Anderson v. Dauphin Cnty. Adult Prob. Office
| Decision Date | 25 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-00878 |
| Parties | WARREN D. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. DAUPHIN COUNTY ADULT PROBATION OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(KANE, J.)
(SAPORITO, M.J.)
This is a pro se federal civil rights action. The plaintiff claims that the several defendants violated his civil rights in connection with an allegedly unlawful search of his home and his subsequent arrest on drug possession and other charges. The defendants have sorted themselves into separately represented groups and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, or for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons expressed below, it is recommended that the motions be granted and the complaint be dismissed with respect to all defendants but one.
On May 6, 2015, the Court received and filed the pro se complaint, signed and dated by the plaintiff on April 27, 2015. (Doc. 1). At the time, Anderson was incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
In his complaint, Anderson has asserted Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and excessive force claims and an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has also asserted supplemental state law claims for unreasonable search and seizure under the Pennsylvania state constitution and official oppression under a Pennsylvania criminal statute. Anderson seeks an award of compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants. He does not request declaratory or injunctive relief.
The complaint alleges that, on the afternoon of May 17, 2013, officers from the Dauphin County Adult Probation Office, the Dauphin County Sheriff's Department, and the Lower Paxton Police Department sought to execute an arrest warrant on an individual named Kevin Ramos, a white Hispanic male, whom they believed to reside at 2308 Orange Street in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the home where Anderson resided. Anderson alleges that Ramos did not live there, nor was he present at the time.
One of the officers knocked on the front door. A black male, later identified as Ronnie Daniels, opened the front door, saw the several policeofficers outside, and attempted to close the door. The officers kicked in the front door and immediately detained Daniels in the home's living room, handcuffing him and directing him to sit on a couch while the officers searched for Ramos.
When officers searched upstairs, they found Anderson, also a black male, in the bathroom, where the officers later claimed to have found him flushing marijuana down the toilet. Anderson was handcuffed and taken downstairs, where he too was instructed to sit on the couch. One of the officers, probation officer Tom Walton, apparently believed that Anderson had something in his mouth and used a Taser to shock Anderson and force him to spit it out. The officers claimed to have recovered several small bags of drugs that had been secreted in Anderson's mouth.1
At this time, apparently having determined that Ramos was not in the house, officers asked for consent to continue their search of the home. Anderson consented to the search, though the allegations of his complaint suggest that he did so in fear of the further use of force. Based on theallegations of the complaint, it does not appear that officers found any additional evidence of a criminal nature. At some point—the complaint does not clearly state when—Anderson alleges that he was punched in the ribs by multiple officers.
The complaint specifically identifies the following defendants as having participated in the conduct described above: Dauphin County probation officer Tom Walton; Dauphin County probation officer Brandon Reigle; Dauphin County probation officer (first-name unknown) Brunell; Dauphin County deputy sheriff Sean Reed; Dauphin County deputy sheriff (first-name unknown) McMillian; and Lower Paxton Township police officer Dan Smeck. The complaint further names Harrisburg police officer Jon Fustine as a defendant. Fustine did not arrive on scene until after these events, but he prepared and filed the criminal complaint against Anderson, charging him with various drug-related offenses based on evidence recovered as a result of the conduct described above. The complaint also names the Dauphin County Adult Probation Office, the Dauphin County Sheriff's Department, and the Lower Paxton Township Police Departments as defendants, apparently on a respondeat superior basis.
The several defendants have sorted themselves into separately represented groups and entered their appearances. Each of the various groups of defendants has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or for judgment on the pleadings on the same basis, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 12; Doc. 26; Doc. 27; Doc. 45). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. (Doc. 13; Doc. 32; Doc. 28; Doc. 43; Doc. 46).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although theCourt must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant has the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1980); Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 491, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Although a plaintiff is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond to a motion to dismiss, he has no obligation to do so—he may opt to stand on the pleadings rather than file an opposition. The Court must nevertheless examine the complaint and determine whether it states a claim as a matter of law. Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991); Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1990). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
One set of defendants has answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the theory that the plaintiff failed to state a claim is reviewed under the same standards that apply to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Corbett, 79 F. Supp. 3d 536, 541 (). "[T]he difference between the two is procedural—a motion for judgment on the pleadings if filed after the pleadings are closed, and a motion to dismiss is filed in lieu of an answer." Behar v. Pa. Dep't ofTransp., 791 F. Supp. 2d 383, 403 (M.D. Pa. 2011). Ultimately, "the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which if accepted as true, states a facially plausible claim for relief." Caprio, 709 F.3d at 147.
Anderson has brought this federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible forthe alleged civil rights violations. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).
Here, Anderson has asserted several claims arising out of the circumstances of his arrest on May 17, 2013. First,...
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