Anders v. California State University, 1:21-cv-00179-AWI-BAM
| Decision Date | 22 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00179-AWI-BAM |
| Parties | TAYLOR ANDERS, HENNESSEY EVANS, ABBIGAYLE ROBERTS, MEGAN WALAITIS, TARA WEIR, and COURTNEY WALBURGER, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FRESNO and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
On February 12, 2021, Plaintiffs Taylor Anders, Hennessey Evans Abbigayle Roberts, Megan Walaitis and Tara Weir filed this putative class action alleging several violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) against California State University, Fresno (“Fresno State”); Fresno State's athletic director Terrence Tumey; Fresno State's former president Joseph Castro; and Fresno State's interim president, as of January 4, 2021, Saul Jiménez-Sandoval. Doc. No. 1. On May 12, 2021, the Court denied a motion to dismiss the Complaint as moot because Plaintiffs had filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 3, 2021. Doc. Nos. 36 & 41.
The FAC adds Courtney Walburger, who was also a member of Fresno State's women's lacrosse team during the 2020-21 academic years as a Plaintiff and alleges three Title IX claims against Fresno State and the California State University Board of Trustees (the “Board” and together with Fresno State “Defendants”).[1] Doc. No. 36. On May 17, 2021, the Board brought a motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety.[2] The motion has been fully briefed and the Court has deemed it suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). See Doc. No 47. After thoroughly reviewing all relevant filings, the Court will deny the motion in part and grant the motion in part.
BACKGROUND[3]
In the 2020-21 academic year, Fresno State sponsored men's baseball, basketball, track, football, golf, tennis, and wrestling teams. Doc. No. 36 ¶ 101. During the same period, Fresno State sponsored women's basketball, track, equestrian, golf, lacrosse, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, and water polo teams. Id. Each of these sports is segregated based on sex. Id. On October 16, 2020, Fresno State announced it would eliminate women's lacrosse, men's tennis and men's wrestling, with effect at the end of the 2020-21 academic year. Id. ¶ 2.
Fresno State's athletic program is subject to Title IX because Fresno State receives federal funding. Doc. No. 36 ¶ 5. All Plaintiffs were members of Fresno State's women's lacrosse team during the 2020-21 academic year. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37, 42, 52, 58 and 63. Plaintiffs allege Fresno State has not provided females with opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics that are substantially proportionate to their undergraduate enrollment for years and that the condition will persist after the elimination of women's lacrosse, men's tennis and men's wrestling takes effect. Id. ¶¶ 84, 116. They further allege Fresno State has failed to provide adequate funding for women's athletic scholarships relative to the funding provided for men's athletic scholarship and that the women's lacrosse team has been treated worse than men's teams in several respects ranging from facilities to coaching. Id. ¶¶ 16-24.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring putative class action claims against Defendants for: (i) failure “to provide female students an equal opportunity to participate in varsity intercollegiate athletics in violation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. §106.41(c)(1), ” Doc. No. 36 ¶ 228; (ii) failure to “provide female student-athletes at Fresno State with an equal allocation of athletic financial assistance” in violation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.37, id. ¶ 245; and (iii) failure to “provide female student-athletes at Fresno State with an equal allocation” of athletic benefits (such as equipment, supplies and uniforms) in violation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10). Id. ¶ 251.
In the motion at bar, the Board seeks dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)[4] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, to some extent, for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). See Doc. No. 42.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a cause of action may be dismissed where a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to allege sufficient facts, a complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Compliance with this rule ensures that the defendant has “fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 663.
In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015); Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2008). But the Court is “not ‘required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.' ” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). Rather, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). If a motion to dismiss is granted, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Henry A. v Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
“[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). “[T]o satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). “[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Id. (citing Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1087 n.6 (9th Cir.2011)).
Title IX states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ….” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). At the direction of Congress, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (the predecessor of today's Department of Education) issued regulations for Title IX that took effect in 1975.[5] See 34 C.F.R. §106.1.
Regulations applying Title IX to athletics are set forth at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1) and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41. These regulations establish a “bipartite regulatory framework” for athletics that requires educational institutions receiving federal funds to provide members of both sexes (1) equal athletic financial assistance (scholarships) and (2) equal athletic opportunity. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F.Supp.2d 414, 435 (D. Conn. 2013) (“Biediger I”).
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c), which applies to athletic opportunity, states that recipients of federal funds that operate athletic programs “shall...
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