Anderson v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 30 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-3315,82-3315
• Citation: 714 F.2d 906
• Parties: Darline J. ANDERSON and James Q. Anderson, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Jerald G. BOYD, Ass't Director, Oregon Interstate Compact, William Cogswell, Chairman, Oregon State Parole Board, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 906

714 F.2d 906

Darline J. ANDERSON and James Q. Anderson, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Jerald G. BOYD, Ass't Director, Oregon Interstate Compact William Cogswell, Chairman, Oregon State Parole Board, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 82-3315.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 7, 1983.

Decided Aug. 30, 1983.

Michael D. Reynolds, Deputy Atty. Gen., Salem, Or., for defendants-appellees.

James Q. Anderson, Hermiston, Or., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before SNEED, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

FARRIS, Circuit Judge:

The district court dismissed the Andersons' section 1983 action on the ground that the defendant parole officials were absolutely immune from civil liability. The Andersons appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

On May 23, 1979, James and Darline Anderson, husband and wife, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and other relief against William Cogswell, Chairman of the Oregon State Parole Board, and Jerald Boyd, Assistant Director of the Oregon Interstate Compact. The complaint alleged that the defendants were harassing the husband, a state prisoner on parole, in violation of various constitutional guarantees. Specifically, Anderson first challenged parole conditions which restricted his out-of-state travel and thereby caused him to be separated from his wife. He also alleged that he had repeatedly been arrested and placed on nonbail parole holds pending investigation of baseless charges of parole violations. Finally, he alleged that the defendants had knowingly repeated false statements to Idaho officials regarding his criminal record.

Cogswell and Boyd filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that their status as parole board officials conferred immunity from civil liability. Properly treating the motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted, see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice p 56.11, the district court dismissed the Andersons' action on the ground that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity under Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981).

ANALYSIS

In reviewing the propriety of a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we take as true the allegations in the pleadings. See Benson v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners, 673 F.2d 272, 275 & n. 7 (9th Cir.1982). In addition, we liberally construe pro se complaints. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). The absolute, quasi-judicial immunity of parole officials when they act "to grant, deny, or revoke parole," which we recognized in Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303, would not extend to the knowing dissemination of false information concerning a parolee as alleged in the Andersons' complaint. The district court erred by dismissing that portion of the complaint containing these allegations.

In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911-2912, 2916, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Supreme Court accorded absolute immunity to executive branch hearing examiners, judicial officers, and attorneys acting in adjudicatory or prosecutorial capacities. The Court emphasized that an official derives the appropriate degree of immunity not from his or her administrative designation but by the function he or she performs. Id. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-2914.

We followed this reasoning in Sellars when we accorded parole officials this high level of immunity expressly in order to preserve the integrity of their decisions:

We believe that parole board officials perform functionally comparable tasks to judges when they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole. The daily task of both judges and parole board officials is the adjudication of specific cases or controversies. Their duty is often the same: to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong feelings because the litigant's liberty is at stake. They face the same risk of constant unfounded suits by those disappointed by the parole board's decisions.

Judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil rights suits in order to keep the judicial decision-making process pristine. As noted earlier, we expect and require the judge to be an impartial fact finder. When he or she weighs the merits of a case, we do not want the scales to be tipped by fear of litigation.

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We believe that the same degree of protection must be accorded to the decision-making process of parole board officials. Just as the decision-making process of judges must be kept free from fear, so must that of parole board officials. Without this protection, there is the same danger that the decision-maker might not impartially adjudicate the often difficult cases that come before them [sic ].

Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303. Because parole officials perform an essentially judicial function when considering parole applications, they are entitled to the absolute protection of quasi-judicial immunity when engaged in this activity.

However, this absolute immunity does not attach to the performance of duties not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion. Quasi-judicial immunity completely shields covered officials when they perform the functions which give rise to the need for absolute protection, even when the officials make egregious mistakes in carrying out these duties. But the absolute immunity recognized in Sellars extends no further than necessary to accomplish its purpose to insulate parole officials' adjudicatory decisions from potentially distorting influences, such as the threat of retaliatory lawsuits. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303. There is no reason to clothe actions taken outside an official's adjudicatory role with the absolute immunity tailored to the demands of that role. A parole official is no more entitled to absolute immunity for conduct not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion than is a judge or court official for nonjudicial duties or behavior. See Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 913-15 (9th Cir.1982) (members of Hawaii Judicial Selection Commission not absolutely immune for review of state judge's qualifications and decision not to reappoint him); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir.1974) (judge's use of physical force to evict person from courtroom nonjudicial act not clothed with absolute immunity); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235-37 (7th Cir.1980) (judge's prosecutorial acts nonjudicial and unprotected by absolute immunity), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028, 101 S.Ct. 601, 66 L.Ed.2d 491 (1980).

The Andersons' allegations encompass three distinct types of actions: imposition of parole conditions, execution of parole revocation procedures, and knowing dissemination of false information. The imposition of parole conditions is an integral part of a decision to grant parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598-2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). "The essence of parole is the release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Id. at 477, 92 S.Ct. at 2598. It follows that the defendants cannot be held liable for conduct relating to the imposition of parole conditions.

Similarly, the Andersons' allegations that Cogswell and Boyd, without reasonable justification, had James arrested and placed on parole holds pending investigation of purported parole violations cannot overcome the bar of quasi-judicial immunity. These actions directly related to the decision to revoke parole and are...