Anderson v. Com., 2006-SC-000563-MR.

• Decision Date: 22 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2006-SC-000563-MR.,No. 2006-SC-000894-TG.,2006-SC-000563-MR.,2006-SC-000894-TG.
• Citation: 281 S.W.3d 761
• Parties: Raymond ANDERSON, Jr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

281 S.W.3d 761 Raymond ANDERSON, Jr., Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. No. 2006-SC-000563-MR. No. 2006-SC-000894-TG. Supreme Court of Kentucky. January 22, 2009. Rehearing Denied May 21, 2009.

Shelly R. Fears, Assistant Public Advocate, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellant.

Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, Henry Albert Flores, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.

[281 S.W.3d 762]

Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice MINTON.

I. INTRODUCTION.

Nearly twelve years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Old Chief v. United States¹ that a trial court abused its discretion when it refused to permit a criminal defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm to concede to having a previous felony conviction.² The prosecution had refused to join in a stipulation.³ After Old Chief was rendered, we have hinted that it may apply to cases in Kentucky state courts;⁴ but, until today, we have not had occasion squarely to determine whether to adopt the rationale of Old Chief. After careful deliberation, we adopt what we perceive to be the limited holding of Old Chief: a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm may stipulate to having a prior felony conviction, even without the Commonwealth's consent.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

The facts relevant to these appeals are simple and largely uncontested. Responding to a call about a suspicious vehicle, a police officer encountered Raymond Anderson, Jr., who was sitting in a parked car. After running a records check, the officer discovered that Anderson was wanted on an outstanding warrant. So the officer arrested Anderson and, searching incident to that arrest, found a gun in a compact disc carrier located in the front floorboard. Anderson told the arresting officer that the gun was not his and that he had dropped off a friend, Robert Bucher, nearby and was merely awaiting Bucher's return.

Anderson was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia while in possession of a firearm, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I). The possession of a firearm and PFO I charges progressed to a jury trial.⁵

Shortly after opening statements, but before the calling of witnesses, the Commonwealth sought to introduce a certified judgment showing Anderson's earlier felony convictions for receiving stolen property and escape in the second degree. In response, Anderson offered to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon, arguing that disclosing the specific nature of his

281 S.W.3d 763

felony convictions to the jury would be overly prejudicial. The trial court, ultimately, refused to let Anderson concede to the convictions; and the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce the judgment containing the receiving stolen property and escape convictions.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the arresting officer's testimony of how he had discovered the gun in the car, as well as Anderson's denial of ownership, or even knowledge, of the gun. The arresting officer also testified that Bucher had stated to him that he had seen Anderson carrying the compact disc case when he (Bucher) picked Anderson up from work. Bucher himself similarly testified that Anderson had brought the compact disc case into the car but that he (Bucher) had not seen a gun in the case when he flipped through it to see the compact discs. Bucher also testified that he had not seen the gun and does not own a gun. The Commonwealth also called another officer, who testified that the car contained numerous items of Bucher's personal property. In response, Anderson testified that he had been left in the vehicle while Bucher went to search for his girlfriend; but he denied having a gun or knowing about the gun's presence in the car.

The jury convicted Anderson of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and of being a PFO I. The jury recommended that Anderson be sentenced to five years' imprisonment on the possession of a firearm charge, enhanced to twenty years' imprisonment by virtue of the PFO I conviction. The trial court sentenced Anderson to twenty years' imprisonment in accordance with the jury's recommendation, after which Anderson filed appeal number 2006-SC-000563-MR as a matter of right.⁶ After that notice of appeal had been filed, Anderson filed a pro se motion for relief under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02, which the trial court denied. Anderson appealed the denial of his CR 60.02 motion to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which recommended transfer to this Court. We granted transfer of Anderson's CR 60.02-related appeal, which is case number 2006-SC-000894-TG. We have elected to resolve both appeals in this combined opinion. However, Anderson has made no arguments to us regarding the denial of his CR 60.02 motion.

III. ANALYSIS.

The only issue raised by Anderson is the trial court's denial of his offer to stipulate to being a convicted felon. Resolution of that issue entirely depends upon whether we adopt the holding of Old Chief. After careful consideration, we join the "overwhelming majority of courts ... to have considered the matter"⁷ in choosing to adopt the limited holding of Old Chief.

281 S.W.3d 764

Old Chief is a case remarkably similar to the one at hand. The defendant in Old Chief was charged with the federal offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, an offense similar to Anderson's charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm.⁸ Before trial, the defendant moved to prevent the prosecution from entering into evidence the specific nature of his previous felony conviction (assault).⁹ In an argument echoed by Anderson in this case, the defendant in Old Chief argued to the trial court that the...