Anderson v. Breda

• Decision Date: 30 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 51169-1,51169-1
• Citation: 700 P.2d 737,103 Wn.2d 901
• Parties: , 53 USLW 2616 Robert ANDERSON, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Florence Anderson, Deceased; Linda Jzyk and Richard Anderson, Petitioners, v. Uri W. BREDA and Jane Doe Breda, husband and wife; Shorewood Osteopathic Hospital; John A. Doe and Jane A. Doe, his wife; John B. Doe and Jane B. Doe, his wife; John C. Doe and Jane C. Doe, his wife, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 901

103 Wn.2d 901

700 P.2d 737, 53 USLW 2616

Robert ANDERSON, individually and as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Florence Anderson, Deceased;

Linda Jzyk and Richard Anderson, Petitioners, v. Uri W. BREDA and Jane Doe Breda, husband and wife;

Shorewood Osteopathic Hospital; John A. Doe and Jane A.

Doe, his wife; John B. Doe and Jane B. Doe, his wife; John

C. Doe and Jane C. Doe, his wife, Respondents.

No. 51169-1.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

May 30, 1985.

Peterson, Bracelin, Young, Putra & Fletcher, Jan Eric Peterson, Christopher E. Young, Burns, Schneiderman & Davis, Susan R. Davis, Seattle, for petitioners.

Williams, Lanza, Kastner & Gibbs, Gerald A. Palm, William H. Robertson, Seattle, for respondent Breda.

Reed, McClure, Moceri, & Thonn, P.S., Hugh A. McClure, Judy Lee Young, Seattle, (for respondent Shorewood Osteopathic Hosp.

DORE, Justice.

This is a medical malpractice action brought by the surviving spouse of Florence Anderson, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Florence Anderson, and by Florence Anderson's children. The respondents are physicians whose attending care the petitioners allege was negligent, and Shorewood Hospital, which petitioners allege was negligent in the granting and maintaining of privileges for Dr. Uri Breda to practice at the hospital. In the course of discovery in this action, petitioners questioned Dr. Breda during a deposition regarding termination or suspension of any of his hospital privileges. Dr. Breda refused to answer these questions. The trial court concluded that these questions sought privileged information. It, therefore, entered an order to the effect that Dr. Breda did not have to answer deposition questions concerning termination or suspension of any of his hospital privileges. We vacate the trial court's order.

FACTS

In May of 1981, Florence Anderson's regular general physician referred her to Dr. Breda for a gall bladder operation. Dr. Breda admitted her to Shorewood Hospital for Petitioners allege that Dr. Breda was incompetent, used negligent medical judgment, failed to attend the patient, failed to respond to an emergency condition and attempted to practice medicine beyond his limitations. Petitioners further allege that Shorewood Hospital breached its duty of proper supervision of its medical staff in failing to deny or restrict Dr. Breda's hospital privileges when it knew or should have known of prior restrictions or termination of privileges at other hospitals.

                this surgery, where he held privileges to practice medicine and surgery.   Petitioners allege that several negligent errors were made over the next few days, causing Florence Anderson to have kidney failure and go into shock for over 19 hours, which condition was not properly or timely treated by the doctors or nurses.   At the request of her family, the original referring physician visited her at Shorewood Hospital and immediately ordered her transferred to Swedish Hospital.   She died within hours after her arrival.   She never had the gall bladder surgery
                

During Dr. Breda's deposition, he was questioned concerning privileges at other hospitals. He refused to answer these questions, claiming privilege pursuant to the provisions of RCW 4.24.250.

Petitioners moved to compel Dr. Breda to answer the questions. The trial court ordered that Dr. Breda did not have to answer questions as to why his privileges at hospitals had been terminated or even whether they have been voluntarily or involuntarily terminated, concluding that he was afforded this protection by RCW 4.24.250. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review. The case was then transferred to this court to aid in the prompt and orderly administration of justice. ¹

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly interpreted RCW 4.24.250

to preclude a medical malpractice plaintiff from inquiring in discovery from a defendant doctor concerning [700 P.2d 740] termination of the doctor's hospital privileges.

DECISION

Resolution of the issue is dependent on the scope of the immunity from discovery granted in RCW 4.24.250. The statute provides:

Any health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020(1) and (2) as now existing or hereafter amended who, in good faith, files charges or presents evidence against another member of their profession based on the claimed incompetency or gross misconduct of such person before a regularly constituted review committee or board of a professional society or hospital whose duty it is to evaluate the competency and qualifications of members of the profession, including limiting the extent of practice of such person in a hospital or similar institution, or before a regularly constituted committee or board of a hospital whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality of patient care, shall be immune from civil action for damages arising out of such activities. The proceedings, reports, and written records of such committees or boards, or of a member, employee, staff person, or investigator of such a committee or board, shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings in any civil action, except actions arising out of the recommendations of such committees or boards involving the restriction or revocation of the clinical or staff privileges of a health care provider as defined above.

As can be seen, this statute provides several protections. First, the statute provides immunity from civil liability to health care providers who file charges or present evidence against another member of the profession in connection with a competency review by a board or review committee. Dr. Breda claims no such immunity, nor could he, because he does not claim that he filed charges or presented evidence against another member of his profession.

Second, the statute makes privileged (or protects from discovery) the "proceedings, reports, and written records" of quality review committee proceedings, along with the The scope of the immunity from discovery granted by RCW 4.24.250 was recently addressed in Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash.2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984). We held in Coburn that the statute's application to particular discovery requests is determined by deciding whether disclosure would interfere with the statutory purpose. Coburn, at 278, 677 P.2d 173. RCW 4.24.250, and similar statutes prohibiting discovery of hospital quality review committees, represent a legislative choice between competing public concerns. The Legislature recognized that external access to committee investigations stifles candor and inhibits constructive criticism thought necessary to effective quality review. The immunity from discovery of committee review embraces this goal of medical staff candor in apprising their peers to improve the quality of in-hospital medical practice at the costs of impairing malpractice plaintiffs access to evidence revealing the competency of a hospital's staff. Coburn, at 275, 677 P.2d 173. See also Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.App.3d 623, 115 Cal.Rptr. 317 (1974). Because this immunity from discovery is in derogation of both the common law and the general policy favoring discovery, it is to be strictly construed and limited to its intended purpose. Coburn, 101 Wash.2d at 276, 677 P.2d 173. The burden of establishing entitlement to nondisclosure rests with the party resisting discovery.

                records of committee members and agents.   It is this privilege that Dr. Breda seeks to invoke here.   The question thus becomes whether the fact that a physician's hospital privileges have been restricted, revoked, or suspended as a result of such peer review proceedings is privileged under this language of the statute
                

Application of RCW 4.24.250 is only appropriate when two components are...