Amstein v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 03 January 1883 |
| Citation | 134 Mass. 4 |
| Parties | Valentine Amstein v. G. C. Gardner |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued September 19, 1882
Franklin. Tort against the manager of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and the Hoosac Tunnel, for injuries occasioned to the plaintiff's horse by falling into the openings between the ties of a bridge in Buckland over which the railroad passed. After the former decision, reported 132 Mass. 28, the case was tried in the Superior Court, before Knowlton, J. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff alleged exceptions, which appear in the opinion.
Exceptions sustained.
H Winn, for the plaintiff.
C. Delano, for the defendant.
The principal question in this case is, whether an action can be maintained against the defendant, as manager of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and the Hoosac Tunnel, to recover for an injury which occurred in consequence of defective construction, which was the work of his predecessor in office; or in consequence of the omission of his predecessor to build a necessary cattle-guard or barrier to keep animals from entering upon the railroad and passing along the track or the lands on the sides thereof, the presiding judge having ruled that the defendant might be held responsible for damages caused by the defective construction of the railroad while he was manager, but not for damages caused by such construction which was the work of a former manager. It is contended by the defendant, that such liability only exists in any case for negligence or default of the manager in reference to things which he could control without going to the Governor and Council for means or authority, as, for example, the selection and employment of men, the management of switches, &c.; and especially that this action, if maintainable at all, can only be maintained against the former manager. But an examination of the statutes has satisfied us that neither of these grounds of defence is well founded.
The legislation material to be considered began in 1875. At this time the railroad and tunnel were nearly ready to be opened for business. By the St. of 1875, c. 77, § 1, a manager was to be appointed "to take charge of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and the Hoosac Tunnel, and manage the same in behalf of the Commonwealth." He was to be removable at the pleasure of the Governor and Council; and, in case of a vacancy from any cause, the vacancy was to be filled by a new appointment. The manager was to be "held responsible in person and property, for all damages sustained by any person or persons recoverable by law in consequence of the mismanagement of said railroad or tunnel, to the same extent as a railroad corporation established by this Commonwealth would be liable," and to be entitled to receive, from the earnings of said railroad and tunnel, compensation for the damages recovered against him, and costs incident thereto. By § 2, he was to supervise the completion and arching of the tunnel, "and the renovation of the said Troy and Greenfield Railroad." By § 3, the Governor and Council were to have "the said Troy and Greenfield Railroad renovated and relocated as far as they shall deem it advisable to adapt it for the transmission of passengers and freight." By § 5, reasonable tolls were to be prescribed by the Governor and Council, for the passage of cars with freight and passengers, &c.; and, in fixing such tolls, "due regard shall be had. . . . to the development of business, as well as to the cost of said tunnel." The St. of 1876, c. 150, § 6, provided that the manager, under the direction of the Governor and Council and with their approval, "shall have and exercise the power and authority conferred upon railroad corporations by the general railroad act" of 1874, for the purposes expressed in said act and a preceding one, viz. in renovating and relocating the road. Under the St. of 1878, c. 191, § 1, whenever judgment is recovered in an action for damages against the manager, under or by virtue of the provisions of the St. of 1875, c. 77, "no execution therefor shall be issued against the person or property of the said manager, but said judgment shall be paid out of the earnings of the road, in the hands of the treasurer" thereof; "and the manager shall be entitled to retain from the earnings of said road such sums as will be sufficient to pay and satisfy such judgment." By the St. of 1879, c. 141, § 1, it was provided that the treasurer of the railroad company should every month or oftener pay to the treasurer of the Commonwealth all moneys received on account of said railroad and tunnel, and should every month deliver to the auditor of the Commonwealth bills of all dues that might have become payable on account of said railroad and tunnel; and, when allowed, the amounts of such bills might be paid upon the warrants of the Governor and Council. By § 2, the manager was required to make a report to the Legislature annually of his doings, and of the earnings and expenses of said railroad and tunnel, with a detailed estimate of all sums to be required for the year next ensuing. The St. of 1880, c. 261, § 1, provided that the tolls fixed under the St. of 1875, c. 77, might be a proportionate part of the gross receipts of the railroad corporation using said railroad and tunnel; and § 3 authorized the manager, by direction of the Governor and Council, to make contracts with connecting railroads for the purpose of constituting through lines, and, in making such contracts, to agree to accept a pro rata of the through rates upon freight and passengers via such through lines.
Such was the state of the legislation at the time when the accident happened which is the subject of the present action and the question to be determined is a question of the true construction of the statutes. It is urged, in behalf of the defendant, that the Commonwealth cannot be impleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent, clearly manifested by an act of the Legislature. But, without now considering how far this doctrine is applicable to its agents and servants, we are of the opinion that the Legislature intended to give its consent that the manager of its railroad might be sued in cases like the present. In undertaking the operation of the railroad, it is reasonable to think that the same responsibilities were intended to be assumed as ordinary railroad corporations are obliged to assume. The first section of the St. of 1875, c. 77, recognizes and declares this intention. The Legislature might well deem it a narrow policy for the State to undertake such management, without making adequate provision for meeting the ordinary responsibilities which are incident to this kind of business. Many of these are imposed by the common law on all common carriers of passengers and goods. Their expediency and wisdom have been recognized by the...
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Sargent Cnty. v. State
...the corporation and exercises no power or privilege in respect to those transactions not derived from the charter. Likewise, in Amstein v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 4, where a railroad and tunnel line was created and operated pursuant to legislative enactment subject to executive control and super......
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Sargent County v. State of North Dakota Doing Business
...its sovereignty and exercises no power or privilege in respect to those transactions not derived from the charter. Likewise, in Amstein v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 4, where a and tunnel line was created and operated pursuant to legislative enactment subject to executive control and supervision, i......
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City of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen.
...of the Troy & Greenfield Railroad was taken over by the Commonwealth. Troy & Greenfield Railroad v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43;Amstein v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 4. Property invested in street railways by private investors becomes thereby affected with a public interest. Donham v. Public Service......
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Harrington v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (In Re Boston Elevated Ry. Co.)
...51 N. E. 460;Walker v. Williamson, 205 Mass. 514, 91 N. E. 885;Lynch v. Larivee Lumber Co., 223 Mass. 335, 340, 111 N. E. 861;Amstein v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 4, 9;Spokane & Inland R. R. v. United States, 241 U. S. 344, 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 668, 60 L. Ed. 1037. It involved, as a necessary element ......