Anderson v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 07 May 1958
• Docket Number: 20007,Nos. 20006,s. 20006
• Citation: 214 Ga. 164,104 S.E.2d 90
• Parties: E. R. ANDERSON v. Paul Arthur COOPER, Jr., by Next Friend, et al. SCARBORO ENTERPRISES, Incorporated, v. Paul Arthur COOPER, Jr., by Next Friend, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 90

104 S.E.2d 90

214 Ga. 164

E. R. ANDERSON v. Paul Arthur COOPER, Jr., by Next Friend, et al.

SCARBORO ENTERPRISES, Incorporated, v. Paul Arthur COOPER, Jr., by Next Friend, et al.

Nos. 20006, 20007.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 7, 1958.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court.

Under the circumstances in this case, the injured child involved was an invitee rather than a licensee.

This case comes to this court upon the grant of an application for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The facts, very briefly, are that Paul Arthur Cooper, Jr., an infant nine months of age was injured when he was carried into a bakery shop by his father who went into the bakery shop to purchase bakery products. The bakery shop was owned and operated by the defendant Anderson in a building owned by the defendant Scarboro Enterprises, Inc. The trial court sustained the general demurrers of both defendants and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court as to both defendants. This decision is assigned as error in the application for certiorari and in the proceedings before this court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals appears in Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga.App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770, where a full statement of facts will be found which need not be repeated here. The petition for certiorari contains numerous grounds of complaint, the result of which is to complain of almost all of the language of the Court of Appeals in the above cited opinion. We will deal here only with that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals which we consider to need further comment.

Those rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the application for certiorari and are not dealt with in this opinion we consider to be sound.

No. 20006:

T. J. Long and Ben Weinberg, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Wilson, Branch & Barwick, M. Cook Barwick, Thomas S. Bentley, Atlanta, Sarah Frances McDonald, B. Hugh Burgess, Decatur, for defendants in error.

No. 20007:

B. Hugh Burgess, Sarah Frances McDonald, Decatur, for plaintiff in error.

Wilson, Branch & Barwick, Thomas S. Bentley, T. J. Long and Ben Weinberg, Jr., Atlanta, for defendants in error.

WYATT, Presiding Justice.

1. The question which primarily moved this court to grant the application for certiorari was whether the injured child, under the circumstances of this case, was an invitee or a licensee. The Court of Appeals held the child to be an invitee. While we agree with that decision, the opinion of the Court of Appeals contains language which we believe to be subject to misconstruction which might lead to a misunderstanding as to the duty of the courts of this State in considering, following and construing the enactments of the General Assembly. For this reason, we have decided to elaborate upon what was said by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case.

While the Court of Appeals has had occasion in a number of cases to consider the question here involved, the question presented is apparently one of first impression in this court. No case in the Supreme Court has been cited to us, and we have found none, involving this exact question. The focal point of the various contentions of all the parties in this case is Code, § 105-402, which defines a licensee and reads as follows: 'Licensees; definition; Liability for injury to.--A licensee is a person who is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted expressly or impliedly to go thereon merely for his own interest, convenience or gratification. The owner of such premises is liable to a licensee only for wilful or wanton injury.'

One point with reference to the above-quoted Code section upon which all parties agree is that this section is plain and unambiguous. Applicants for certiorari devote some considerable argument to this effect. They insist that, when a Code section is clear and unambiguous, it needs no construction, and the court is bound to follow the words of the statute regardless of any intention the legislature might have had in adopting the statute. With all of these conclusions we are in complete agreement. This court has consistently held that, 'Where an act is plain, unambiguous, and positive, and is not capable of two constructions, the court is not authorized to construe the act according to the supposed intention of the Legislature.' Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313, 106 S.E. 280, 281. See also Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Whitaker, 172 Ga. 663, 158 S.E. 416; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. McFarley, 191 Ga. 334, 12 S.E.2d 355. The reason for this rule is well stated in Strawbridge v. Mann, 17 Ga. 454, where it is said: '* * * And in my opinion, the rule of rules in the interpretation of statutes, is to follow the words, if their meaning is plain. This rule, it is true, I should feel myself at liberty to depart from, in the case of some old English Statutes, and some Statutes of our own which pursue old English Statutes, such as the Statute of Frauds and Statutes of Limitation; and in the case of a few other Statutes with respect to which, as with respect to those named, a different rule has been used so long as to have become as well known as the words of the Statutes, and to have been recognized in various ways by the legislative power as the true rule.

'But as a general thing, with respect to the Acts of our own Legislature, I should feel myself rigorously bound down to the words. The words of those Acts are what the great majority of the people of the State shape their actions by. It is the words only, that are published to them * * * and when, after they have followed the words of the law, they are told by the Courts that they have not followed the law, they feel, that for them, the law has been turned into a snare. And it is difficult to say that they have not the right so to feel.' These reasons are as valid today as they were in 1885 when they were given. The same rules apply to Code sections adopted by the legislature. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co. v. Wise, 190 Ga. 254, 9 S.E.2d 63.

Therefore, since it is agreed that we are dealing with a plain and unambiguous statute, it is not necessary to search for any intention the legislature might have had in adopting it. It is only necessary to follow the words of the Code section. The applicants contend that it is clear that the injured child in this case is neither a 'customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises,' and that, therefore, he is a licensee under Code, §...