Anderson v. Colvin

Decision Date21 November 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12 CV 3871,12 CV 3871
PartiesKIMBERLY ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kimberly Anderson filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (SSA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423(d), 1381a. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To recover Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the SSA, a claimant must establish that he or she isdisabled within the meaning of the SSA.2 York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2001). A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:

1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?
2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?
3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?
4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?
5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520, 416.909, 416.920; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on May 6, 2009, alleging that she became disabled on January 31, 2009, because of fibromyalgia, carpel tunnel, and migraines. (R. at 38, 146-47). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration, after which Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at 63, 65). On February 14, 2011, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 33-53). The ALJ also heard testimony from Kerry Seaver, a vocational expert (VE). (Id. at 53-60). The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on March 11, 2011. (Id. at 20-28).

Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 31, 2009, the alleged onset date.3 (R. at 22). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable severe impairments: fibromyalgia, carpel tunnel syndrome of the right hand, lupus, depression, bipolar disorder, and migraine headaches. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 22-23).

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)4 and determined that she can perform light work with the following additional limitations: "a sit/stand option [during an eight hour day]; no ladder, rope or scaffold climbing; occasionally stooping and crouching; no kneeling or crawling; performing fine and gross motor manipulation with the right hand; performing simple repetitive tasks in only low stress jobs." (R. at 23). Based on Plaintiff's RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work as a certified nurse's aide. (Id. at 27). At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC, her vocational factors, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the regional economy that Plaintiff can perform, including information clerk, sorter and cashier. (Id. at 27-28). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a disability as defined by the SSA. (Id. at 28).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 16, 2012. (R. at 1). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by § 405(g) of the SSA. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis ofwhether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Relevant Medical Evidence

Plaintiff is a 44-year-old woman who lives with her adult daughter and her grandson, age 11. (R. at 44). When her job as a nursing home care provider ended in January 2009, Anderson did not look for similar work because she did not "trust [herself] as far as lifting people." (Id. at 39). She testified that she has constant pain that "burns . . . aches and [is] giving [her] numbness." (Id.). Her entire right side is affected since carpel tunnel hurts her fingertips to her shoulder, and her back problems impact her buttocks to her ankle. (Id. at 40). Nine months prior to the hearing, she switched doctors from Dr. P. Sales to Dr. Tracy Muhammad because she "just didn't feel like [she] was getting anywhere with Dr. P. Sales, I was steady having pain and [Sales] was just giving me pain meds." (Id.).

According to her testimony, she is doing physical therapy for the fibromyalgia and the doctors are discussing "injections in [her] back." (R. at 43). She is right-handed and has had carpel tunnel in her right hand since October 2010. (Id.). She wears splints and plans to see a surgeon. (Id. at 43-44, 47). She testified that she takes a variety of medications for her mental health and her physical symptoms. (Id. at 44). Anderson also testified that she attends therapy three times a week, both individual and group, for depression and bipolar disease. (Id. at 41).

In terms of her physical abilities, Anderson testified that she could stand for 15-20 minutes at a time, can walk a block or two, but only with pain. (R. at 44). She is driven to medical appointments by a medical car service. (Id. at 46). She can sit forabout 15 minutes, but "[i]t starts to hurt immediately." (Id.). She described her pain as pressure building in her back, buttocks and her leg and arm. (Id.). She testified that she can lift 5-10 pounds. She drops things because her fingers swell, and she wears her brace all of time, except to wash her hands. (Id. at 49). Because of discomfort, she has not slept in her bed for "over maybe six months." (Id. at 50). She had been sleeping in the reclining chair "but now [she] can't sit in the chair and be comfortable." (Id.). She also testified that with all the drugs she is taking she falls asleep; therefore, she no longer drives and is not able to wait at a bus stop. (Id. at 51). She nods off to sleep after she takes her medicine for about 30 minutes every day and has a migraine at least once a week. (Id. at 52).

Her daily activities include getting her grandson off to school and doing housework. (R. at 45). She cooks meals but mostly prepared foods. (R. at 52). She spends "all day long" doing housework because her physical ailments make it so much more difficult for her to get tasks done.5 For instance, when doing laundry, she tosses clothes over the stairs as opposed to carrying them down the stairs. When she does go downstairs, she takes one...

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