Anastasi v. Zoning Commission of City of Bristol

• Decision Date: 24 May 1972
• Citation: 302 A.2d 258,163 Conn. 187
• Parties: Joseph ANASTASI v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the CITY OF BRISTOL et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 258

302 A.2d 258

163 Conn. 187

Joseph ANASTASI v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the CITY OF BRISTOL et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

May 24, 1972.

Maxwell Heiman, Bristol, with whom, on the brief, were Thomas J. O'Donnell, Charles L. Furey, Theodore M. Donovan and William J. Eddy, Bristol, for appellants (defendant David Friedman and others).

Kenneth J. Laska, Plainville, for appellant (named defendant).

Sherwood Anderson, III, Bristol, with whom, on the brief, were Frederick W. Beach, George T. Calder and Richard H. Alden, Bristol, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and RYAN, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and MacDONALD, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Associate Justice.

On May 24, 1968, the defendants David and Abraham Friedman, hereinafter called the applications, filed an application with the defendant zoning commission of the city of Bristol seeking a special exception for the erection of a building on land located on the northerly side of Pine Street and to be used in whole or in part as a package store. Following a public hearing held on June 12, 1968, the commission unanimously voted to grant the application. The plaintiff appealed therefrom to the Court of Common Pleas which rendered judgment sustaining the appeal. The defendants have appealed from that judgment, assigning as error certain conclusions reached by the court, the failure of the court of reach certain conclusions, and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff.

The court's findings of facts is unattacked and included therein are these facts: The applicant filed an application for a special exception to permit the erection of a store for the sale of liquor for off-premises consumption. The proposed premises were to have off-street parking in front, rear and side with room for trucks to come off the street to unload, turn around and exit. On June 12, 1968, the commission conducted a hearing on the application and on that date granted it. The commission gave as its reason for its decision: '(T) he situation in this particular application is entirely different from the previous one.' The minutes of the previous application referred to at the hearing were not placed in the record of this case. Section 6A(4) of the Bristol zoning ordinances makes provisions for special exceptions. ¹ Among the conclusions reached by the court and attacked by the defendants are the following: The commission did not have before it at the hearing sufficient evidence to justify granting the application; and that in granting the application, the commission acted arbitrarily, illegally and in abuse of the discretion vested in it.

We point out that the record before us is barren as to any prior application nor does anything appear that points to what was the difference 'from the previous one.' The appendix to the defendants' brief discloses that in behalf of the applicants the commission had before it only a statement by the attorney for the applicants, made at the hearing before the commission, describing the type of their proposed building; that they were tenants and wished to build their own store; that the location is near Accurate Brass and that there will be open space between the proposed building and Accurate Brass; that their present location is inadequate; that there would be off-street parking and provision made for truck unloading; that sidewalks will be built and traffic control will be improved; and that the new location is more remote (from the school). The record discloses the minutes of the meeting of the commission of June 12, 1968. ²

The terms 'special exception' and 'special permit' hold the same legal import and can be used interchangeably. Summ v. Zoning Commission, 150 Conn. 79, 87, 186 A.2d 160. 'In making a determination on a special permit, a zoning authority is to consider the standards provided in the zoning regulations themselves and the conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values. See General Statutes § 8-2; Powers v. Common Council, 154 Conn. 156, 161, 222 A.2d 337; Summ v. Zoning...