Anastasio v. Scheer

• Decision Date: 22 May 1997
• Citation: 239 A.D.2d 823,658 N.Y.S.2d 467
• Parties: Helen K. ANASTASIO et al., Appellants, v. Patricia SCHEER et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 467

658 N.Y.S.2d 467

239 A.D.2d 823

Helen K. ANASTASIO et al., Appellants, v. Patricia SCHEER et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

May 22, 1997.

John A. Aretakis, New York City, for appellants.

Edward C. Fassett (Nancy May-Skinner of Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Napierski & Maloney, of counsel), Albany, for respondents.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MIKOLL, MERCURE, CREW and CASEY, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Czajka, J.), entered February 16, 1996 in Albany County, which granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.

Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff Helen K. Anastasio (hereinafter plaintiff) in an August 15, 1990 motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Hillcrest Avenue and Berkshire Boulevard in the City of Albany. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was traveling in a northbound direction on Hillcrest Avenue and defendant Patricia Scheer (hereinafter defendant) was operating her vehicle in an eastbound direction on Berkshire Boulevard. When plaintiff came to the intersection, which was controlled by a stop sign for traffic on Hillcrest Avenue only, she first brought her car to a full stop and then, because her view to the left (west) was obstructed by hedges, a mailbox, a telephone pole and a number of parked cars, inched forward and came to a second stop. Plaintiff then proceeded into the intersection, directly into the path of defendant's vehicle, which struck plaintiff's vehicle on the left side. Ultimately, the action came on for trial and, at the end of plaintiffs' case, Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.

We agree with Supreme Court's conclusion that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendants were in any part liable for the accident (see, Rhabb v. New York City Hous. Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 200, 202, 391 N.Y.S.2d 540, 359 N.E.2d 1335; Matter of Soltys, 199 A.D.2d 846, 847, 606 N.Y.S.2d 364, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 754, 612 N.Y.S.2d 108, 634 N.E.2d 604; Van Syckle v. Powers, 106 A.D.2d 711, 713, 483 N.Y.S.2d 756, lv denied 64 N.Y.2d 609, 489 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 478 N.E.2d 209). We accordingly affirm. The evidence adduced at trial establishes plaintiff's clear violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), which requires that a vehicle at a stop sign yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is approaching so closely to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time that the former is moving across or within the intersection (see Weiser v. Dalbo, 184 A.D.2d 935, 936, 585 N.Y.S.2d 124, lv dismissed 80 N.Y.2d 925, 589 N.Y.S.2d 312, 602 N.E.2d 1128; Hernandez v. Joseph, 143 A.D.2d 632, 533 N.Y.S.2d 13; Lester v. Jolicofur, 120 A.D.2d 574, 502 N.Y.S.2d 61).

In addition, there was no evidence of any culpable conduct on defendant's part. Plaintiffs' speculation that defendant may have contributed to the accident by failing to anticipate that plaintiff might improperly pull into traffic or to take appropriate evasive action is insufficient to raise an issue of fact (see, Miesing v. Whinnery, 233 A.D.2d 551, 649 N.Y.S.2d 246; Peck v. Dygon, 224 A.D.2d 744, 745, 636 N.Y.S.2d 940; Wilke v. Price, 221 A.D.2d 846, 633 N.Y.S.2d 686). The record discloses no condition that would...