And v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.

• Citation: 993 F.Supp.2d 475
• Decision Date: 24 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 12–7240 (KM).
• Parties: Helena ANDREYKO Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Paulina Andreyko Deceased, Plaintiff, v. SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING, INC. (a Virginia Corporation); Sunrise Assisted Living Management, Inc. (A Virginia Corporation); Sunrise of Edgewater, LLC (A New Jersey Limited Liability Company); John Does 1–10, (Being the persons and/or entities responsible for the injuries suffered by plaintiff), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

993 F.Supp.2d 475

Helena ANDREYKO Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Paulina Andreyko Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING, INC. (a Virginia Corporation); Sunrise Assisted Living Management, Inc. (A Virginia Corporation); Sunrise of Edgewater, LLC (A New Jersey Limited Liability Company); John Does 1–10, (Being the persons and/or entities responsible for the injuries suffered by plaintiff), Defendants.

Civ. No. 12–7240 (KM).

United States District Court,

D. New Jersey.

Jan. 24, 2014.

Gregg D. Trautmann, Esq., Trautmann & Associates, LLC, Rockaway, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Rafael Vergara, White and Williams LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION

DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge.

This case arises out of the alleged beating, mistreatment, and/or neglect suffered by a patient-resident in an assisted living facility in New Jersey. Presently before the Court is a motion for reconsideration of a previous decision which granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss. The instant motion arises out of a complaint filed by Plaintiff Helena Andreyko (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Helena”) individually and as administratrix of the estate of her late mother Paulina Andreyko (hereinafter “Paulina”) regarding treatment at an assisted living facility managed by Defendants Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (“SSLI”), Sunrise Senior Living Management, Inc. (“Sunrise Management”) (formerly known as Sunrise Assisted Living Management), Sunrise of Edgewater LLC,¹ and John Does 1–10 (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Sunrise Management manages and operates the Sunrise of Edgewater assisted living facility at issue, and is a wholly owned subsidiary of SSLI. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are set forth in full by the Court in its October 24, 2013 opinion. ( See Oct. 24, 2013 Op., ECF 23, 2013 WL 5774129.) In essence, Paulina required assistance in her activities of daily living as a result of dementia. She resided at the Sunrise of Edgewater living facility from about March 2005 until her death on June 25, 2010 at the age of 94. The crux of the underlying Complaint is based on allegations that on or about January 31, 2009, Paulina was beaten, mistreated, and/or neglected by the Sunrise staff. Her daughter Helena observed facial and head bruising for two consecutive days, and arranged for Paulina to be brought to a hospital so that her wounds could be treated. Due to Paulina's dementia, she was unable to describe how her face and head had been bruised. Thereafter, Helena hired private aids to care for Paulina overnight.

The Complaint asserts that regardless of whether Paulina was the victim of abuse and neglect or whether Sunrise failed to provide the staffing levels necessary to ensure it met its contractual obligations, Sunrise is liable for the injuries Paulina suffered while a resident there. First, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for breach of contract pursuant to the written Resident Agreement to provide basic and “Assisted Living Plus” care, and request compensatory damages, cost of suit, attorney fees, and equitable relief. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants violated the New Jersey Nursing Home Responsibilities & Rights of Residents Act, N.J.S.A. § 30:13–1 et seq. (hereinafter “NHRRRA”), by failing to provide Paulina with a safe and decent living environment that recognizes her dignity and individuality. Plaintiff thus requests compensatory damages and punitive damages, cost of suit, attorney fees, and such relief which the court deems proper.

On November 21, 2012, Defendants SSLI and Sunrise Management petitioned for removal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County. On December 19, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss both the breach of contract claim (count one) and the statutory violation claim (count two). First, Defendants contended that the applicable statute of limitations for a personal injury action should apply, and thus Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is properly considered a tort which has a shorter statute of limitations that has expired. Second, Defendants argued that the NHRRRA is inapplicable. Third, Defendants submitted that SSLI is not liable for any possible negligence because a corporate parent is not liable for the actions of its subsidiary and because Plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts to indicate SSLI's involvement. Fourth, Defendants argued that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend her complaint to cure any deficiencies.

On October 24, 2013, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Oct. 24, 2013 Op., ECF 23.) The Court's reasoning is set forth in additional detail below. First, the Court granted the dismissal of count one for breach of contract because the essence of the action is for personal injury, and thus the statute of limitations expired. Second, the Court denied the dismissal of count two because the Court originally interpreted assisted living facilities as covered by the NHRRRA. Last, the Court granted without prejudice the dismissal of SSLI as a party to the action because Plaintiff failed to establish sufficient factual allegations to pierce the corporate veil.

On November 7, 2013 Defendants petitioned the Court for reconsideration. Defendants pressed for reconsideration on the basis that the Court overlooked two legal issues: (i) that the applicable two-year statute of limitations bars all claims in this case, including the now outstanding NHRRRA claim, and (ii) that assisted living facilities are not covered by the NHRRRA in the first place. In the event that the Court declines Defendants' request for reconsideration, Defendants request that the Court certify its ruling for interlocutory appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for guidance by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on these issues.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the District of New Jersey, motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) and are considered “extremely limited procedural vehicle(s).” Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J.1992). As a result, “reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, that is granted ‘very sparingly[.]’ ” Brackett v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 03–3988(WJM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21312, 2003 WL 22303078, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (quoting Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 215 F.Supp.2d 482, 507 (D.N.J.2002)).

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek reconsideration by the Court of matters which the party “believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked”when it ruled on the motion. See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). The movant has the burden of demonstrating either: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.1995)). The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where its prior decision has overlooked a factual or legal issue that may alter the disposition of the matter. See United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 339, 345 (D.N.J.1999); see also L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). “The word ‘overlooked’ is the operative term in the Rule.” Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F.Supp.2d 610, 612 (D.N.J.2001) (citation omitted).

Moreover, L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to restate arguments which the court has already considered. See G–69 v. Degnan, 748 F.Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J.1990). Thus, a difference of opinion with the court's decision should be dealt with through the normal appellate process. See e.g., Bowers, 130 F.Supp.2d at 612 (citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F.Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J.1988); NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J.1996) ( “Reconsideration motions ... may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”). In other words, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.” Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511, 533 (D.N.J.1998) (citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

1. The Statute of Limitations

The Court previously dismissed the breach of contract claim because the essence of the action is for personal injury. ( See Oct. 24, 2013 Op., ECF 23.) After examining relevant case law, the Court looked to N.J.S.A. § 2A:14–2, which provides:

Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.

N.J.S.A. § 2A:14–2 (emphasis added).

Additionally, the Court noted that pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 2A:31–3, survivorship actions for wrongful death must commence within two years after the death of the decedent, except in the case of certain exceptions which are not applicable here. (Op. at 8).

Here, Paulina suffered injuries on or around January 31, 2009 and died on June 25, 2010.² The Court concluded:

This action commenced on August 21, 2012. Even if the Court were to apply the statute of limitations from the date of death, the applicable statute of limitations expired approximately two months prior to the filing of this action. “[T]he statute of limitations under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2 applies to actions for personal injuries, regardless of whether they arise out of tort or breach of contract.” Rothman v. Silber, 83 N.J.Super. 192, 197 (Law Div.1964) ( citing Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37 (1956 [1955] ), Tackling v. Chrysler Corp., 77 N.J.Super. 12 ( Law Div. 1962...