Anderson v. Dorchester Cnty.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2:20-cv-2084-DCN-MGB,2:20-cv-2084-DCN-MGB
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: ALEX ANDERSON, Individually as Parent &, Legal Guardian; TYDREAN A. ANDERSON, Individually and as incompetent person, Plaintiffs, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY; DORCHESTER COUNTY SHERRIFF'S OFFICE; OFFICER CALLIE PIRKEL, Individually and in her capacity of the Dorchester County Sherriff's Office; DORCHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT II; DUBOSE MIDDLE SCHOOL; PRINCIPAL TED BRINKLEY, Individually and in his official capacity as Principal of Dubose Middle School, Defendants.

ALEX ANDERSON, Individually as Parent &, Legal Guardian;

TYDREAN A. ANDERSON, Individually and as incompetent person, Plaintiffs, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY; DORCHESTER COUNTY SHERRIFF'S OFFICE;

OFFICER CALLIE PIRKEL, Individually and in her capacity of the Dorchester County Sherriff's Office;

DORCHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT II; DUBOSE MIDDLE SCHOOL;

PRINCIPAL TED BRINKLEY, Individually and in his official capacity as

Principal of Dubose Middle School, Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-2084-DCN-MGB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

March 30, 2021

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker's report and recommendation ("R&R"), ECF No. 46, recommending that the court grant defendant Dubose Middle School's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, and defendant Ted Brinkley's ("Brinkley") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12; and grant in part and deny in part defendant Dorchester School District II 's ("the District") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11, and defendants Dorchester County, Dorchester County Sherriff's Office ("DCSO"), and Callie Pirkel's ("Pirkel") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16. After Magistrate Judge Baker filed the R&R, the District filed a second motion to dismiss, ECF No. 60. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts in part and rejects in part the R&R grants Brinkley's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, and Dubose Middle School's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10; and grants in part and denies in part the District's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 11, and Dorchester County, DCSO, and Pirkel's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16. Further, the court denies the District's second motion to dismiss, ECF No. 60.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from the allegedly unlawful detention of plaintiff Tydrean A. Anderson ("Tydrean") while he was a student at Dubose Middle School. According to the complaint, on February 1, 2016, Tydrean "was accused of smoking pot on school premises," when a "resource officer falsely stated [that] he found pills in Tydrean's book bag[.]" ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs allege that the resource officer placed Tydrean "in a room alone with [an] officer who had a gun, who then questioned Tydrean and forced him to write a statement falsely stating that he was smoking pot on school grounds and was in possession of pills, all without the knowledge of Tydrean's parents." Id. ¶ 19. Tydrean was charged with "Simple Possession" of marijuana and a Schedule II controlled substance and expelled from school. Id. ¶ 21. According to the complaint, however, the Dorchester County Solicitor's Office "dismissed the charges" and "refused to prosecute the case." Id. ¶ 22. The complaint states that this action is brought by Tydrean "individually" and "as an incompetent person," as well as by Alex Anderson ("Alex") (together with Tydrean, "plaintiffs"), "individually and as Parent & Legal Guardian of" Tydrean. Id. at 1. As a result of the alleged incident, plaintiffs allege that they have suffered "actual damages, including, but not limited to, deprivation of their liberty, injury to their reputation, public embarrassment and humiliation, loss of freedom, mental anguish, emotional distress and attorney fees and costs." Id. ¶ 23.

On June 2, 2020, plaintiffs filed suit in this court alleging seven causes of action: (1) "Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983" against all defendants; (2) "False Arrest and Confinement—42 U.S.C. § 1983" against all defendants; (3) negligence against all defendants; (4) invasion of privacy against all defendants;¹ (5) "Grossly Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress/Outrage" against all defendants; (6) "Discrimination Against Person with Disability, Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794" against the District, Dorchester County, and DCSO and (7) civil conspiracy against all defendants. Compl. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02 (D.S.C.), the court assigned the matter to Magistrate Judge Baker. On June 29, 2020, Dubose Middle School, the District, and Brinkley (the "District Defendants") filed respective motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 10, 11, 12. On July 2, 2020, Dorchester County, DCSO, and Pirkel (the "County Defendants") also filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 16.

After the motions became ripe, Magistrate Judge Baker issued the R&R on September 11, 2020. ECF No. 46. On September 25, 2020, the County Defendants and the District Defendants filed objections to the R&R. ECF Nos. 49 and 50. On October 5, 2020, plaintiffs also filed objections to the R&R. ECF No. 52. On October 9 and October 16, 2020, plaintiffs responded to defendants' objections. ECF Nos. 53 and 56. On October 19, 2020, the County Defendants and the District Defendants filed respective responses to plaintiffs' objections, making the case ready for a ruling from this court.ECF Nos. 58 and 59. Thereafter, the District filed another motion to dismiss, ECF No. 60, which garnered a response, ECF No. 61, and a reply, ECF No. 62. The court held a hearing on the motions on March 8, 2021. As such, this matter is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

A. R&R

The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The recommendation carries no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. at 270-71. The court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the R&R to which a specific objection is made. Id. However, de novo review is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections without directing a court's attention to a specific error in the magistrate judge's proposed findings. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of a specific objection, the court reviews the R&R only for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. DISCUSSION

In the motions to dismiss, defendants² make various, overlapping arguments for dismissal. The R&R recommends that the court grant in part and deny in part those motions.³ All parties filed objections. The court addresses defendants' objections, turns to plaintiffs' objections, and then summarizes the effects of its findings.

A. Defendants' Objections

1. Service

First, the court addresses the District's argument that the action must be dismissed for improper service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Specifically, the District argues that plaintiffs' "purported service is ineffective pursuant to Rule 4(j)(2)(A) [ ], as a copy of the Summons and Complaint were not delivered to the [District's] chief executive officer." ECF No. 11 at 3. The R&R agrees with the District's premise but rejects its conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, it appears [the District] has not been properly served given the lack of service on [the District's CEO]. However, the "provisions of [Rule 4] should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court, thus insuring the opportunity for a trial on the merits." Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1963). Noncompliance with Rule 4 does not mandate dismissal where the necessary parties have received actual notice of the suit and have not been prejudiced by the technical defect in service. Id. at 668-69. "[T]he real purpose of service of process is to give notice to the defendant[.]" Scott v. Md. State Dep't of Labor, 673 Fed. App'x. 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2016).

Here, the fact that [the District] is represented by counsel and moving to dismiss is common sense evidence that it has notice of the claims . . . . And the Court cannot find that service on [the District] is "unlikely to be accomplished" based on the current record. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that dismissal not be granted on the basis of lack of proper service. Instead, the Court should allow Plaintiffs additional time to effectuate proper service[.]

ECF No. 46 at 7-8. The District objects to the recommendation, arguing again that plaintiffs' improper service warrants dismissal. The court agrees with the R&R.

Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(5) provides defendants a vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of a plaintiff's service of process. While the plaintiff bears the burden to show...