Anderson v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 11 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16CA3571,16CA3571 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 2827,86 N.E.3d 349 |
| Parties | Melissa ANDERSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Rondal ANDERSON, Jr., Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Stephen S. Gussler, Margulis, Gussler & Hall, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellant.
Stephen K. Sesser, Benson & Sesser, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.1
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} Melissa Anderson appeals the judgment entry decree of divorce journalized August 19, 2016 in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas. Upon review, we find all the issues between the parties to the divorce were adjudicated on June 23, 2016, and prior to Appellee Rondal J. Anderson, Jr.'s death on July 31, 2016. Thus, the divorce action did not abate upon the date of his death. Accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter the judgment entry decree of divorce on August 19, 2016. As such, we find no merit to Appellant's sole assignment of error and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} The record shows that Appellant and Appellee were married on October 31, 2008 and no children were born during the marriage. On July 30, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint for divorce alleging incompatibility, gross neglect of duty, and extreme cruelty, along with a motion for mutual restraining order. Appellee filed an answer to the complaint, admitting the parties were incompatible.
{¶ 3} On December 4, 2015, the trial court issued an order submitting the case to the magistrate to hear any disputed issues. On June 20, 2016, Appellant filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint instanter, asserting additional grounds for divorce. On June 23, 2016, the matter came on for a final uncontested divorce hearing before the magistrate.
{¶ 4} At the hearing, counsel for the parties indicated Appellant and Appellee had reached an agreement to resolve all the disputed issues. The agreement was read into the record. Appellant and Appellee were duly sworn. On the record, both acknowledged their understanding of, and agreement with, the terms of the agreement for division of their marital property and acquired marital debt.
{¶ 5} The magistrate found the parties were incompatible and rendered an oral decision granting Appellant's complaint for divorce and approving and adopting the parties' agreement. Counsel for Appellee was charged with preparing the written magistrate's decision confirming the agreement. Appellee died unexpectedly on July 31, 2016.
{¶ 6} On August 19, 2016, the magistrate's decision, which made no mention of the decedent's death, was filed at 8:42 a.m. and contained the signatures of both attorneys for the parties. At 9:04 a.m. on that same date, the judgment entry decree of divorce, which recited the additional fact of Appellee's death, was filed. It also contained the signatures of counsel for both parties and a handwritten date of "8/15/16."
{¶ 7} On August 26, 2016, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment entry decree of divorce, asserting that the trial court did not independently review the magistrate's decision until after the decedent's death and thus, no judgment was rendered while Appellee was alive. Appellee's counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to vacate.
{¶ 8} Appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court on September 16, 2016. On September 29, 2016, the trial court dismissed the motion to vacate, finding that it lost jurisdiction after the appeal had been perfected. Where pertinent, additional facts are set forth below.
{¶ 9} In accordance with Civ.R. 53, the trial court reviews a magistrate's decision de novo. In re Estate of Humphrey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-233, 2014-Ohio-5859, 2014 WL 7671071, ¶ 15, citing Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774, 2010 WL 2433119, ¶ 15. In reviewing objections to a magistrate's decision, the trial court must make an independent review of the matters objected to in order "to ascertain [whether] the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). An appellate court, by contrast, applies an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision. Humphrey,supra, at ¶ 15. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Claims of error by the trial court must be based on the trial court's actions, rather than on the magistrate's findings. Mayle at ¶ 15. Therefore, we may reverse the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision only if the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. Id.
{¶ 10} However, this case presents a jurisdictional question, in that Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review and approve the magistrate's decision after Appellee's death. "The existence of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo." Martindale v. Martindale, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA30, 2016-Ohio-524, 2016 WL 562864, ¶ 27, quoting Barber v. Williamson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3265, 2012-Ohio-4925, 2012 WL 5289381, ¶ 12, quoting Yazdani–Isfehani v. Yazdani–Isfehani, 170 Ohio App.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-7105, 865 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.). As such, we proceed to determine whether the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction, journalizing the judgment entry decree of divorce after Appellee's death, was legally correct.
{¶ 11} The parties' briefs contain additional disputed facts which are not entirely pertinent to this appeal.2 Appellant asserts that she decided to appeal the trial court's decision after she learned that his death certificate, issued prior to the judgment entry decree of divorce, listed him as "divorced." Both parties' briefs acknowledge a lifetime annuity was payable to Appellee's spouse if he was married at the time of his death.3
{¶ 12} Further, Appellee's brief advises that on August 1, 2016, the parties' counsel met with the trial court to discuss how to proceed upon Appellee's death. At that time, the trial court indicated it planned to grant the divorce and adopt and approve the parties' agreement. Counsel for Appellee further advises that he submitted a revised judgment entry decree of divorce which acknowledged the fact of Appellee's death, and that Appellant's counsel consented to and approved the magistrate's decision and revised judgment entry decree of divorce. While we have no reason to doubt counsel's representation, the record does not contain a hearing notice for the date of August 1, 2016. As this information is a matter outside of the record, we cannot consider it.4
{¶ 13} Appellant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review and approve the magistrate's decision after Appellee's death because no judge ever heard the evidence in this matter or reached a decision while Appellee was alive. Notwithstanding that the case was heard by a magistrate and the parties waived their right to object, Appellant argues the trial judge still had a duty to review the magistrate's decision and issue his own judgment. Appellant concludes the case was not decided at the time of the decedent's death.
{¶ 14} Appellee, however, responds that the appeal does not present any novel issues as the matter of the trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enter judgment following the death of a party to a divorce is well-settled. Appellee directs our attention to Grashel v. Grashel, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 02CA2826, 2002-Ohio-4612, 2002 WL 2030907. Appellee points out: (1) there were no issues in dispute at the time of the final hearing before the magistrate; (2) the agreement was read into the record; (3) the parties testified under oath that they understood the terms of the agreement and believed them to be fair and equitable; and (4) an oral decision was rendered prior to the decedent's death. We agree with Appellee that the law in Ohio is well-settled with regard to the trial court's continuing jurisdiction on the abatement of an action upon the death of a party.
{¶ 15} The Supreme Court of Ohio, other appellate districts, and this Court have observed that the provisions of R.C. 2311.21 generally provide that no action or proceeding pending in any court shall abate by the death of a party except for actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, nuisance or against a judge of a county court for misconduct of office. King v. King, 4th Dist. Adams No. 01CA719, 2002-Ohio-1060, 2002 WL 398716, *4. While divorce actions are not explicitly denoted in the above statute, when one or both parties to a divorce case dies before the final decree, the action abates (because circumstances have achieved the primary objective sought). State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 671 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1996) ; Porter v. Lerch, 129 Ohio St. 47, 56, 193 N.E. 766, 770 (1934).
{¶ 16} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has carved out an exception to this general rule of abatement, and held that a divorce action is not abated by a party's death when that death occurs after a decision is rendered but before it is journalized. King, supra, citing State ex rel. Litty, supra, at 99, 671 N.E.2d at 239 ; Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 60 N.E.2d 483 (1945), at paragraph three of the syllabus. Under such circumstances, the decree may be journalized by nunc pro tunc entry. See Caprita, supra, at paragraph four of the syllabus. The Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that when a party to an action dies after a trial and determination of the issues, the interests of...
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