Anders v. Nash, 19214
| Decision Date | 29 April 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 19214,19214 |
| Citation | 256 S.C. 102,180 S.E.2d 878 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Kate ANDERS, Respondent, v. Agnes NASH and Norwood Nash, a Minor Over Fourteen (14) Years of Age, Appellants. Joe ANDERS, Respondent, v. Agnes NASH and Norwood Nash, a Minor Over Fourteen (14) Years of Age, Appellants. |
Ralph Hoffman and Suggs & McCutcheon, Conway, for appellants.
Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, and Stevens & Holt, Loris, for respondents.
This appeal involves two actions, both arising out of an automobile-pedestrian accident which occurred on July 3, 1967, when a vehicle owned by the defendant Agnes Nash, and driven by her son, the defendant Norwood Nash, collided with the plaintiff, Kate Anders, as she was attempting to walk across Ocean Boulevard, in the City of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Actions were brought by Mrs. Anders and her husband, Joe Anders, against the above defendants to recover the damages sustained from the accident. The action of Mrs. Anders sought recovery for her personal injuries; and that of her husband for medical expenses of the wife, and loss of her services and consortium. Both actions charged negligence and recklessness on the part of defendant Norwood Nash in the operation of his mother's automobile.
The answers of the defendants in both cases contained general denials and interposed the further defenses of sole neglgience and recklessness, contributory negligence and recklessness, sudden emergency, and unavoidable accident.
By agreement, the cases were tried together at the November 1969 Term of the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs for actual damages--in the case of the wife for $25,000.00 and in that of the husband for $18,000.00. Defendants have appealed from the refusal by the lower court of their timely motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, and for a new trial, both appeals presenting identical issues.
The exceptions charge that the lower court erred in (1) permitting an amendment to the complaint of Mrs. Anders, after the jury was sworn, so as to allege disfigurement as an element of damage; (2) refusing to strike testimony of Mrs. Anders to the effect that she 'was cautious' as she walked across the street; (3) excluding testimony concerning the statement, allegedly made by plaintiffs' son after the accident: 'Mama, I told you not to cross;' and (4) refusing to grant defendants' motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that plaintiffs' injuries and damages resulted from the sole negligence or contributory negligence of Mrs. Anders.
The complaint of Mrs. Anders alleged that she had sustained permanent disability and that, 'among others, her injuries consisted of a fracture of the pelvis, fracture and dislocation of the right shoulder, cerebral concussion and multiple bruises and abrasions', causing her to 'suffer greatly' and rendering her 'permanently partially disabled in the use of her right arm and have affected her normal and customary ability to walk and maneuver.'
After the jury was drawn, motion was made to amend the complaint of Mrs. Anders so as to specifically include mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and disfigurement as elements of damage. The trial judge allowed the complaint to be amended to include mental anguish and disfigurement, but refused in it the other particulars.
Defendants apparently concede the propriety of the amendment to include mental anguish as an element of damage, but contend that error was committed in permitting the complaint to be amended to include disfigurement. They take the position that the amendment caught them by surprise and deprived them of the opportunity to meet the issue.
The court have very broad discretion, under Section 10--692 of the 1962 Code of Laws, to grant amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice and the exercise of such power will not be disturbed by this court except upon a showing of abuse of such discretion.
We find no abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment in question. The allegations of the complaint with respect to damages were very broad and, as noted by the trial judge, might properly be construed as embracing recovery for disfigurement. However, at the most, the effect of the amendment was to include an additional element of damage resulting from the wrongful acts originally set forth in the complaint. The medical testimony upon which plaintiff relied was introduced in evidence through depositions taken before trial, at which counsel representing defendants cross-examined the doctors. This medical testimony constituted a full disclosure of the physical condition of Mrs. Anders; and we find no basis upon which to hold that the amendment operated as a surprise or resulted in legal prejudice to defendants.
Error is also charged in the refusal by the trial judge to strike a statement made by Mrs. Anders during cross-examination. Upon being asked if she looked any more after starting to enter the street, she replied: 'I looked, and I was cautious all the way.' The motion of counsel for defendants to strike the statement, 'I was cautious all the way,' was refused.
The statement might have been properly stricken as a conclusion and not responsive to the question asked. However, the ruling was discretionary and we find no abuse of discretion or resulting prejudice to defendants' rights from the refusal to strike the testimony. The statement concerned the manner in which the witness looked as she attempted to cross the street. She was cross-examined as to what she actually did not other witnesses testified as to her actions. When the statement is viewed in context and in the light of the testimony of the witness as to what she actually did in crossing the street, we fail to find any basis upon which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Burton
...other jurisdictions have held inadmissible spontaneous statements not relating to the startling event. See, e.g., Anders v. Nash, 256 S.C. 102, 108, 180 S.E.2d 878 (1971), Cook v. Hall, 308 Ky. 500, 214 S.W.2d 1017 (1948), Adams v. Quality Service Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 253 Wis. 334, 338, ......
-
Crowley v. Spivey
...discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be disturbed unless there is shown an abuse of discretion. Anders v. Nash, 256 S.C. 102, 180 S.E.2d 878 (1971). While amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed, circumstances such as inexcusable delay, surprise to the ad......
-
State v. Blackburn
...failed to explain, elucidate or in some way characterize the nature of the event; rather it expressed a conclusion. Anders v. Nash et al., 256 S.C. 102, 180 S.E.2d 878 (1971). The Federal Rules of Evidence have codified the res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule. The first two exceptions......
-
Bradley v. Hullander
...toward allowance of amendments to increase the prayer for damages, and to allow additional elements of damage, Anders v. Nash, 256 S.C. 102, 180 S.E.2d 878 (1971). Hullander has made no allegation or showing that Bradley's actions misled them on the issue of attorneys fees. Hullander had am......