Anderson v. Cribbs
| Decision Date | 14 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | A22A1225 |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. CRIBBS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Alanna Anderson, the mother of a minor daughter she shares with Chad Cribbs, appeals an order of the Superior Court of Cobb County granting Cribbs' pro se petition for legitimation arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to require Cribbs to submit to a drug test based upon his known history of substance abuse; (2) entering a parenting plan that is not in the child's best interest; and (3) failing to award Anderson current or retroactive child support. Finding no error, we affirm.[1] "When reviewing a superior court's custody ruling, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Pearce, 334 Ga.App. 84 (778 S.E.2d 248) (2015).[2] So viewed, the record demonstrates that Anderson and Cribbs are the parents of a child born out of wedlock on November 28, 2012. Cribbs filed a pro se petition to legitimate the child on August 6, 2018.[3] In November 2019 the trial court entered a temporary order granting Cribbs' petition for legitimation, awarding joint custody of the child to Anderson and Cribbs, and awarding primary physical custody to Anderson. The trial court also awarded Cribbs visitation on every other weekend, but "[o]nce [he] present[ed] the Court a drug screen indicating he is negative for THC, he shall have parenting time" every weekend. The trial court declined to order child support at that time.[4]
During the final hearing, Anderson requested at least one weekend of visitation per month (in view of Cribbs' visitation each weekend)[5] and a specific visitation schedule over the summer. Anderson also "ask[ed] . . . that [Cribbs] take a drug test" and that the trial court award child support, retroactive child support, and attorney fees. Testimony during the hearing suggested that the child resided with Cribbs in 2018 and attended an elementary school in Cribbs' district because that school was better than the school in Anderson's district. Cribbs testified that he "paid for everything that happens" when he had the child. For her part, Anderson testified that Cribbs did not contribute to the child's activities, clothing needs, insurance, tutoring, or similar expenses. Following the trial court's November 2019 temporary order, the child resided with Anderson.
Cribbs works as a building custodian for the Fulton County School District and lives with his wife and two children in Marietta near Smyrna. Anderson works an overnight shift as a police dispatcher for the City of Atlanta and has a babysitter for the child during the nights that she is at work. Anderson resides in Smyrna, and the child now attends King Springs Elementary School in Smyrna, located in Anderson's district. The child independently boards a school bus in the mornings within view of Anderson's residence. Anderson intended to continue the child's enrollment at King Springs, and Cribbs indicated that if he were granted primary physical custody, Cribbs' wife would take the child to school due to his work schedule.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court noted that "this is not a crisis case" and observed that The trial court also identified Cribbs and Anderson as good candidates for "coparenting without anger." Thereafter, the trial court entered a final order of legitimation which, relevant to this appeal, incorporated a final parenting plan that awarded joint legal and physical custody to Anderson and Cribbs and established a "2-2-5-5"[6] parenting schedule. The trial court also determined that Anderson was not entitled to child support payments and declined to award retroactive child support because "both parents have covered the expenses of the child while in their custody." This appeal followed.
1. In her first enumeration, Anderson contends that the trial court failed to consider Cribbs' history of positive drug screens and failed to require him to submit to a drug screen at the final legitimation hearing. We find no abuse of discretion.
In determining to whom custody of a child should be awarded, "[t]he duty of the judge in all such cases shall be to exercise discretion to look to and determine solely what is for the best interest of the child and what will best promote the child's welfare and happiness and to make his or her award accordingly." OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (2). Judges may consider any relevant factor in evaluating the best interests of the child "including, but not limited to: . . . [a]ny evidence of substance abuse by either parent." OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3) (Q).
When considering a dispute regarding the custody of a child, a trial court has very broad discretion, looking always to the best interest of the child. This Court will not interfere unless the evidence shows a clear abuse of discretion, and where there is any evidence to support the trial court's finding, we will not find there was an abuse of discretion.
(Citation omitted.) Bridger v. Franze, 348 Ga.App. 227 (820 S.E.2d 223) (2018).
During the final hearing, Anderson's counsel "ask[ed]" that Cribbs take a drug test in view of his history of drug use. When the trial court asked Cribbs if he still smoked marijuana, he replied he did not and agreed to take a drug test. The trial court indicated that it was "not ordering [Cribbs] to take [a drug test]" but simply "giving [Cribbs] an option to take it." On cross-examination, Cribbs again denied smoking marijuana and agreed to take a drug test. Anderson also remarked that it "would be nice" if Cribbs took a drug test. The record demonstrates that, prior to the trial court's November 20, 2019 temporary hearing, Cribbs had two "positive" drug screens for THC on November 6 and November 19.[7] After the temporary hearing, however, the record shows four "negative" drug screens on December 6, December 16, January 14, 2020, and January 27, 2020.[8] The trial court did not require Cribbs to submit to a drug screen in its final order.
We find no abuse of discretion. At the outset, the final hearing transcript indicates that the trial court considered Cribbs' prior drug use in determining the child's best interest, questioning Cribbs on any recent drug use. See OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3) (Q). Cribbs' testimony, as well as his consistent "negative" drug screen results following the temporary hearing, did not suggest any ongoing substance abuse or a need for additional drug screens, nor did Anderson allege that Cribbs' substance abuse continued unabated or that his alleged drug use had a detrimental effect on the child. Compare In the Interest of D. L., 268 Ga.App. 360, 363 (1) (601 S.E.2d 714) (2004) (); In the Interest of M. N. L., 221 Ga.App. 123, 124 (1) (470 S.E.2d 753) (1996) (same). To be sure, the only evidence of substance abuse before the trial court was that Cribbs no longer smoked marijuana. Moreover, Anderson has not cited any authority suggesting that a drug screen is mandatory under such circumstances. See OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (3) (Q) () (emphasis supplied). Against this backdrop, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to order further drug screens for Cribbs.
2. Next, Anderson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by entering a "2-2-5-5" parenting plan that required the child to move between her parents' homes every two to five days - instead of on a weekly basis - and that the plan is not in the child's best interest. We disagree.
(Citation omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 301 Ga. 218, 220 (1) (800 S.E.2d 282) (2017).
Evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that the child resided with Cribbs in 2018 and that Cribbs later exercised visitation each weekend. During his visits, Cribbs and the child would visit parks, take walks, go cycling or swimming, and participate in other family activities. Cribbs testified that he wanted more time with the child and to provide the child with a more stable environment due to Anderson's overnight work schedule. Cribbs did not have the child in any extracurricular activities, but testified that he did pay for any activities and costs the child incurred while in his care. Cribbs and his wife own a five-bedroom home, such that each child has their own room, in a neighborhood where other children are present. Cribbs sought primary physical custody.
Anderson testified that her neighborhood also has several children and that the child plays with them outside daily. Both parents were familiar with the child's teachers, although Cribbs and Anderson had differing views on the child's progress at school.[9] In addition to extracurricular activities like dance and gymnastics, Anderson takes the child on hikes and walks. Anderson asked to have visitation one weekend...
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