Anderson v. Century Data Systems, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 8410IC293,8410IC293
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Theodore R. ANDERSON Plaintiff Employee, v. CENTURY DATA SYSTEMS, INC. Defendant Employer, and Integon Indemnity Corp. Defendant Carrier.

Page 638

322 S.E.2d 638

71 N.C.App. 540

Theodore R. ANDERSON Plaintiff Employee, v. CENTURY DATA SYSTEMS, INC. Defendant Employer and Integon Indemnity Corp. Defendant Carrier.

No. 8410IC293.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 4, 1984.

Patterson, Dilthey, Clay, Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog by Ronald C. Dilthey and Sanford W. Thompson, IV, Raleigh, for plaintiff, appellee.

Horton & Michaels, by Walter L. Horton, Jr., Raleigh, for defendants, appellants.

HEDRICK, Judge.

The following facts are undisputed: plaintiff-employee is a field service technician employed by defendant to service "computer-type" cash registers sold by defendant-employer. Defendant provided plaintiff a car to use in making service calls, and assigned him a "service territory" in southeastern North Carolina. On 13 March 1980 plaintiff reported to defendant-employer's Wilmington office and was instructed to go to Myrtle Beach, outside his service territory, to repair a slip printer at the Litchfield Beach Inn. Plaintiff left Wilmington at approximately 10:30 a.m. and arrived in Myrtle Beach at approximately noon. After completing his assigned work at the Litchfield Beach Inn, plaintiff and two other employees went to a steak house. One employee, a Branch Manager for defendant-employer in South Carolina, bought beer for himself, plaintiff, and the third employee. At approximately 1:30 a.m., while returning to Wilmington from Myrtle Beach, plaintiff was seriously injured in an accident occurring when the car he was driving veered into the path of an oncoming Mack Tractor Trailer unit. Testing on a blood sample taken from plaintiff at approximately 2:30 a.m. on 14 March 1980 revealed a blood-alcohol level of .199%.

At the hearing on plaintiff's claim for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, the parties stipulated that "Defendants plead the provisions of 97-12 with reference to intoxication in bar of the claim." G.S. 97-12 in pertinent part provides:

No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by:

(1) His intoxication, provided the intoxicant was not supplied by the employer or his agent in a supervisory capacity to the employee;

In support of their contention that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication, defendants introduced evidence tending to show that on the evening of 13 March 1980 plaintiff drank one or two beers between 8:00 and 9:00. Plaintiff returned to his car at approximately 9:30, and he was not intoxicated at that time. At approximately 1:30 a.m. plaintiff was observed by William J. Davis on Highway 17, approximately fifty miles north of Myrtle Beach. Mr. Davis, who was driving a Mack Tractor Trailer unit in the southbound lane, first observed plaintiff when he was about three-quarters of a mile away. Mr. Davis saw the vehicle driven by plaintiff round a curve, at which time the car crossed the center lane, with "most of the car" in the southbound lane. Mr. Davis prepared to stop and flashed his headlights, whereupon plaintiff's car returned to the northbound lane. When the vehicles were approximately 45 feet apart, plaintiff's car again veered into the truck's path, and the collision occurred.

Plaintiff testified that he is unable to remember any of the events surrounding the accident.

The findings of fact made by the Commission from the evidence in the case pertinent to the issue of plaintiff's intoxication are as follows:

6. Plaintiff completed his work at the Litchfield Beach Inn between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. and he and Bernie returned to Myrtle Beach where they met Mr. Frie at the steak house at approximately 8:00 p.m. The three men stayed at the steak house for about one hour and drank two or more bottle of beer each which beer was purchased by Mr. Frie. Thereafter, Mr. Frie left the steak house at approximately 9:00 p.m.

7. Plaintiff and Bernie remained at the steak house for about another hour.... The two men then left the steak house and went to the place in Myrtle Beach where Bernie had left his automobile.... The two men then parted....

8. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on 14 March 1980 the Pinto which plaintiff was driving rounded a curve partly in the wrong side of the road headed in a Northerly direction on U.S. Highway 17 ... 50 or more miles North of Myrtle Beach on the highway....

9. There was headed on the same stretch of straight highway in a Southerly direction at the same time a Mack Tractor pulling a tanker trailer. Such rig was driven at a speed of approximately 55 miles per hour by William J. Davis. The weather was fair and clear. Davis observed the vehicle driven by plaintiff being driven back on the right Northbound lane and of such Pinto being driven straight down the highway at a reasonable rate of speed. Nothing abnormal occurred until the vehicles were only about 45 feet apart. At such time the Pinto suddenly veered into Mr. Davis' lane of travel and the two vehicles collided with the left front of the Pinto striking the left front of the Mack Tractor Trailer.

10. ... Plaintiff's blood alcoholic content upon hospitalization was .199%. At least a portion of the alcohol plaintiff consumed in the hours prior to his injury by accident was supplied by an agent of defendant-employer acting in his supervisory capacity.

* * *

12. It has not been proven that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by intoxication.

Based on the above findings, the Commission made what it termed a conclusion of law:

1. On 14 March 1980 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant employer. It has not been proven that such injury by accident was proximately caused by intoxication. G.S. 97-2(6); G.S. 97-12; Yates v. Hajoca Corp., 1 N.C.App. 553 ; Lassiter v. Town of Chapel Hill, supra [15 N.C.App. 98, 189 S.E.2d 769]. Inscoe v. Industries, 292 N.C. 210 ; Smith v. Central Transport, 51 N.C.App. 316 . However, even if it had been concluded that intoxication was a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident, at least a portion of the alcohol consumed by the plaintiff in the hours prior to his injury was supplied by an agent of defendant-employer acting in his supervisory capacity.

The only question raised on this appeal relates to the affirmative defense described in G.S. 97-12, which provides that an employer is relieved of his obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act where an employee's injury is proximately caused by that employee's intoxication.

It is the duty of the Commission to make findings of fact resolving all issues raised by the evidence given in the case. The evidence in the instant case raises two issues: (1) whether plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and (2) if so, whether the accident was proximately caused by his intoxication.

In regard to the first issue, whether plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident, we note that the Commission did not make an express ultimate finding of fact on this point. Examination of the evidentiary findings made by the Commission, however, persuades us that the Commission implicitly found that plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Indeed, the evidence would not support a finding to the contrary.

We next consider the Commission's findings with respect to whether the accident was proximately caused by plaintiff's intoxication. In this regard, we hold the Commission's statement, labeled a finding of fact, that "[i]t has not been proven that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by intoxication," insufficient to resolve the issue raised by the evidence on this point. We further hold that the Commission's statement is affected by error of law, made manifest in the following additional language in the Commission's opinion:

The cause of plaintiff's motor vehicle veering across the highway into the path of the Mack Tractor is unknown. There are various possibilities as to the cause which would appear to include the possibility of plaintiff dozing or falling asleep, the possibility of his attention being diverted by some unknown cause, the possibility of his suddenly becoming ill, and the possibility of the incident being caused by intoxication. A finding of fact concerning any of such possibilities would, in the opinion of the undersigned, be based upon suspicion and conjecture.

Under G.S. 97-12, the...