where the prison doors are opened by the hand of the law. He must have remained a true prisoner whose remaining a...