Anderson v. Buonforte
| Decision Date | 13 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 3998.,3998. |
| Citation | 617 S.E.2d 750 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alan D. ANDERSON, Robert and Diane Ressler, William Todt, Thomas A. Brooks, Juliana S. Calhoun, Robin and Keith Lee, Donald J. and Michele B. Hatcher, Philip D. and Jean F. Landfried, Appellants/Respondents, v. Hank and Linda BUONFORTE, Respondents/Appellants. |
John S. Keffer, of Sumter, for Appellants-Respondents.
Michael E. Kozlarek, of Columbia, for Respondents-Appellants.
Alan D. Anderson, Robert Ressler, Diane Ressler, William Todt, Thomas A. Brooks, Juliana S. Calhoun, Robin Lee, Keith Lee, Donald J. Hatcher, Michele B. Hatcher, Philip D. Lanfried, and Jean F. Landfried (collectively "the Neighbors"), sued Hank and Linda Buonforte (collectively "the Buonfortes"), seeking to enforce the restrictive covenants of the Indian Hills Subdivision in Sumter, South Carolina. The special referee ordered the Buonfortes to remove a two-car garage from their property and modify a recently built extension to their home. Both parties appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Buonfortes began construction of a house in the Indian Hills Subdivision in Sumter, South Carolina. Hank Buonforte convinced his parents to move into his home, promising to build an extension to the main house ("the mother-in-law wing"). Thereafter, he approached the City Planning Director's Office for a variance to his permit and applied to the Sumter City-County Board of Appeals ("the Board") for a variance to the city's setback requirements to build a garage. However, at the Buonfortes' hearing before the Board, several neighbors appeared in opposition to the request.
The Buonfortes applied for a variance with the subdivision's designated representative for enforcement of the restrictive covenants. However, eighteen days later, before the Buonfortes received a response from the representative, the Neighbors sued the Buonfortes, alleging the Buonfortes' mother-in-law wing and garage violated the community's restrictive covenants because: 1) the main structure was no longer a single-family dwelling; and 2) the house no longer complied with the setback lines. Additionally, the Neighbors sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting any further construction on the lot.
After a full hearing on the merits, the special referee ruled the home was a single-family dwelling within the meaning of the term in the restrictive covenants. Furthermore, the special referee determined the house violated "the general scheme of development" and ordered the garage removed and the "mother-in-law wing" altered to better conform to surrounding houses. The special referee also ordered the Buonfortes to pay all court costs and special referee fees. Both parties appeal.
An action to enforce a restrictive covenant is in equity. South Carolina Dep't of Natural Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 622, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2001). As such, this court may view the facts in accordance with our preponderance of the evidence. However, we should not disregard the findings of the special referee, who was in a better position to weigh the credibility of witnesses. Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1989).
Initially, the Neighbors argue the special referee erred by failing to rule on whether the Buonfortes' house was a single-family dwelling or a duplex. We disagree.
An appellate court must view the trial court's statements as a whole to determine its reasoning. State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 584, 582 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2003). Furthermore, "[a]n order should be construed within the context of the proceeding in which it is rendered." Dibble v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278, 282, 322 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Ct.App.1984); see also Eddins v. Eddins, 304 S.C. 133, 135, 403 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ct.App.1991) ().
The special referee's order specifically found the Buonfortes' house, "constitutes a single family unit as defined by the restrictive covenants." Thus, the Neighbors' claim is without merit.
Next, the Neighbors assert the contrary argument that the special referee erred by ruling on whether the Buonfortes' structure constituted a single-family dwelling or a duplex. They contend this issue was neither raised by the pleadings nor argued at trial. We disagree.
"A judgment must conform to the pleadings and be in accordance with the theory of action upon which the case was tried." Chandler v. Merrell, 291 S.C. 227, 228, 353 S.E.2d 135, 136 (1987). However, "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Rule 15(b), SCRCP.
In pertinent part, the Neighbors' complaint alleges, "the. . . [Buonfortes'] construction . . . violate[s] the restrictive covenants in the following particulars: . . . The . . . [Buonfortes] are developing and/or constructing a residence and attached apartment/duplex which is in clear violation of the limit to a single family residence . . . ." Furthermore, during the trial, both the Neighbors and the Buonfortes presented extensive testimony about whether the structure was a single-family dwelling or a duplex. Neither party objected to the admission of the testimony. Thus, this issue was both raised in the pleadings and tried by consent during the trial. Consequently, this issue is without merit.
Next, the Neighbors argue the special referee erred by considering the testimony of two of the Buonfortes' witnesses. Specifically, the Neighbors claim the testimony was irrelevant. We disagree.
"Any evidence that assists in getting at the truth of the issue is relevant and admissible, unless because of some legal rule it is incompetent." Toole v. Salter, 249 S.C. 354, 361, 154 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1967). Furthermore,
[i]n determining a dispute concerning the relevancy of . . . evidence, the question to be resolved is as to whether there is a logical or rational connection between the fact which is sought to be presented and a matter of fact which has been made an issue in the case. Relevancy is that quality of evidence which renders it properly applicable in determining the truth and falsity of matters in issue between the parties to a suit. All that is required to render evidence admissible is that the fact shown thereby legally tends to prove, or make more or less probable, some matter in issue, and bear directly or indirectly thereon.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
When a term is not defined within a contract, evidence of its usual and customary meaning is competent to aid in determining its meaning. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oates, 356 S.C. 378, 382-83, 588 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Ct.App.2003).
The restrictive covenant states only single-family dwellings are permitted on the Buonfortes' property. Furthermore, the covenant expressly prohibits the construction of duplexes. However, neither "single-family dwelling" nor "duplex" is defined within the restrictive covenants.
Thus, attempting to demonstrate the house was a single-family dwelling, the Buonfortes presented the testimony of William Henry Hoge, the Planning Director for the Sumter Planning Commission, and John Humphries, the Building Official for the City of Sumter, who testified that pursuant to the applicable Sumter zoning ordinances, the Buonfortes' house was a single-family dwelling. The Neighbors objected, arguing only the testimony of Robert Ross Dinkins, the person responsible for enforcing the restrictive covenants, was relevant on the issue.
We conclude the admitted testimony was relevant to determine the meaning of the term "single-family dwelling" within the restrictive covenants, as the zoning ordinances were evidence of its usual and customary meaning. Thus, the special referee did not err by admitting the testimony.
Lastly, the Neighbors argue the special referee abused his discretion by ruling the Buonfortes' structure was a single-family dwelling. We disagree.
Dinkins testified he was responsible for enforcing the restrictive covenants, and, in his opinion, the structure was a duplex. The Neighbors also admitted the testimony of Charles R. McCreight, an architect, who opined the structure was a duplex.
In response, the Buonfortes presented the testimony of Hoge and Humphries. Hoge testified it was his duty to enforce the zoning ordinances of the City of Sumter. Additionally, he testified the Indians Hills Subdivision is within the City of Sumter, zoned in an area where duplexes are prohibited. In his opinion, the structure constituted a single-family residence under the applicable Sumter zoning ordinances. Humphries, who is responsible for enforcing the City of Sumter building regulations, testified the structure was a single-family dwelling and did not meet the definition of a duplex within the building code definition.
Viewing the entirety of the record, we agree with the special referee that the weight of the evidence indicates the Buonfortes' structure was a single-family dwelling for purposes of the restrictive covenants.
The Neighbors argue the special referee erred by finding the Buonfortes were not on notice of the restrictive covenants. The Neighbors misunderstand the special referee's ruling.
An appellate court must view the trial court's statements as a whole to determine its reasoning. Evans, 354 S.C. at 584, 582 S.E.2d at 410. Furthermore, "[a]n order should be construed within the context of the proceeding in which it is rendered." Dibble, 283 S.C. at 282, 322...
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