Anderson, In re
| Decision Date | 06 September 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31702,31702 |
| Citation | 235 P.2d 303,39 Wn.2d 356 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re ANDERSON. BOEING AIRPLANE CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT. |
Smith Troy Atty. Gen., William J. Millard, Jr., Ass't. Atty. Gen., for appellant Commissioner.
Holman, Mickelwait, Marion, Prince & Black, William M. Holman and Burroughs B. Anderson, Seattle, for respondent employer.
L. Presley Gill, Seattle, for Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge 751, I.A.M., amicus curiae.
Andrew Bernard Anderson was employed by the Boeing Airplane Company, a corporation, at Seattle from April 14, 1947, to November 25, 1949. During the latter portion of this employment, he was classified as an 'Assembler-Installer Electric and Radio 'A',' receiving $1.63 an hour, plus a bonus of ten cents an hour when working on the second shift.
November 25, 1949, Anderson was informed that there was a surplus of workers in the 'A' classification and was offered a transfer to another work area at the same general type of work but with a 'B' classification, at a wage of $1.43 an hour for the first shift. Anderson refused to accept the transfer and quit work. Four days thereafter, he received a 'termination slip,' effective as of November 30, 1949, containing a notation, 'Declines transfer to other available work.'
December 9, 1949, Anderson filed an application for 'Initial Determination' of his rights as a claimant under the applicable section of the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act.
On the same day, Anderson signed the following statement:
The unemployment compensation representative of the benefit division of the employment security department determined that Anderson 'left work voluntarily without good cause,' and denied him any 'Benefit' under the statute.
Anderson appealed from this ruling to the 'appeal tribunal' of the employment security department. After a hearing, the following findings of fact were made:
'The appellant is a former employee of the Boeing Airplane Company, Seattle, Washington, where he was employed from April 14, 1947, until November 28, 1949. He was classified as an Assembler Installer Electric and Radio 'A' at $1.63 an hour, plus a ten cent bonus for the second shift. On Monday, November 28, 1949, he was informed that there was a surplus of workers in the 'A' classification and was offered a transfer to another work area in the same type of work but with a 'B' classification, at the wage rate of $1.43 an hour, on the first shift. The appellant refused this transfer and went home. On the fourth day he received a termination slip from the Company, effective as of November 30, 1949, and under Remarks giving the reason for termination as 'Declined transfer to other available work.'
After entering an appropriate conclusion, the ruling of the unemployment compensation representative was affirmed and Anderson's claim for benefits denied.
Anderson then appealed to the commissioner of the employment security department, who reversed the order appealed from and directed that Anderson be allowed benefits 'for all weeks for which the claimant has reported and been in all other respects eligible.'
From this ruling of the commissioner, the employer, Boeing Airplane Company, appealed to the superior court where the matter was heard upon the record, the company being represented by its counsel, and the commissioner by the attorney general.
After the trial, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the claimant Anderson, was not justified in quitting work and should be disqualified for benefits under the statute. The court then entered a judgment reversing the decision of the commissioner and reinstating the decision of the appeal tribunal. From this judgment, the commissioner has appealed to this court and presents the following assignment of errors:
'(1) The court erred in substituting its Findings of Fact for those of the Commissioner of the Employment Security Department.
'(2) The court erred in failing to consider the application of Section 78 of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-216.
'(3) The court erred in denying unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant for the period in question.'
The unemployment compensation act provides that, in all court proceedings under or pursuant thereto, the decision of the commissioner shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same. The act also provides that, on appeal to the superior court, the proceeding shall be heard as an equitable action. The statute further provides that, if the court determines that the commissioner has acted within his power and has correctly construed the law, his decision shall be confirmed, otherwise it shall be reversed or modified. An appeal to this court lies from the judgment of the superior court as in other civil cases. Laws of 1945, chapter 35, §§ 128, 131, pp. 143, 145 Rem.Supp.1945, §§ 9998-266, 9998-269.
The following provisions of the unemployment compensation statutes are pertinent:
Laws of 1949, chapter 214, § 12, p. 690, Rem.Supp.1949, § 9998-211:
Laws of 1949, chapter 214, § 15, p. 691, Rem.Supp.1949, § 9998-214:
Laws of 1945, chapter 35, § 78, p. 116, Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-216:
Laws of 1945, chapter 35, § 79, p. 116, Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-217:
'(b) if the remuneration, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; * * *.'
The statute does not purport to state a specific definition of the phrase 'without good cause,' but makes that question one for the commissioner to determine. Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-216, supra, refers to certain factors to be considered by the commissioner in determining whether a voluntary termination of employment by an employee was with or without good cause. In other respects, the language of the statute should be construed according to its apparent and ordinary meaning.
From the record before us, it appears that respondent employer ceased to have available employment for Anderson in the type of work designated as class 'A' but did have employment for a workman in class 'B'. This latter work was of the same general kind and class as that in which Anderson had previously been employed, but the wage scale was twenty cents an hour less, the opportunity to be called to work on a second shift (for which an additional ten cents an hour would be paid) was not open to the employee, and the work offered would have been outside of the building of the employer instead of inside the building, where class 'A' work was performed.
It is undoubtedly true that an employee might be justified in voluntarily terminating his employment, if called upon to work for substantially reduced wages or under less favorable conditions; but each phase would be...
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