Amos v Vanderbuilt University

Decision Date31 March 2000
Docket Number99-00998
PartiesESTATE OF JULIE AMOS and RONALD AMOS, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, INC., d/b/a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant/Appellant. AppealCOURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Filed
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Davidson Circuit No. 90C-4158

THE HONORABLE HAMILTON Y. GAYDEN, JUDGE

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED AS MODIFIED

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:

ABBY R. RUBENFELD, Rubenfeld & Associates, 2505 Hillsboro Road, Suite 201, Nashville, Tennessee 37212

A. BRUCE JONES, PATRICIA DEAN, Holland & Hart,555 Seventeenth Street, Suite 3200

Post Office Box 8749, Denver, Colorado 80201-8749,

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:

E. CLIFTON KNOWLES, JOHN S. BRYANT, STEVEN E. ANDERSON, Bass, Berry & Sims

2700 First American Center, Nashville, Tennessee 37238-2700

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

CONCUR: BEN H. CANTRELL, P.J., M.S., WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

OPINION

This case represents another chapter in a protracted suit filed by a father and mother against a healthcare provider for the alleged wrongful birth of their daughter. The child, Alison Amos, was born in September of 1989, having been infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in utero through her mother Julie.1 In 1989 an HIV positive diagnosis brought with it a myriad of possible infections, such as pneumocystis carinii. As mild as these infections might be to a healthy immune system, in an immuno-deficient environment, especially that of an infant, just one such infection could spell disaster. Two months after her birth, Alison developed pneumocystis pneumonia, a common AIDS related infection, and died four days later.

Julie Story Amos1 Alison's mother, was infected with HIV when she was transfused with four units of blood during a cosmetic operation performed at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (hereinafter Vanderbilt) in August of 1984. Vanderbilt received those units from the regional blood blank of the American Red Cross. At the time of the operation, the HIV virus had not been isolated, therefore no test was available to screen blood prior to transfusion. At that time Vanderbilt had no procedure for informing transfused patients that they had received blood during surgery.

By the Spring of 1985 the HIV virus had been isolated, and Vanderbilt, as well as many other medical facilities across the country, was actively screening the blood given to current transfusion recipients. However, many of these facilities, including Vanderbilt, elected not to identify or warn former prior transfusion recipients that they could have been exposed to the HIV virus. As a result, some of these former patients led their lives infected and unaware. Julie Story lived thus for five years. In that time she met and married Ronald Amos. Together they built a family with her two children from a previous marriage. In addition and most importantly, she gave birth to daughter Alison. Julie did not know her HIV status until after Alison was hospitalized.

I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND POSTURE

Alison died on Monday, November 28, 1989. Ron and Julie Amos, as Plaintiffs "Doe," filed suit in Davidson County Circuit Court against Vanderbilt and the American Red Cross in March of 1991. The complaint alleged, inter alia, the following:

19. At no time from March of 1985 until the present did [the Defendants] inform Plaintiff JANE DOE that she had received a transfusion of blood or that she was at risk for HIV-infection.

* * *

(Wrongful Birth)

* * *

26. As a direct and proximate result of the grossly negligent, careless and reckless acts and omissions of the Defendants and their agents, to wit, the failure of Defendants to notify Plaintiff JANE DOE that she had received a transfusion of blood and/or HIV-infected blood in 1984 and was at risk for HIV-infection, Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe failed to take precautions to prevent the birth of an HIV-infected infant.

27. As a direct and proximate result of the grossly negligent, careless and reckless conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs JANE DOE and JOHN DOE have suffered and will continue to suffer additional medical expenses, pain and suffering, disability, emotional distress, anguish, humiliation and other forms of emotional and psychological injury.

In April of 1991 the Red Cross removed the case to federal court. For reasons not germane to the issues before us, the case was remanded back to state court and again removed to federal court. After this second removal the Plaintiffs settled with the American Red Cross. The federal district court declined to exercise further jurisdiction over the case, and the cause was thus returned to state court.

Post discovery Vanderbilt successfully argued its pretrial motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to show a violation of the applicable standard of care consistent with Tennessee's Medical Malpractice Act. See Tenn. Code Ann.29-26-115. The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and on May 30, 1997, we released our opinion holding expert opinion unnecessary to establish Plaintiffs' prima facie case. This Court stated the following:

As we have stated, Vanderbilt's decision not to implement a notification policy was not "a matter of medical science or art requiring specialized skills." In so holding, we do not dispute that medical expert testimony would be important to assist a jury in determining the notification issue on the merits. However, we agree with New York's supreme court that the need for expert testimony does not always signify medical malpractice. See Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 88 N.Y.2d 784, 650 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632, 673 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1996). Under these facts, we do not think that scientific data and knowledge on which Vanderbilt relied in making the decision indicates that this case sounds in medical malpractice.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Vanderbilt was not engaging in the practice of medicine when it decided in the late 1980's not to implement a policy to notify former patients who had received blood prior to March of 1985 that they had received blood which was not tested for the HIV virus. Thus, the trial court erred in requiring the plaintiffs' expert proof to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act and it erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant when the plaintiffs failed to so comply. In light of this error, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court so that it may be considered on the merits.

Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., 958 S.W.2d 117, 122-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

No additional discovery was taken, and the case proceeded to trial. The plaintiffs presented proof regarding the alleged duty to warn Julie Amos of the possibility that she had been infected with HIV in 1984 and of the need to be tested for the virus. In addition, proof was taken concerning the manner in which Ron and Julie Amos were informed about Alison's and Julie's HIV status. The medical and funeral expenses associated with Alison's birth and death were shown to be $32,884.07.

Plaintiffs attempted to prove the emotional damage associated with Alison's birth and death, using their own testimony and the testimony of their relatives. In addition, two of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified in general terms regarding the emotional impact of an AIDS diagnosis connected with the death of a child infected in utero. While these experts testified in generalities, neither testified as to the severity of the emotional distress suffered by either Ron or Julie Amos.

Both at the close of Plaintiffs' proof and at the close of all the proof, Defendant Vanderbilt moved for a directed verdict on the emotional damages portion of the plaintiffs' claims. The court denied those motions, finding the emotional damages to be "parasitic" to the cause of action for negligence, finding direct lay testimony as to the emotional injury suffered by the plaintiffs, and taking judicial notice of the devastating emotional effect of an AIDS diagnosis on the plaintiffs. The case was thus submitted to the jury. After consideration, the jury found the following as evidenced in its verdict form:

1. Do you find the defendant Vanderbilt University negligent?

Yes: X No:

2. Do you find the defendant's negligence to be the legal cause of any injury to:

a. The estate of Julie Amos?

Yes: X No:

b. Ronald Amos?

Yes: X No:

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3. Decide the total amount of damages sustained by each plaintiff:

Estate of Julie Amos:$2,722,500

Ronald Amos: $1,639,200

Defendant Vanderbilt, now seeks relief from the jury verdict below, raising several issues on appeal. Of these issues, the Court finds the following dispositive:

1. Whether Plaintiffs Amos properly proved entitlement to damages for their emotional injury?

2. Whether Vanderbilt owed a duty to Ronald Amos to warn Julie Amos of the possibility that she had been exposed to HIV in 1984?

II.THE DUTY OWED TO RONALD AMOS

In the interest of clarity, we address Vanderbilt's second issue first. It is argued that Vanderbilt owed no duty to Mr. Amos. Absent proof of this duty, there is no negligence claim on his behalf. It is well to note that were Tennessee to recognize "wrongful birth" as a separate cause of action from one for negligence, the resolution of this issue might be different. See Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 905 (Call. App. 1984). However, Tennessee does not recognize "wrongful birth" as anything other than a claim for ordinary negligence. See Owens v. Foote, 773 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tenn. 1989). The same elements must be made out in Mr. Amos' cause as are to be made out for the estate of Julie Amos. The most troubling of these elements is duty.

Although the jury awarded Mr. Amos over a million dollars in damages, the plaintiffs failed to show that Vanderbilt owed any duty to Mr. Amos. It also bears...

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