Anders v. Cal. State Univ., Fresno
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00179-AWI-BAM |
| Parties | TAYLOR ANDERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FRESNO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (DOC. NO. 88)
Plaintiffs Taylor Anders, Hennessey Evans, Abbigayle Roberts, Megan Walaitis, Tara Weir and Courtney Walburger (together “Plaintiffs”) bring a motion for class certification under Rules[1] 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. No. 88. The motion has been fully briefed and deemed suitable for decision without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). Doc. No. 92. Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefing and other relevant portions of the record, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice.
In the 2020-21 academic year, Defendant California State University Fresno (“Fresno State”) sponsored eight varsity sports for men and 13 varsity sports for women. Doc. No. 19 at 8:14-18;[2] Doc. No. 19-2 at 19. Each of these sports is segregated by sex. Doc. No. 19-2 at 19. On October 16 2020, Fresno State announced it would stop offering men's wrestling, men's tennis and women's lacrosse at the end of the current 2020-21 academic year. Doc. No. 2-1 at 6:13-18.
On February 12, 2021, Anders, Evans, Roberts, Walaitis and Weir filed this class action (as members of Fresno State's women's varsity lacrosse team) against Fresno State and certain Fresno State administrators (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) and implementing regulations by failing to provide female students an equal opportunity to participate in varsity athletics (the “effective accommodation” claim); failing to provide female athletes with an equal allocation of financial aid (the “financial aid” claim); and failing to provide female athletes with benefits comparable to those provided to male athletes (the “equal treatment” claim). Doc. No. 1. On February 12, 2021, Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction barring Fresno State from cutting women's lacrosse-or any other women's team-and requiring Fresno State “to treat the women's lacrosse team and its members fairly” during the pendency of this litigation. Doc. No. 2-1 at 6:5-9. The Court granted the motion as to equal treatment of the women's lacrosse team but did not bar elimination of the women's lacrosse team. Doc. No. 35.
On May 3, 2021, a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed, adding Walburger as a sixth Plaintiff. See Doc. No. 36 & 41. On May 15, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety-including the effective accommodation claim, the financial aid claim, and the equal treatment claim. Doc. No. 42. The motion was granted, with leave to amend, as to the financial aid claim and denied as to the effective accommodation claim and the equal treatment claim. Doc. No. 57 at 30.
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on August 12, 2021 seeking to state a financial aid claim, Doc. No. 59, and on October 29, 2021, the Court granted, with prejudice, Defendants' motion to dismiss the financial aid claim on a finding that, properly construed, data cited by the Plaintiffs showed that female student-athletes received a disproportionate share of athletic scholarships at Fresno State. Doc. Nos. 60 & 73.
Defendants answered the SAC on November 19, 2021, Doc. No. 74, and on February 25, 2022, Plaintiffs brought the instant motion for class certification. Doc. No. 88.
In this motion, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure of a class defined as follows:
All present and future women students and potential students at Fresno State who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics there.
Doc. No. 88 at 2:15-20. Further, they seek appointment of two Plaintiffs-Anders and Walburger-as class representatives and appointment of Bailey & Glasser, LLP as class counsel. Id. at 2:8-12.
Plaintiffs argue, in the main, that class certification is warranted because the sex discrimination alleged in this action is “inherently class-based” and that “the proposed class representatives will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent the interests of the class.” See Doc. No. 88-1 at 22:17-20, 25:22-24. Defendants argue that the proposed class is overbroad and that none of the four prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a) have been satisfied. See Doc. No. 90.
A class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a class action, one or more class members may “litigate on behalf of many absent class members, and those class members are bound by the outcome of the representative's litigation.” 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 1:1 (5th ed.) (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921)).
Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth a two-part framework for deciding whether a class may be certified for representative litigation. See Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 254 F.R.D. 102, 107 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
First, Rule 23(a) asks whether a proposed class action satisfies each of the following four requirements: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).
Assuming all four of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites are satisfied, the second step of the analysis addresses whether the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), Rule 23(b)(2), or Rule 23(b)(3). See Kanawi, 254 F.R.D. at 107. Here, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows for a class action to be maintained where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
A court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether all applicable requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) have been satisfied. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The merits of the class members' substantive claims are generally irrelevant to this analysis, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 17778 (1974), but courts are “at liberty to consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the evidence may also relate to the underlying merits of the case.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A court takes “the substantive allegations of the complaint as true,” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975), and a court is not limited to considering only admissible evidence in deciding a motion for class certification. Sali v. Corona Reg'l Med. Ctr., 909 F.3d 996, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed, 139 S.Ct. 1651 (2019).
Courts apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in deciding motions for class certification, Martin v. Sysco Corporation, 325 F.R.D. 343, 354 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted), and the proponent of class treatment bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that class certification is warranted. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011); see also, Kanawi, 254 F.R.D. at 107 (“The party seeking certification must provide facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).” (citing Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1977)).
If a court decides to certify a class, the court must issue a certification order defining “the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel” under Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A)-(B).
When “a class is defined so broadly as to include a great number of members who for some reason could not have been harmed by the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, the class is defined too broadly to permit certification.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 669 (9th Cir. 2022) (). The Court will therefore begin by reviewing the scope of the proposed class. See Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ., 297 F.Supp.3d 929, 942 (D. Minn. 2018) (); see also, Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 1996 WL 328446, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996) (assessing proper scope of class in light of allegations in the complaint prior to conducting point-by-point Rule 23 analysis); Lundquist v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that courts are “not bound by the class definition proposed in the complaint” (quoting Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 937 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Defendants argue that the “proposed class definition sweeps far too broadly” because: (i) it “includes no requirement that a class member have experienced any actual harm from Fresno State's athletic policies or...
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