Anderson v. Banks
| Decision Date | 17 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. CV478-138,CV479-323.,CV478-138 |
| Citation | 520 F. Supp. 472 |
| Parties | ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANKS, et al., Defendants. JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SIKES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
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Richard D. Phillips, Ludowici, Ga., for plaintiffs in No. CV478-138.
J. Franklin Edenfield, Swainsboro, Ga., M. Francis Stubbs, Reidsville, Ga., for Ben F. Sikes, in both cases.
B. Daniel Dubberly, Jr., Glennville, Ga., Charles Rippin Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gardner, Savannah, Ga., for defendants in both cases.
David Arnold, Ga. Legal Services Programs, Central Office, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs in No. CV479-323.
Spivey & Carlton, P. C., Swainsboro, Ga., for defendants in No. CV479-323.
OUTLINE
I. Background of the Cases ............................... ____
II. Jurisdiction .......................................... ____
III. Historical Background ................................. ____
A. Tattnall County .................................... ____
B. The School System .................................. ____
C. The History of Segregation in Tattnall County ...... ____
D. The Tracking System ................................ ____
IV. The Test .............................................. ____
A. Its Inception ...................................... ____
B. Its Implementation ................................. ____
C. The Racial Impact of the CAT Requirement ........... ____
D. The CAT Itself ..................................... ____
E. The CAT in Tattnall County ......................... ____
F. The Benefits ....................................... ____
V. Special Placement ...................................... ____
VI. The Legal Conclusions .................................. ____
A. The Racial Discrimination Claims .................... ____
1. The Equal Protection Claims ..................... ____
2. Statutory Claims ................................ ____
B. The Due Process Claims .............................. ____
C. The Claims of Those Students Classified as Mentally
Retarded ............................................ ____
1. The Effect of the Diploma Policy on Children
Accurately Classified ........................... ____
2. The Effect of the Diploma Policy on Those
Misclassified as Mentally Retarded .............. ____
3. The Equal Protection Claims of the Handicapped .. ____
VII. Summary ................................................ ____
The impetus for this litigation was the institution by the Tattnall County School District of an exit examination. Beginning with the graduating class of 1978, all diploma candidates have been required, in addition to other already existing diploma requirements, to achieve a grade equivalency score of 9.0 on both the mathematics and reading sections of the California Achievement Test (CAT). Claims were initially raised in an administrative proceeding which progressed from the local school board, to the State Board of Education, and ultimately to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The issues raised in that proceeding were: (1) whether the Tattnall County School Board had the authority under state law to adopt an additional graduation requirement; and (2) whether a violation of the equal protection clause had occurred since a greater burden was placed on the students of Tattnall County than on the students in other Georgia counties. The first suit in this Court challenging the exit exam, styled as Wells v. Banks, CV478-138, was then filed asserting due process and equal protection claims as well as the state law claims. An additional claim concerning irregularities in the School Board voting districts was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs before trial. While the case was pending here, the authority of the School Board to require the examination was upheld in the Georgia courts. The Georgia courts also found no equal protection violation in the fact that children in other counties were not subjected to the requirement. There were no black plaintiffs remaining in the case in this Court at time of trial. The case was restyled Anderson v. Banks. In addition, plaintiff's counsel adopted in his proposed pretrial order the outline of legal issues set forth by plaintiff's counsel in Johnson v. Sikes, thus further narrowing the scope of issues in this case to the due process claim. Since Anderson v. Banks is a suit for damages, it was agreed among all counsel and the Court that liability only would be tried presently and a separate trial on the issue of damages would be held later if necessary.
2. The second action here consolidated for trial was filed in October, 1979, by Kathy Norris Johnson. In October, 1979, she moved to proceed in forma pauperis and to consolidate her case with Wells v. Banks. The motions were granted. The Court certified the following classes:
The issues in the Johnson case are as follows: (1) whether the exit exam violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether the diploma requirement is violative of due process; (3) whether the policy violates Title VI; (4) whether the policy violates 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1706; and (5) whether the policy of excluding educably mentally retarded (EMR) students from the possibility of obtaining a diploma violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The case was brought to trial on August 7, 1980.
After a thorough analysis of the issues, the Court sent a copy of its proposed order to the parties for comment. The Court then reworked the order in light of these very helpful comments. The Court has been very cautious in this matter which is of vital importance to the educators of this state. The recent opinion in Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (M.D.Fla.1981), has caused the Court to reconsider major portions of its reasoning.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) over plaintiff's claims asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., because each constitutional or statutory provision provides for the protection of equal or civil rights. Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 have noted the strong similarities in statutory language and legislative history to civil rights legislation. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), review granted, 449 U.S. 950, 101 S.Ct. 352, 66 L.Ed.2d 213 (1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). Jurisdiction over the Equal Opportunities Act claim is also found under 20 U.S.C. § 1708.
Defendants have strenuously argued that the plaintiffs' case is basically a challenge to an academic program and academic regulations, which, in the absence of a bad motive, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. As support they cite Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976). Yet in Mahavongsanan the Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiff had no action on the merits of the case. The Court did review plaintiff's arguments and decided that no rights of the plaintiff had been violated. In underscoring the reluctance of the courts to review purely academic decisions, the Fifth Circuit did not suggest that the district court should have refused to hear the case at all because it concerned academic matters. A substantive rule of law rather than a jurisdictional rule is announced there. In addition, the diploma of a graduate student rather than a high school student was at stake. Arguably, a high school diploma represents a very different interest, in light of compulsory attendance laws and the realities of our society which would not be applicable to a graduate degree.
In addition, a large portion of plaintiffs' claims here rest on allegations of racial discrimination which, even in an academic setting, are clearly subject to judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Gadsden County School System, 572 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1978). Insofar as the claims allege that particular statutes giving rise to private litigation have...
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