Summ v. Zoning Commission of Town of Ridgefield

Decision Date06 November 1962
Citation150 Conn. 79,186 A.2d 160
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesJeanne E. SUMM et al. v. ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

John V. Donnelly, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff Jed co.).

W. Bradley Morehouse, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Paul C. Shafer, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellants (named plaintiff and others).

Romeo G. Petroni, Ridgefield, with whom was Reed F. Shields, Ridgefield, for appellee (defendant).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs have appealed from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing their appeal from the action of the defendant commission in amending the zoning regulations of Ridgefield to permit the use of land by research and development laboratories under a special permit to be issued by the commission.

Zoning was adopted in Ridgefield in 1946, pursuant to what is now chapter 124 of the General Statutes. The zoning commission thereafter adopted zoning regulations and divided the town into zoning districts. In December, 1960, the regulations were amended by adding § 9A, authorizing the commission, subject to specified standards and conditions, to issue a special permit for the use of land for research and development laboratories in any zone in the town. A research and development laboratory is defined as a 'private commercial enterprise engaged exclusively in the pursuit of scientific research and development, including research concerning, and development of, manufactured, processed or compounded products.' There are extensive provisions concerning the buildings, structures, facilities and equipment which can be used on property for which a special permit for a research and development laboratory has been issued. Commercial manufacture, production or fabrication of products for sale, lease or disposition other than for testing purposes is expressly forbidden. Also prohibited is the use of land for any laboratory which might create a risk of harm or damage to persons, structures or plant growth beyond the boundaries of the land. Safeguards are established to prevent any use which would cause noise, smoke, dust, odor and certain other specified conditions which are generally considered to be objectionable in a modern residential neighborhood.

Among the exacting requirements to be met to obtain a special permit are the following: Each property must consist of an area of at least forty acres in single ownership; the area which can be covered by buildings is limited; the height of structures and their location on the land with relation to street lines, side-lot lines and rear-lot lines are restricted; prescribed space to park motor vehicles must be provided; buildings, structures and parking areas must be screened by trees, shrubbery or other means so as substantially to conceal them from surrounding properties at all seasons of the year; special conditions concerning access to and egress from the premises must be met; on the issuance of a special permit, the premises must be devoted exclusively to the use specified, together with the uses accessory thereto; plans concerning sanitary conditions on the premises must be submitted to the town director of health; the applicant must furnish to the commission any information reasonably required by it to enable it to determine whether the proposed use meets the requirements for a special permit. The regulation contains a provision that it shall be construed and administered so as to promote the health, safety, and economic and general welfare of the town as a whole and so as to minimize any detriment to the convenience and property values of property owners in the vicinity. The commission is required in each case, before it issues a permit, to find as a fact that such objectives are met. If a permit is issued, the commission is given continuing authority to inspect the premises at all reasonable times thereafter and to enforce continued compliance with the regulation and with the requirements of the permit. Authority to permit the use of land for laboratories is limited to a total of 240 acres in the entire town.

The action of the zoning commission in adopting the amendment was unanimous. In accordance with § 8-3a of the General Statutes, when the amendment was proposed, it was referred to the planning commission for consideration, and that commission voted unanimously to recommend its adoption by the zoning commission.

The plaintiffs, as owners of residential property in the town, could be adversely affected by the adoption of § 9A of the regulations, if it involved a change in the comprehensive plan of zoning for the town, and are therefore entitled to appeal, as aggrieved persons, from the action of the commission. Mills v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 237, 241, 140 A.2d 871. The plaintiffs claim that the zoning commission, in adopting § 9A, exceeded the powers vested in it by the 1959 Public Acts, No. 614, § 2, which amended § 8-2 of the General Statutes. Section 8-2 authorizes the zoning commission of each municipality to regulate the use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes; to divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be best suited to carry out the purposes of zoning; and to regulate within such districts the erection, construction, reconstruction or alteration of buildings or structures and the use of land. Prior to 1959, § 8-2 also contained the following provision: 'All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings or structures throughout each district, but the regulatins in one district may differ from those in another district.' For many years, this quoted language had remained unchanged. Public Acts 1925, c. 242, § 2; Rev.1930, § 424; Rev.1949, § 837. By the 1959 Public Acts, No. 614, § 2, it was amended to read: 'All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings, structures or use of land throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in another district, and may provide that certain classes or kinds of buildings, structures or use of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit or special exception from a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, whichever commission or board the regulations may designate, subject to standards set forth in the regulations and to conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values.'

The amendment of § 8-2 of the General Statutes in 1959 was subsequent to the decision of this court in Pecora v. Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48, wherein we reviewed the action of the zoning commission of Trumbull in changing the zoning of a tract of land from residence to commercial, thereby authorizing its use for a regional shopping center. The zoning commission in that case attached to the land in question certain special and additional requirements not applicable in other commercial zones in Trumbull. The claim was made that the commission in attaching these special requirements violated the portion of § N10 of the November, 1955, Supplement, the then existing statute, which required that '[a]ll * * * regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings or structures throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in another district.' We held that this provision of the statute related only to buildings or structures and that the requirements imposed by the zoning commission of Trumbull affected the land itself. We concluded (p. 441, 144 A.2d p. 51) that the special requirements imposed by the commission really affected the land use rather than any buildings or structures and that therefore the commission did not act in violation of the statute. The claim was also made in the Pecora case that the special requirements could not be imposed by the commission under the zoning regulations because they fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals. In answer to this claim, we said (p. 442, 144 A.2d p. 52) that there was nothing to show that the grant of power to the zoning board of appeals to make such requirements was an exclusive one.

The Pecora case was decided in July, 1958. We can assume that the legislature was aware of the interpretation which we placed on the statute. Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 63, 111 A.2d 4; Forman Schools, Inc. v. Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 6, 54 A.2d 710; Stamford v. Stamford, 107 Conn. 596, 606, 141 A. 891. The plain purpose of the legislature in adopting the 1959 amendment to § 8-2 of the General Statutes was to provide a means by which the result reached by us in the Pecora case could be accomplished whether the zoning requirement affected buildings and structures or land uses. The insertion of the phrase 'or use of land' in the third sentence of § 8-2 is clear evidence of an intention to require that regulations for the use of land, like regulations for each class of buildings or structures, be uniform. This change in the statute was made to eliminate the distinction which had been drawn by us in the Pecora case. At the same time, however, the legislature added the provision authorizing the adoption by a zoning commission of regulations which would allow a use subject to standards set forth in the regulations and under special conditions, after the obtaining of a special permit. The power of local zoning authorities was thus broadened, and they were allowed to impose certain standards and conditions on the use of property when the public interest required it. Under the amended statute, the zoning commission could by regulation reserve to itself or delegate to any of the other specified agencies power to grant the special permit or special...

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