Tackling v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1962
• Docket Number: No. L--5764,L--5764
• Citation: 77 N.J.Super. 12,185 A.2d 238
• Parties: Prosper TACKLING and Katherine Tackling, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and Frank Van Syckle, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 12

77 N.J.Super. 12

185 A.2d 238

Prosper TACKLING and Katherine Tackling, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and Frank Van Syckle, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendants.

No. L--5764.

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division.

Oct. 19, 1962.

[185 A.2d 239] John T. Lynch, Westfield, for plaintiffs (Davidson, Buttermore & Lynch, Westfield, attorneys).

James M. Shashaty, Upper Montclair, for defendant Chrysler Corporation (Schreiber, Lancaster & Demos, Newark, attorneys).

Eugene W. Landy, New Brunswick, for defendant Frank Van Syckle, Inc. (Durand, Ivins & Carton, Asbury Park, attorneys).

HALPERN, A.J.S.C. (orally).

This is plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, to add two counts charging the defendant, Chrysler Corporation, with breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The original claims against the defendant Chrysler are grounded in negligence, alleging negligence in the manufacture and assembly of the automobile.

The alleged accident and injury occurred on August 4, 1958. The female plaintiff alleges that while driving a newly purchased automobile, the left front wheel fell off, causing the car to come to an abrupt stop and resulting in personal injuries to her. Her husband sues Per quod.

The issues to be decided on this motion are:

1. What is the limitation time period within which to bring the actions sought to be added by the amendment?

2. Do the proposed amendments to the complaint set forth new causes of action which cannot now be introduced?

FIRST ISSUE

It is clear that where an action is brought for personal injuries, whether the physical injury arises out of tort or contract, the applicable statute of limitations would be two years. N.J.S. 2A:14--2, N.J.S.A. Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37, 118 A.2d 544 (1955). The six-year statute of limitations (N.J.S. 2A:14--1, N.J.S.A.) which is applicable to breach of warranty actions is applied only where the relief sought is for contractual damages. See John S. Sills & Sons v. Bridgeton Condensed Milk Co., 43 F.2d 72 (3 Cir., 1930); Berg v. Remington Arms Co., 207 F.Supp. 65 (D.Pa.1962)

In the instant case the physical injury was sustained by the plaintiff on August 4, 1958, and this would be the date the cause of action for personal injuries based on the alleged breach of implied warranty of merchantability came into being; and, therefore, would normally be barred by the statute of limitations on August 4, 1960. The Per quod claim of the husband which arises out of and flows from the wife's claim, would likewise be barred by the statute of limitations. It is interesting to note that in the Berg case, supra, the court held that in a personal injury suit arising out of an implied warranty, and where the statute of limitations was two and six years as in New Jersey, the cause of action which accrued first was the one that started the applicable limitations period to run. See also Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962), where this same issue existed but was not raised or passed upon by the court.

SECOND ISSUE

In determining whether the proposed amendments are barred by the statute of limitations I must decide whether they state or bring into the case a new cause of action. If the answer is in the affirmative then, as I decided under the first issue, the statute of limitations would bar the amendments. If the answer is in the negative, then the statute of limitations would not bar them and I would be relegated to the exercise of my judicial discretion in passing on the motion.

The rule of court governing amendments to pleadings provides:

R.R. 4:15--3:

'Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading; but the court, in addition to its power to allow amendments may, upon terms, permit the statement of a new or different claim or defense in the pleading.'

This rule embodies former statutes which were not re-enacted. 2 C.S., 2817 and 2818, secs. 23 and 24; R.S. 2:27--132 (not re-enacted).

A construction of the rule to determine whether an amendment arose out of the allegations originally pleaded is really tested by deciding whether the amendment states a new cause of action or merely restates the original one in different form. 34 Am.Jur., 211, par. 260.

Certainly one cannot, under the pretext of amending a complaint, state a new or different cause of action from the one originally pleaded.

However, courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to save actions, if possible, from the bar of the statute of limitations. Courts should disregard subtleties and answer technical objections by an honest effort to determine the real issues on their merits and to do substantial justice between litigants. See 34 Am.Jur. 214.

Several tests or guides have been pronounced by various courts and text writers to determine whether an amendment states a new cause of action. For example, if the same evidence would support a judgment rendered on...