Anderson v. Baker

• Decision Date: 24 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-420,80-420
• Citation: 641 P.2d 1035,39 St.Rep. 273,196 Mont. 494
• Parties: Patsy Jean ANDERSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marie Sanders, Deceased, Plaintiff, Cross-Appellant and Respondent, v. Leo B. BAKER, Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1035

641 P.2d 1035

196 Mont. 494

Patsy Jean ANDERSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marie Sanders, Deceased, Plaintiff Cross-Appellant and Respondent, v. Leo B. BAKER, Defendant, Cross-Appellant and Respondent.

No. 80-420.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Nov. 30, 1981.

Decided Feb. 11, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 1982.

Holmstrom, Dunaway & West, Vicki Dunaway, argued, Billings, for plaintiff, cross-appellant and respondent.

Hauf & Forsythe, John Hauf, argued, Billings, for defendant, cross-appellant and respondent.

HASWELL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a summary judgment in a claim and delivery action. The District Court of Yellowstone County awarded each party one-half of the monies in a savings account and two certificates of deposit in a savings and loan association. We reverse.

The uncontradicted facts disclose that Marie Sanders, who lived on a farm near Ballantine, Montana, opened a savings account and two certificates of deposit in 1972 and 1974 at Security Federal Savings and Loan in Billings, Montana. On October 28, 1975, the name of her son, Leo B. Baker, who was buying the farm from Sanders, was added as a joint tenant to the three accounts which, by July 30, 1978, (through various deposits and interest accumulation) had come to total $26,182.35.

The signature cards for the three accounts, signed by Baker and Sanders contained the following language:

"... It is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by the parties with the Association that any funds placed in or added to the account by any one of the parties is and shall be conclusively intended to be a gift and delivery at that time of such funds to the signatory party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata interest in the account."

The facts indicate that Mrs. Sanders did not intend to gift any portion of the savings accounts to Baker and that his name was placed on the account so he could withdraw money for her expenses, if needed. Also, a bank officer's affidavit indicated that in 1978, three years after Baker's name had been placed on the accounts, Baker told the officer that the funds in the accounts belonged to his mother and were not his money.

In 1975, Mrs. Sanders gave the passbook and certificates to Baker. In May, 1978, Mrs. Sanders was hospitalized for about a week in Billings, Montana, at which time her granddaughter, Patsy Jean Anderson, came from Arizona to visit her. In early June, after Mrs. Sanders had been released from the hospital she went to Arizona to see her granddaughter.

On June 29, 1978, Mrs. Sanders executed her will, giving the bulk of her estate to Anderson (except for a few cash bequests) and named Anderson as her personal representative. On July 7, Sanders, through her attorney in Billings, made a written demand on Baker for the return of the passbook and certificates so she could withdraw the money. Baker refused and on August 3, 1978, Sanders filed the instant suit for their return.

Thus Marie Sanders commenced this action on August 3, 1978, alleging that her son, Leo Baker, was wrongfully retaining the two certificates of deposit and passbook. She asked for their return and that Baker's name be removed therefrom. In the alternative, she asked for the total sum of $26,182.35 in damages, if the certificates of deposit and passbook were not returned.

Baker filed an answer on October 20, asserting that he had the right to retain the certificates of deposit and passbook and further alleging that Sanders was incompetent and acting under coercion and undue influence. On November 18, 1978, Mrs. Sanders died in Arizona and on November 30, Baker withdrew all the money from the three accounts.

After Sanders' death the personal representative, Patsy Jean Anderson, was substituted as plaintiff. On March 5, 1979, the defendant filed an amended answer, raising the additional defenses of statute of limitations, laches and equitable estoppel. After a substitution of counsel for defendant, both sides moved for summary judgment, each seeking the total amount on deposit.

On July 10, 1980, the District Court entered judgment granting each of the parties one-half of the total funds on deposit. Baker now appeals, contending he is entitled to all of the accounts as the surviving joint tenant. Anderson cross-appeals, claiming that she, as residuary legatee of Sanders, is entitled to the full balance.

The issues on appeal can be stated as follows:

1. Is parol evidence admissible to show the funds were not intended as a gift by Sanders to Baker?

2. Is Sanders' suit barred by the applicable statute of limitations, laches, or equitable estoppel?

3. Is the plaintiff entitled to interest calculated from the date Baker withdrew all funds from the three bank accounts?

We reverse the trial court and find that the plaintiff personal representative should have been granted summary judgment in her claim and delivery action.

With regard to the first issue, Baker argues that State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1968), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, and Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286, are controlling. In Cole, the decedent created five joint bank accounts between herself and various relatives, all within three years of her death. After the decedent's death, the trial court imposed an inheritance tax measured by one-half of the value of the accounts. The questions presented on appeal included whether the state was entitled to an inheritance tax on the full amount of the joint bank accounts, or just one-half of the accounts. The court, in finding that the half-interest in the bank account which the joint tenants received was taxable as a transfer in contemplation of death, made the following statements:

"Of course if the transfer by the donor to the joint account be regarded as a gift it has to satisfy all the requirements of a valid gift inter vivos. The essential requisites of a gift inter vivos are delivery, accompanying intent, and acceptance by the donee. (Citing cases.)

"The first question is the intention of the parties making the deposit. (5 Michie, Banks & Banking, p. 101, sec. 46.) Such intention was discussed in Hill v. Badeljy, 107 Cal.App. 598, 605, 290 P. 637, 640, where the court declared, 'The question involved in cases of this character is the intention of the parties making the deposit, and where such intention is evidenced by a written agreement, as was done in the case at bar, this question of intention ceases to be an issue, and the courts are bound by the written agreement.' The above quotation was cited and approved by this court in Ludwig v. Montana Bank & Trust Co., 109 Mont. 477, 502, 98 P.2d 377, 379.

"The Montana court also said, quoting from 9 C.J.S., Banks & Banking, sec. 286, 'Where no other evidence of intent is available, the form of the deposit may control; but when such intent is evidenced by a written agreement, the question of intention ceases to be an issue and the courts are bound by the agreement.' Ludwig v. Montana Bank & Trust Co. supra, at page 502 of 109 Mont., at page 389 of 98 P.2d.

"In this jurisdiction the signing of the signature card containing an agreement that the deposit was payable to either of the co-depositors or the survivor settled the question of the donative intent of the donor to make a gift in joint tenancy. See In re Sullivan's Estate, 112 Mont. 519, 118 P.2d 383." 122 Mont. at 14-15, 195 P.2d at 992.

In Casagranda, supra, the decedent placed funds in two savings accounts, naming himself and the defendant as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. After his death, the executrix brought suit to quiet title in the accounts and the court awarded the money to the defendant, as the surviving joint tenant.

The court elaborated on the Cole holding with the following language:

"Cole stood for the proposition that, in Montana, signing a signature card containing an agreement that the deposit is payable to either of the co-depositors or the survivor settles the question of donative intent to make a joint tenancy. Appellant cites an Arizona decision, O'Hair v. O'Hair (1973), 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66, wherein it was held that the mere form of a bank account is not regarded as sufficient to establish the intent of the depositor to give another a joint interest in or ownership of it. We find the Montana rule represents a more reliable manner for determining questions concerning the ownership of joint bank accounts. This should not be mistakenly understood to mean we have no concern for the depositor's intentions. Intention is clearly expressed on the face of the signature card. Additional evidence is unnecessary..." 178 Mont. at 483-484, 585 P.2d at 1288.

However, we distinguish the instant case from Cole and Casagranda for the following reason. In neither Cole nor Casagranda was there any attempt made during the lifetime of the donor-depositor, as there was here, to divest the other joint tenant of his or her interest in the account. In spite of the conclusory gift language contained on the signature card signed by Baker and Sanders, the uncontroverted evidence here shows that no gift was intended, i.e., Baker was named as a joint tenant for convenience purposes only. The legal effect of Sanders' claim and delivery action, filed during her lifetime, was to establish judicially her exclusive ownership to the funds in the account cutting off Baker's right of survivorship and to allow Baker to take, solely on the basis of the language contained on the signature card, would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice.

We therefore hold that where, as here, a depositor during his or her lifetime raises the issue of ownership of funds in a joint tenancy account, the statements on the signature card are not conclusive and additional evidence may be examined to ascertain the true intent of the parties. We are especially cognizant of the fact that many elderly peopl...