Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519 v. Alexander
| Citation | 416 N.E.2d 1327 |
| Decision Date | 04 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-1179A365,2-1179A365 |
| Parties | 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2172 ANDERSON FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 519 et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Edna Mae ALEXANDER et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Hopper & Opperman, Indianapolis, for appellant, Anderson Federation of Teachers.
Richard J. Darko, Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, for Indiana State Teachers Ass'n, amicus curiae.
James Newton Wilhoit, III, Brown, Younger & Wilhoit, McLean, Va., Michael C. Lacey, Davisson, Davisson & Davisson, Anderson, for appellees.
Robert W. Rund, Indianapolis, for Indiana School Bd. Ass'n, amicus curiae.
The Anderson Federation of Teachers (AFT) appeals from a declaratory judgment by the Madison Superior Court in favor of Edna Mae Alexander (Alexander), invalidating the AFT's agency shop agreement with the Anderson Community School Corporation (Schools).
We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Local 519 of the Anderson Federation of Teachers is the exclusive representative for collective bargaining of all teachers employed by the Anderson Community School Corporation. In September of 1977, the AFT and the Schools amended their master contract to provide that teachers who are not members of the AFT should have a "representation fee" deducted from their pay. The amendment provided that "the teacher's signature on his/her individual contract shall be authorization for the fee withholding." The schools and the AFT agreed that any teacher who refused to sign a contract because of this provision should be considered to have resigned.
At this point (October 21, 1977) suit was filed by Edna Mae Alexander, and 114 others, all teachers employed by the Anderson Community School Corporation, some tenured and some not, some members of the AFT, and some not. The complaint was in two counts, the first seeking a declaratory judgment that the agency shop agreement was invalid, the second praying an injunction against its being put into effect.
On November 8, 1978, the AFT and the schools revised their agency shop agreement to read, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The AFT and the employer agree that all members of the bargaining unit who are not also members of the AFT have an obligation, as a condition of employment, to pay a representation fee to the AFT, in an amount equal to the membership dues of the AFT less the cost of benefit provided solely for AFT members. This obligation applies to persons who become members of the bargaining unit during the duration of this agreement, on temporary contracts or otherwise, as well as to persons who are members of the bargaining unit on the effective date of this agreement.
(2) The AFT will provide the employer with a list of bargaining unit members who are not also AFT members and the employer shall request each such person to submit a payroll deduction authorization form within a reasonable time. The employer will deduct the representation fee in bi-weekly equal installments from the payroll of each person who submits an authorization. Persons who refuse to sign an authorization form or who revoke an executed form have a continuing enforceable obligation to pay the representation fee directly to the AFT. (emphasis added).
The trial court, granting summary judgment on the first count, invalidated both agency shop agreements, citing three reasons:
1. By providing that the representation fee should be deducted automatically from teachers' salaries, the first agreement violated the requirement of both the Indiana Wage Assignment Act, I.C. 22-2-6-2(a), and the school collective bargaining law, I.C. 20-7.5-1-8, that employers may make deductions from employees' paychecks only upon the written, signed, and revocable authorization of the employees involved.
2. The first agreement's making a refusal to sign an agency shop contract a constructive resignation, and the second's making the payment of representation fees "a condition of employment," create additional grounds for discharging tenured teachers in violation of I.C. 20-6.1-4-10.
3. The trial court could find "no express statutory authority" allowing a public school corporation to enter into an agency shop agreement with a teacher's union. It was therefore beyond the Anderson schools' authority to agree to either the first or the second agency shop clause.
Both clauses were therefore held invalid and unenforceable, and partial summary judgment was entered accordingly. The second count of Alexander's complaint is being held in abeyance pending the disposition of this appeal.
Since the agency shop agreement of November 8, 1978, has superseded any previous agency shop agreement, we need dispose of the November 8 agreement only. The issue presented for appeal by that agreement is:
Is a provision in a teachers' collective bargaining agreement valid, which makes payment of a representation fee a "condition of employment"?
Because our resolution of this issue suffices to sustain the judgment of the trial court, we reach no other issue raised by either the parties or the amici.
The parties and the amici regard this case as a fundamental dispute about what is variously denominated "union security" or the "right to work." Apparently they expect ringing declarations from us on this subject with Indiana law subordinate to the larger question. Their most persuasive arguments relate to the Teacher Tenure Act, but as we shall see, the legal solution lies in an unexplored corner of the Certificated Educational Employees' Bargaining Act.
The AFT concedes that Nonetheless, the AFT and amicus Indiana State Teachers Association (ISTA) insist that there is ISTA goes further. It argues that failure to pay a representation fee provided for in a collective bargaining agreement would constitute a "good and just cause" for dismissal under I.C. 20-6.1-4-10(a)(6). To hold otherwise would unreasonably restrict the disciplinary powers of school boards.
no inherent conflict between a teacher tenure law and an agency shop agreement. They point to the affidavit of the superintendent of the Anderson Community School Corporation in which the superintendent swore that the School Corporation "will not terminate the employment of a teacher for failure to pay said representation fee." Therefore, the AFT and ISTA say, the trial court's conclusion that the agency shop agreement adds grounds for dismissal other than those provided for in the Teacher Tenure Act was speculative and premature.
Alexander and amicus Indiana School Boards Association (ISBA) argue that the phrase "condition of employment" can scarcely have any meaning other than that the AFT and the Anderson schools meant to institute additional grounds for discharging teachers. Relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, they argue that a tenured teacher may be discharged only for causes related to pedagogical competence or administrative necessity; and that union security agreements meet neither of these criteria.
This agency shop agreement cannot stand. School Corporations may not make collective bargaining agreements requiring the discharge of teachers.
Because of the special responsibility that school corporations have to the public, their collective bargaining powers are restricted by law. Among these restrictions is the requirement that school employers retain their sole responsibility to hire and fire teachers. The legislature has made it plain that this responsibility belongs to school boards alone, and they may not bargain it away in labor negotiations.
At the threshold, we dispose of the AFT's contention that the sentence "The AFT and the employer agree that all members of the bargaining unit who are not also members of the AFT have an obligation, as a condition of employment, to pay a representation fee to the AFT ...," does not mean that teachers who refuse to pay the fee are liable to discharge. Neither the AFT nor ISTA offer any authority for the proposition that the phrase "condition of employment," in this context, has anything but its evident, unambiguous meaning that the act described must be performed in order for employment to continue. In fact, the phrase "as a condition of employment" is found both in that form 1 and in the more precise form of "as a condition of continued employment," 2 in contexts in which it is clear that the condition is to be met, or the employee discharged. It would be the acme of judicial opacity for us to determine otherwise.
Now we consider the principal issue of whether a teachers' collective bargaining agreement may contain an agency shop provision enforceable by the discharge of a non-complying employee.
Labor relations between school corporations and teachers are governed by the 1973 Certificated Educational Employee Bargaining Act (CEEBA), I.C. 20-7.5-1-1 et seq. 3
The CEEBA has never been interpreted by a court undertaking to ascertain the limits that act places on collective bargaining agreements. So we briefly review the applicable principles of statutory construction.
I.C. 1-1-4-1 (Burns 1980) provides that I.C. 1-1-4-1(1) (Burns 1980); Hazelett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Indiana (1980), Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1134; State v. Bress, (1976), 169 Ind.App. 397, 349 N.E.2d 229. Statutes are to be construed as a whole, Hazelett, supra; In re Big Raccoon Conservancy District v. Kessler Farms Corp. (1977), Ind.App., 363...
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...contracts. 6 It is factually and legally distinguishable from the case here. In Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519 v. Alexander, (1981) Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1327, the clause in question made payment of service fees a condition of employment--teachers failing to pay were subject to d......
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...but also with Indiana Code Sec. 20-7.5-1-1 et seq., known as the Collective Bargaining Statute, (CEEBA). In Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. Alexander (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1327, we explained CEEBA's delegation and reservation of powers as The scope of collective bargaining by schools, ......
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