Anderson v. City of Alpharetta
Citation | 187 Ga.App. 148,369 S.E.2d 521 |
Decision Date | 13 May 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76072,76072 |
Parties | ANDERSON v. CITY OF ALPHARETTA. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael E. Bergin, Fairburn, for appellant.
Robert A. Harris, Sol., for appellee.
Appellant was tried in the Municipal Court of the City of Alpharetta on a charge of "failure to yield right-of-way." See OCGA § 40-13-21. Appellant was found guilty and, pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-28, she appealed her conviction to the Superior Court of Fulton County. Following a hearing, the superior court dismissed appellant's appeal. Appellant brings this direct appeal from the order of the superior court dismissing her appeal from the municipal court.
The threshold issue is whether this court has jurisdiction over appellant's appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) provides that appeals to this court from decisions of the superior court reviewing the decisions of lower courts "by certiorari or de novo proceedings" are discretionary. Appellant's appeal to the superior court was clearly not taken by certiorari. If, however, appellant's appeal was a "de novo proceeding," her appeal to this court must be dismissed for failure to comply with the discretionary appeal provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35.
OCGA § 40-13-28, as amended in 1986, provides, in pertinent part: Thus, OCGA § 40-13-28, as amended, provides that, with but two procedural exceptions, appeals from traffic convictions in municipal courts are to be taken to the superior courts in the same manner as appeals are taken from the probate courts. The two procedural exceptions are that OCGA § 5-3-29 and OCGA § 5-3-30 are inapplicable to such an appeal. Those two provisions provide that appeals from probate courts are de novo before a jury. Accordingly, appellant's appeal to the superior court clearly cannot be considered as a de novo proceeding before a jury, as would otherwise be true with an appeal taken from a probate court. This is not only implicitly clear from the stated inapplicability of OCGA §§ 5-3-29 and 5-3-30, it is also made explicitly clear from the statutory language of OCGA § 40-13-28 that "[t]he appeal to the superior court shall not be a de novo investigation before a jury...." Since the applicable statutory provision clearly establishes that the appeal is not de novo before a jury, the issue becomes whether the elimination of the jury feature has the added effect of removing the appeal entirely from the concept of a "de novo proceeding" as employed in OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1).
OCGA § 40-13-28, having eliminated the jury feature of an appeal to the superior court, then provides that the appeal "shall be on the record of the hearing as certified by the judge of that court who presided at the hearing below." Thus, it is the superior court itself, rather than a jury, which is charged with the fact-finding responsibility. Rather than rehearing the evidence, the superior court conducts a review of the record of the lower court hearing, and, after conducting such a review, the superior court, as the trior of fact, makes its own determination as to guilt. Thus, the superior court does make a de novo finding as to guilt vel non, in much the same manner as the Full Board of Worker's Compensation reviews the awards of...
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Walton v. State
...that an appeal pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-28 is not an appeal de novo, and expressly disapproved that language in Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 187 Ga.App. 148, 369 S.E.2d 521, indicating that an appeal pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-28 "to the superior court is a 'de novo proceeding.' " Walton, ......
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Shannon v. State, A92A1190
...because he was relying upon the construction of OCGA § 40-13-28 providing for such review articulated in Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 187 Ga.App. 148, 369 S.E.2d 521 (1988), and that the Supreme Court's subsequent disapproval of Anderson in Walton v. State, 261 Ga. 392(2), 405 S.E.2d 29 ......
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Walton v. State
..."de novo," although they are not "before a jury," where a jury trial has been waived in the probate court. Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 187 Ga.App. 148, 149, 369 S.E.2d 521 (1988). We disagree with the Court of Appeals' construction of this statute, and expressly disapprove of language i......
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Giles v. City of Locust Grove, A91A1751
...in Walton v. State, 261 Ga. 392, 405 S.E.2d 29 (1991), this establishes no ground for reversal. In Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 187 Ga.App. 148, 149, 369 S.E.2d 521 (1988), this court held that an appeal under § 40-13-28, though not a "de novo investigation," is "a 'de novo proceeding,' ......