Amos v. Scott

Decision Date07 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-10576,94-10576
PartiesBernard Eugene AMOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wayne SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Brent Newton, Annette M. Lamoreaux, Anthony S. Haughton, Texas Resource Center, Houston, TX, for appellant.

Margaret P. Griffey, James B. Matthews, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before KING, DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Bernard Eugene Amos, a Texas death row inmate, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent-Appellant Wayne Scott, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the State), denying and dismissing with prejudice Amos' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I FACTUAL HISTORY

The full factual history for this appeal is detailed in the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirming Amos' conviction and sentence. 1 Summarized briefly, that history is as follows. On January 14, 1988, Amos and his cousin, Gary Von Bennett, drove to a Dallas apartment complex looking for something to steal or an apartment to burglarize. After the two men burglarized one apartment and returned to their car to cache the stolen goods, they were approached by James Joe, an off-duty Dallas police officer and part-time apartment complex security guard. Joe, who was wearing a Dallas Police Department sweatshirt and police badge, identified himself and proceeded to question Amos and Bennett. Amos became upset during the exchange with Joe, and at some point "flinched," turned, drew a pistol, and shot Joe in the chest at point blank range. Bennett eventually testified that he immediately ran toward one of the apartment buildings, ducked down, heard three or four more shots, and then nothing. When Bennett returned to the car, he saw both Amos and Joe lying on the ground.

Bennett was told by Amos that he had been shot and needed help. Bennett helped Amos into the car and drove to a neighboring apartment complex. When the police arrived at that apartment complex, Bennett ran and hid. Amos, who was unable to run, got out of the car and tried to hide under a parked truck. The police found Amos, arrested him, and transported him to a hospital for treatment.

II PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Amos was indicted for the capital murder of James Joe in the course of committing and attempting to commit burglary. Amos entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense and a trial followed. Bennett, as the State's key witness, testified to the foregoing facts at the guilt-innocence phase of Amos' trial. Amos also testified in his own defense, admitting in the course thereof to seven prior felony convictions, one misdemeanor conviction, and four incarcerations in the Texas Department of Corrections. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. After a separate hearing on punishment, the jury, in response to the Texas special issues submitted to it, sentenced Amos to death by lethal injection. Amos' motion for a new trial was denied following a hearing on that motion.

Amos' conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the TCCA, the state's highest appellate court for criminal appeals. In an en banc decision, that court affirmed Amos' conviction and sentence. 2 The United Amos filed his first petition for writs of habeas corpus simultaneously in the TCCA and the Criminal District Court of Dallas County (state habeas court or trial court, depending on context). The state habeas court denied Amos' petition in an order adopting the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and adding the court's own supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. The TCCA also denied Amos' petition, holding that the findings entered by the trial court were supported by the record.

States Supreme Court denied Amos' petition for writ of certiorari. 3

Amos filed a petition for federal writ of habeas corpus and stay of execution in the district court, which granted the stay pending its examination of Amos' habeas petition. In response to Amos' petition, the State filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. Following oral argument, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, dismissing Amos' petition and vacating the stay of execution. In rejecting Amos' petition, the district court held that (1) six of Amos' eleven grounds for relief were procedurally barred under state law; 4 (2) Amos' claim that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence and to correct perjured testimony was meritless; (3) Amos did not satisfy the standard necessary to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that counsel failed to a) conduct a reasonable punishment phase investigation, b) adequately voir dire the jury panel, and c) present evidence that Amos did not knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment rights; and (4) Amos showed no basis for relief on his claim challenging the Texas special issues, as interpreted and applied in his case. Amos' motion to alter or amend the district court's judgment was denied.

Amos timely filed notice of appeal to this court but the district court denied a certificate of probable cause (CPC) to appeal. Amos filed a second notice of appeal as well as another motion for CPC. Again, the district court denied Amos' motion for CPC. Amos then filed a request for CPC with this court, which was carried with this appeal. We grant Amos' request for a CPC, and proceed to the merits of his appeal.

III ANALYSIS

Amos asserts on appeal that the district court erred in (1) relying on the Texas contemporaneous objection rule as an "independent and adequate state-law ground" barring federal court review of his claim that the totality of circumstances surrounding his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial; 5 (2) denying him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the State failed to disclose material impeachment evidence and knowingly presented false testimony; and (3) denying him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his counsels' failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the punishment phase of his trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Amos did not re-urge on appeal his challenge to the Texas special issues.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the habeas proceedings of petitioners in state custody, we must accord a presumption of correctness to state

                court findings of facts. 6  We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and decide any issues of law de novo. 7  A district court's denial of federal habeas review based on a state procedural ground presents a legal question that we review de novo. 8
                
B. TEXAS' CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE--INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE?

Amos contends that the district court erroneously relied on the Texas contemporaneous objection rule as an independent and adequate state-law ground on which to deny review of many of his federal habeas claims. 9 Amos insists vigorously that the state procedural rule is not an adequate state-law ground, advancing two fundamental reasons: (1) the rule and its exceptions are not strictly or regularly followed by the TCCA, and (2) the rule is an inherently discretionary rule of procedure and therefore is per se inadequate.

1. Strictly or Regularly Followed?

A federal court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that state court rests on a state ground that is both independent of the merits of the federal claim and adequate to support that judgment. 10 This "independent and adequate state law" doctrine applies to both substantive and procedural grounds and affects federal review of claims that are raised on either direct or habeas review. 11

Procedural default does not bar federal court review of a federal claim raised in a habeas petition unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case has "clearly and expressly" indicated that its judgment is independent of federal law, e.g., rests on a state procedural bar. 12 Relevant to this appeal in this regard is a recent Supreme Court case, Sochor v. Florida, 13 in which the Court held that a state court opinion expressing that "none of the complained-of jury instructions were objected to at trial, and thus, ... are not preserved for appeal," indicates with "requisite clarity" the rejection of a federal claim based on an alternative state-law ground. 14 We note in particular that the Court reached this conclusion even though the state court opinion also expressed that, "[i]n any event, [the] claims ... have no merit." 15

In addition to being independent of federal law, a state procedural rule barring federal habeas review of a federal claim must be adequate. In general, the test for the adequacy of such a rule is that it is strictly or regularly followed by the cognizant state court. 16 The Supreme Court has further defined this concept of adequacy, however, to include a state procedural ground that is strictly or regularly applied evenhandedly to the vast majority of similar claims. 17

Federal courts will presume that there is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when that decision " 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.' " 18 Nevertheless, a judgment resting on an independent and adequate state rule of procedural default will bar federal habeas review of a federal claim if the habeas petitioner cannot show "cause" for the default and "prejudice attributed thereto," or...

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