Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC

• Decision Date: 01 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1846.,12–1846.
• Citation: 709 F.3d 142
• Parties: Ray V. CAPRIO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Appellant v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC; John Does 1–25.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

709 F.3d 142

Ray V. CAPRIO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Appellant

v.HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC; John Does 1–25.

No. 12–1846.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 14, 2012.

Filed: March 1, 2013.

Joseph K. Jones, Esq., (Argued), Fairfield, NJ, for Appellant.

Richard J. Perr, Esq., (Argued), Fineman, Krekstein & Harris, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.

BEFORE: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Ray V. Caprio filed a complaint against Defendant Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC (“HRRG”), alleging two claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Caprio appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting HRRG's motion for judgment on the pleadings. We will vacate the District Court's order and will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

It is uncontested that “HRRG is primarily in the business of acquiring and/or collecting debts that are allegedly due to another.” (JA Vol. II at 6.) HRRG therefore acknowledges that, at least in certain circumstances, it may fall under the FDCPA's definition of a “debt collector.” See15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“The term ‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”). This case arose out of a December 7, 2010 letter that HRRG sent to Caprio in an attempt to collect an alleged debt that Caprio owed to another.

The body of this one-page and double-sided “Collection Letter” consisted of the following four paragraphs:

The health care provider(s) listed below, recently hired Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC (HRRG) to collect the balance on this account. Our client's records show you as the person responsible for payment of the charges for PHYSICIAN SERVICES.

If we can answer any questions, or if you feel you do not owe this amount, please call us toll free at 800–984–9115 or write us at the above address. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. (NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.)

You may send payment in full. Just fill in your credit card information on the reverse, or enclose your check/money order payable to the creditor along with the payment voucher below. The reply envelope provided needs no postage. Unless specified, your payment will be applied to the oldest balance first.

We hope to have your full cooperation in this collection matter.

(JA Vol. II at 16.)

The letterhead (on the left side at the top of the document) included a stylized “HRRG” logo and, in all capital letters and in a seemingly larger font than the body of the Collection Letter, a Florida post office box mailing address. Using an even larger font, the letterhead (on the right side at the top of the document) also included the same toll-free telephone number provided in the second paragraph. A Spanish-language toll-free telephone number, evidently in the same font size used for the mailing address, appeared right below this number. Furthermore, the Collection Letter included both HRRG's web address (“hrrgcollections.com”) as well as the following subject line: “Re: JIM002 Validation Notification.” ( Id.) The bottom part of the Collection Letter then consisted of a detachable payment slip with an Ohio post office box mailing address and a space for the “Amount Enclosed.” This slip expressly identified the creditor (“EMER PHY ASSOC NORTH JERS”), the account numbers, the debtor's name (“Regarding CAPRIO, RAY V.”), the amount owed (“$49.51”), and the service date (“07/06/10”). There was a form to provide credit card (and insurance) information on the reverse side of the slip.

The reverse side of the Collection Letter (at the center of the page above the slip) contained the following statement, apparently in the same (or at least a very similar) font size as the letterhead's mailing address:

This is an attempt to collect a debt from a debt collection agency.

Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.

Pursuant to Sec. 809 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgement [sic] and mail you a copy of such judgement [sic] or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

( Id. at 17.) This statement is known as the “Validation Notice.”

Based on this Collection Letter, Caprio filed a putative class action complaint under the FDCPA. He specifically alleged that HRRG violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g because “the least sophisticated consumer would believe that he should choose either of the instructions as set forth in the second paragraph of the notice and either call the toll free number or write to HRRG at the address on the letter, to dispute the alleged debt.” ( Id. at 11.) However, a dispute of a debt must be in writing in order to be effective in this Circuit. HRRG also allegedly violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by “providing language that misrepresents to the least sophisticated consumer that she can call [sic] either call the toll free number or write to HRRG at the address on the letter, to dispute the alleged debt, when in fact she must dispute the alleged debt in writing for the dispute to be effective.” ( Id. at 12.)

After filing its answer, HRRG moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The District Court then granted HRRG's motion. See Caprio v. HRRG, Civil Action No. 2:11–cv–2877 (DMC)(MF), 2012 WL 847486 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2012).

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction over this FDCPA proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

A district court's order granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is generally reviewed under a plenary standard. See, e.g., Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 390 (3d Cir.2012). In turn, a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the theory that the plaintiff failed to state a claim is reviewed under the same standards that apply to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Revell v. Port. Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir.2010), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 995, 178 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which if accepted as true, states a facially plausible claim for relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir.2012).

The current appeal generally presents this Court with a legal inquiry. In particular, “whether language in a collection letter contradicts or overshadows the validation notice is a question of law.” Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 n. 2 (3d Cir.2000).

III.

A. The § 1692g Claim

Both the District Court as well as the parties themselves devote most of their attention to Caprio's claim under § 1692g. Although presenting us with an unusual set of circumstances, we ultimately conclude that the District Court committed reversible error by granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of HRRG as to this § 1692g claim.

Section 1692g(a) specifically requires a debt collector to provide the following information to the debtor:

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

“Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a) contain the validation notice—the statements that inform the consumer how to obtain verification of the debt and that he has thirty days in which to do so.” Wilson, 225 F.3d at 353–54.Section 1692g(b) then states, in part, that:

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30–day period referred to in subsection (a) of this section unless the consumer has notified the...