Judge v. Powers

• Decision Date: 17 May 1912
• Citation: 156 Iowa 251,136 N.W. 315
• Parties: JUDGE ET AL. v. POWERS, DISTRICT JUDGE, ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

156 Iowa 251

136 N.W. 315

JUDGE ET AL.

v.POWERS, DISTRICT JUDGE, ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 17, 1912.

Certiorari from District Court, Carroll County; F. M. Powers, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Affirmed.B. I. Salinger and L. H. Salinger, both of Carroll, and Ralph Maclean, for plaintiffs.

M. S. Odle, of Des Moines, for defendants.

SHERWIN, J.

On the 8th day of December, 1908, the plaintiffs herein were permanently enjoined from illegally selling intoxicating liquors. After the injunction had issued, the plaintiffs continued the sale of liquors on the same premises, and on the 7th of December, 1910, an information was filed charging them with contempt for a violation of the injunction. On the 18th day of April, 1911, judgment against the defendants (plaintiffs herein) by consent was entered on that information, and they were fined. That judgment was rendered by Judge Hutchinson, and it was determined therein that the injunction had been violated on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th days of December, 1908. The judgment further recited that “on the 12th day of December, 1908, the defendants complied with the provisions of the mulct law by doing the things prescribed by statute as a condition precedent to the conduct of said business, and have ever since and are now conducting their saloon and making sales of liquor in compliance with the law of the state regulating the same and in such manner as to not violate the injunction above referred to.” Judge and Bunting still continued business at the old stand, and on the 3d day of October, 1911, a second information was filed charging them with contempt in violating the injunction after the 7th day of December, 1910. Upon a trial, the court found that defendants had violated the injunction since the 15th day of December, 1910, and they were again adjudged guilty of contempt and fined, whereupon this proceeding was instituted.

But two questions are before us for determination as we view the case, and they are both of law. The Thirty-Third General Assembly, c. 142, § 3, enacted this law: “No person who shall be hereafter convicted of violating the laws of this state relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors, or shall be permanently enjoined by any court of this state for such violation, shall be permitted to sell intoxicating liquors in this state within five (5) years from the date of such conviction or injunction, and no resolution of consent or permit shall be granted such person within said period.”

[1] On this branch of the case, the only question presented or argued by counsel is whether the judgment of April 18, 1911, decreeing these plaintiffs guilty of contempt, was a “conviction of violating the laws of this state relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors” within the meaning of section 3 of chapter 142, Acts 33d G. A. We have held that proceedings to punish for contempt in violating a liquor injunction are not criminal proceedings. Gibson v. Hutchinson, Judge, 148 Iowa, 139, 126 N. W. 790;Brown & Bennett v. Powers, Judge, 146 Iowa, 729, 125 N. W. 833;McGlasson v. Johnson, 86 Iowa, 477, 53 N. W. 267.

And it would seem to follow that the violation of an injunction in a nuisance case is not a crime as the word is ordinarily understood and defined. In the Gibson Case, supra, we said: “It is a well-settled proposition that, while the proceedings to punish for contempt may in some features resemble hearings in criminal proceedings, and judgment of fine and imprisonment may be entered, yet the object and purpose thereof is not to punish a public offense but to compel obedience to and respect for the order of the court.” The statute provides that words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and approved use of the language unless such words and phrases have acquired a peculiar and appropriate different meaning in law. It has always been the holding of this court that proceedings in contempt are not criminal, and this construction of the provisions of the statute punishing for contempt will be presumed to have been in the minds of the legislators when the statute under consideration was enacted, and the word “convicted” must be construed in the light of such knowledge. That the word “convicted” as here used has not acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning different from its approved use is manifest, for we have, in a sense at least, held otherwise in the cases already cited.

[2] The word “conviction” ordinarily signifies the finding of the jury by verdict that the prisoner is guilty. Hackett & Freeman v. Graves, 103 Iowa, 296, 72 N. W. 528; Bishop, Statutory Crimes, § 348; Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485, 2 Atl. 752, 55 Am. Rep. 149. “Conviction is a technical term applicable to judgment in a criminal prosecution.” Chief Justice Marshall in Amnidon v. Smith, 1 Wheat. 461, 4 L. Ed. 132. An ordinary conviction takes place in a criminal prosecution by indictment, etc., and may either consist of the prisoner's confession and plea of guilty or of the verdict of guilty found by a jury. 4 Blackstone, Com. 262; 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 223; Bouvier's Law Dict. 435. Webster defines the word “convicted” as the past participle of the verb “to convict,” which means to prove or find guilty of an offense or crime charged. Where a license was made void if the person holding it suffer conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was held that “conviction” meant either a finding by a jury that the prisoner was guilty, or else a judgment and sentence of the court upon a verdict or confession of guilt. Commonwealth v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, 23 N. E. 55. To same effect is Hartley v. Henreta, 13 S. E. 375 (W. Va.). “A ‘conviction’ is an adjudication that the accused is guilty. It imports all that the statute requires before holding one to bail, and, more, it involves not only the corpus delicti and the probable guilt of the accused but the actual guilt.” Nason v. Staples, 48 Me. 123. A “conviction” is the finding of guilt. People v. Adams, 95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 461;Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 433, 32 Pac. 929;State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 South. 560;Blair v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 850. We reach the conclusion that punishment for...