Anderson v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 137,137
• Parties: Charles ANDERSON v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 217

310 Md. 217

528 A.2d 904

Charles ANDERSON v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE et al.

No. 137, Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 30, 1987.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief) Baltimore, for appellant.

Susan Sugar Nathan, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and C. Frederick Ryland, Sp. Atty., Clifton T. Perkins Hosp., Jessup, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ^* ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH ^* and McAULIFFE, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

I.

Charles Anderson, at the conclusion of his first degree murder trial, was found "not guilty by reason of insanity" ¹ on April 8, 1981. The Criminal Court of Baltimore ordered him to the custody of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for an examination and evaluation to determine whether he should be confined in a mental hospital. In accordance with the recommendation of the Department, the court committed Anderson on April 21, 1981, to the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center.

Three years later, on October 11, 1984, Anderson applied to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for an administrative release hearing, asserting that he "no longer meets the standards for commitment to a mental institution." The circuit court granted Anderson's request for an administrative release hearing but ruled "that defendant's administrative hearing shall be conducted under the standard of Maryland's new law on incompetency and criminal responsibility, effective July 1, 1984." Specifically, the portion of the new law which the circuit court held applicable provides that the individual seeking release should bear the burden of proof in the administrative proceeding. Previously, the State had borne this burden of proof. Anderson had argued that applying the new law to him would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, but the circuit court rejected the argument. Anderson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed. Anderson v Dep't of Health & Mental Hyg., 64 Md.App. 674, 498 A.2d 679 (1985). The appellate court held that the ex post facto prohibition was inapplicable because the purpose of Anderson's confinement "was solely for 'in-patient care or treatment' ... [and] not a penal or punitive consequence" of the criminal act, 64 Md.App. at 693-694, 498 A.2d 679. Thereafter we issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the application to Anderson of the new burden of proof provision would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.

II.

The relevant statutory background is as follows. In 1982 the Governor created a "Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity" in criminal cases. Enacted pursuant to the report of the Task Force, Chapter 501 of the Acts of 1984, effective July 1, 1984, altered certain aspects of the insanity defense laws. ²

Prior to July 1, 1984, upon a plea of insanity and introduction of sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the defendant's sanity, the State had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane at the time of the criminal activity. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964). See Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 394 n. 1, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1231, 84 L.Ed.2d 368 (1985); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 524, 398 A.2d 421 (1979); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 209 n. 2, 362 A.2d 629 (1976); Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 511-513, 206 A.2d 802 (1965).

Thereafter, if the State failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged but insane at the time of the offense, Maryland Code (1982), § 12-110 of the Health-General Article, required the trial court immediately to

"[c]ommit the individual to the Department for an examination and evaluation to determine whether the individual:

(i) Is mentally retarded or has a mental disorder; and

(ii) Because of mental retardation or a mental disorder, would be a danger to the individual or the person or property of another, if released from confinement...."

This initial commitment was only for a limited time for the purpose of examination and evaluation. This was followed by a hearing at which the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the criminal defendant met the standards for indefinite commitment. See § 12-113(b) and (c) of the Health-General Article (1982); Comment to § 12-113 of the Health-General Article (1986 Cum.Supp.).

Once committed for an indefinite period, a defendant could periodically request to be released. He could choose either an administrative proceeding with judicial review, or a direct statutory judicial proceeding, or a habeas corpus proceeding. Section 12-114(c) authorized the direct judicial release proceeding, either with or without a jury, at which the criminal defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his fitness for release. The habeas corpus proceeding was provided for in § 10-804. Section 12-114(b) authorized the administrative release hearing before the Department at which, prior to July 1, 1984, the State had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the criminal defendant should continue to be confined. See Salinger v. Superintendent, 206 Md. 623, 629-631, 112 A.2d 907 (1955); Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271, 273-275 (4th Cir.1979); Daniels v. Superintendent, 34 Md.App. 173, 366 A.2d 1064 (1976).

Ch. 501 of the Acts of 1984 abolished the rule that in the criminal trial the State had the burden of establishing the defendant's sanity. Section 12-109 of the Health-General Article (1986 Cum.Supp.) now provides:

"(b) Burden of Proof.--The defendant has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally responsible."

Chapter 501 also eliminated the initial commitment examination and hearing procedures; instead it contained an automatic commitment requirement. Section 12-111(a) provides that "after a verdict of not criminally responsible, the court immediately shall commit the defendant to the Department for institutional, inpatient care or treatment." This automatic commitment continues indefinitely until the criminal defendant prevails at an administrative proceeding or a judicial release hearing or obtains a writ of habeas corpus.

Lastly, Ch. 501 abolished the requirement that, in an administrative release hearing, the State has the burden of proving the necessity for the criminal defendant's continued commitment. Section 12-113(d) now places the burden of proof on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer meets the standards for commitment. Thus, under the new statute, the criminal defendant must prove his eligibility for release whether in a judicial proceeding or an administrative proceeding. ³

Additionally, Ch. 501 contained a section expressly dealing with the applicability of its provisions to various situations where the criminal act occurred prior to Ch. 501's effective date of July 1, 1984. Section 4 of the statute stated, inter alia, that the new provisions would apply to a criminal defendant adjudicated insane "who is under commitment to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene on or after the effective date of this Act...."

III.

In challenging the decisions of both courts below, Anderson relies solely on the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. See Constitution of the United States, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 17. He contends that, because the burden of proof provisions for release were changed subsequent to his criminal activity, application of Ch. 501's new burden of proof provision to his administrative release hearing would operate to his disadvantage and, therefore, would violate the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The State, while not disputing that the change in the burden of proof operates to Anderson's disadvantage, contends that the ex post facto prohibition is inapplicable because his confinement in a mental hospital does not constitute "punishment."

It has, of course, been settled since the Supreme Court's decision in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), that the federal ex post facto prohibition relates only to criminal or penal laws or the consequences of an offense. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964-965, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 243, 203 A.2d 697 (1964); Lynn v. State, 84 Md. 67, 78, 35 A. 21 (1896); Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 581-582, 605-606, 624-625 (1865); Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill. 299, 305 (1850). The same is true of the ex post facto clause in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which has been viewed as having the same meaning as the federal prohibition. See, e.g., Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 608-609, 471 A.2d 730 (1984); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 735-736, 415 A.2d 830 (1980); Elliott v. Elliott, 38 Md. 357, 362 (1873); Baugher v. Nelson, supra, 9 Gill. at 306. ⁴ While the ex post facto prohibition relates only to criminal offenses, the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle that the prohibition extends broadly to "any law passed after the commission of an offense which ... 'in relation to that offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.' " Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235, 2 S.Ct. 443, 455, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), quoting Justice Washington in United States v. Hall, 2 Wash.C.C. 366, 26 Fed.Cas. 84, 86 (Case No. 15,285) (1809) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also pointed to "the liberal construction which this court ... [has given] to the words ex post facto law,--a construction in manifest accord with the purpose of the constitutional convention to protect...