Anderson v. Davidson
Decision Date | 08 February 2019 |
Docket Number | E069398 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | A.K. ANDERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bill DAVIDSON, as Acting Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent. |
A.K. Anderson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Jones and Eric M. Fox, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
In a prior appeal, this court affirmed a judgment denying A.K. Anderson’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the September 15, 2012, suspension of his driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). ( A.K. Anderson v. George Valverde (June 12, 2015, E059981), 2015 WL 3653591 (Cal.App. 4th Dist.) [nonpub. opn.] (Anderson I ).) We concluded the record contained substantial evidence that Anderson had been diagnosed by a neurologist with a seizure disorder, and that he had voluntarily discontinued taking anti-seizure medication.
After our first decision became final, Anderson submitted to the DMV a report prepared by a family practice physician that purported to demonstrate Anderson suffered from no medical ailments whatsoever, and that he required no medications. A traffic safety officer concluded the report did not demonstrate Anderson no longer suffered from a seizure disorder, and the officer ordered that Anderson’s license remain suspended as of September 15, 2012. Anderson once again unsuccessfully petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate challenging his original license suspension and the order refusing to lift the suspension.
On appeal, Anderson again challenges the original suspension of his driver’s license, and he argues the DMV could not refuse to reinstate his driver’s license under Vehicle Code section 12806, subdivision (c) ( § 12806(c) ), because there is no evidence he suffered a seizure or a lapse of consciousness within the last three years.
Anderson’s challenge to the original license suspension was determined finally in his appeal from the denial of his first petition for writ of mandate, so he is barred from relitigating it again in this appeal. The plain language of section 12806(c) demonstrates the DMV may refuse to issue or renew a driver’s license to three categories of motorists, including those who suffer from "a disorder characterized by lapses of consciousness." The requirement of a seizure or a lapse of consciousness within the last three years only applies to motorists who suffer from "any condition which may bring about recurrent lapses." (Ibid .) Because we conclude the record contains substantial evidence that Anderson suffers from "a disorder characterized by lapses of consciousness" (ibid .), we affirm the judgment.
Anderson came to the attention of the DMV when it received a confidential morbidity report from Community Hospital of San Bernardino, indicating Anderson suffered from a seizure on June 6, 2006. On July 13, 2006, the DMV mailed Anderson a notice of reexamination, asking him to have his doctor fill out medical forms. The deadline was August 6, 2006, in order to avoid having his license suspended as of August 7, 2006. (Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On January 14, 2008, the DMV issued an order of suspension informing Anderson that his driving privilege would be suspended as of January 18, 2008. The DMV issued the suspension under Vehicle Code section 13801 because Anderson had not completed the reexamination process. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
The DMV held administrative hearings on January 14, September 16, and September 17, 2012. A notice of findings and decision, dated September 18, 2012, withdrew Anderson’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle effective September 15, 2012. Further, a hearing report, also dated September 18, 2012, made the following findings of fact: Anderson’s ability The hearing report described that Anderson "rambled on" at the hearing regarding doctors and a woman claiming that Anderson had a seizure in his sleep. More important for the purposes of this appeal, Anderson "presented no affirmative evidence or testimony to rebut the department’s evidence in this hearing." ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
The DMV conducted a departmental review and mailed Anderson a notice of decision on October 3, 2012, in which it affirmed its order of suspension. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On October 29, 2012, Anderson, acting in propria persona, filed in the superior court a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On July 15, 2013, Anderson filed in the superior court a petitioner’s statement of intention in which he requested the restoration of his driving privilege and $25,000 with interest. Anderson also requested to "[o]btain[ ] the accountability of my life with property, monetary, and liability reimbursement" and to "proceed with discovery in this case and other cases." Anderson further stated that he did not have a seizure on July 13, 2006, as "one or more doctors have claimed," but rather he was assaulted on the job. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On July 26, 2013, the DMV filed its opposition to the writ petition. The DMV argued Anderson had not carried his burden to show that the challenged DMV decision was incorrect. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
The hearing on the writ petition was held on August 16, 2013. The superior court referred to the neurologist’s report of September 5, 2012, stating that Anderson had suffered seizures within the previous three years and that he refused to take anti-seizure medications, which put him at risk of having another seizure. It also referred to Anderson’s admission to the hearing officer that he was not taking his medication and to his claim, unsupported by any evidence, that his doctors had misdiagnosed him. The court stated that "the overwhelming weight of the evidence" supported the DMV decision. After hearing from Anderson, the court denied the petition. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On October 28, 2013, the superior court entered judgment on its denial of the writ petition. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.)
On June 12, 2015, this court affirmed the judgment in Anderson’s first administrative mandate proceeding, concluding, inter alia, that the judgment was amply supported by the evidence provided by Anderson’s treating physician. ( Anderson I , supra , E059981.) We rejected Anderson’s unsupported assertion that he had been misdiagnosed, stating: ( Ibid .)
On July 21, 2016, the DMV mailed a notice to Anderson informing him of a scheduled telephone appointment on July 27, 2016. The record does not disclose whether Anderson completed the interview.
On August 25, 2016, the DMV informed Anderson that he had failed to appear for an in-person interview scheduled for that same day. Consequently, the DMV ordered that Anderson’s license "remain suspended" effective September 15, 2012.
Anderson appeared for an in-person interview on September 13, 2016, to determine whether his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle was still affected by a condition characterized by a lapse of consciousness or control. During the interview, Anderson again denied having a seizure on June 6, 2006; he denied that he ever suffered a seizure or a lapse of consciousness; and he claimed that the genesis of his misdiagnosis with a seizure disorder was a lie his ex-wife told paramedics following a verbal confrontation. Anderson said that in 2008, he started taking Keppra
and Dilantin on the advice of his doctor, but he stopped taking the medication in 2011 "as he was not aware that it was to treat him for Epilepsy." Anderson also stated he had been "manipulated into taking medications," but he did not elaborate on the allegation "or provide any additional details as to why he was taking the medication for three (3) years."
The driver safety officer who conducted the interview concluded Anderson ...
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