Anderson v. Gifft

• Decision Date: 19 November 1940
• Docket Number: 45198.
• Citation: 294 N.W. 721,229 Iowa 515
• Parties: ANDERSON v. GIFFT et al. GIFFT et al. v. ANDERSON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

294 N.W. 721

229 Iowa 515

ANDERSON v. GIFFT et al.

GIFFT et al. v. ANDERSON.

No. 45198.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 19, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Boone County; O. J. Henderson, Judge.

Action in equity for partition, involving the construction of the will of S. N. Gifft. From a decree holding that such will gave to the widow a life estate only, and directing partition accordingly, Frances Anderson appeals.

Affirmed.

H. S Hunn, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Walter Canaday, E. C. Schroeder, Dyer, Jordan & Dyer and L. A. Reed all of Boone, for appellees.

HALE Justice.

This is a partition suit, the principal issue being the interpretation of a will to determine the persons to whom title to the real estate passed thereunder, and consequently the share of ownership. Two suits were commenced, one by appellant and one by certain appellees, but the suits were consolidated for trial and decision by the trial court. The plaintiff in the first suit, Frances Anderson (appellant), is hereinafter designated as plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the widow under the will acquired a fee-simple title. The defense is a contrary interpretation of the will.

The court held that the particular clause of the will created a life estate and the title passed by intestacy to the testator's children, but no title passed to his widow.

S. N Gifft became the owner of the 80 acres in controversy in 1896. He died in 1905 and his will was admitted to probate in Boone county and his estate administered by that court. His will provided first for the payment of debts, and, " Second: I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Martha L. Gifft, all of the property, both real and personal, that I may die seized or possessed of, to have use and control in her own right, as long as she remains my widow, but in case she shall remarry, then I direct that at the time of her marriage, the property, both real and personal, then remaining be divided as follows: to my said wife, Martha L. Gifft, a one-third share of all the property both real and personal, and the remaining two-thirds, to my children that may be alive at that time, share and share alike."

Third, he designated his wife to be the executrix of the estate. Martha L. Gifft qualified as executrix and at the close of administration executed and filed a final report in which she stated: " That by the last Will and Testament of said deceased she was given the use of all the property of said estate." Also, " That she has paid all debts and charges against said estate, as hereinafter shown, and has paid all taxes on the real property belonging to said estate, and has all of said property on hand substantially as shown by said inventory, and holds same as widow of the decedent under the terms of said will."

At the time of Mr. Gifft's death he was survived by his wife, Martha L. Gifft, and by Dora Gifft Moxley, Robert B. Gifft, Merrill C. Gifft, Clarence E. Gifft, Prudence A. Gifft, Edwin Gifft, and Edna F. Gifft, his children. In the interval between 1905 and 1936, Dora G. Moxley, and Edna F. Gifft who intermarried with Iver Sandeen, died. Dora G. Moxley at her death was survived by her second husband, George Frampton, and by Undine Moxley Whitlock, Mina Moxley McIlvain, Almon Moxley, Loren Moxley, and Clarence Moxley, as her children. Edna G. Sandeen died survived by Iver Sandeen, her husband, and by Isabel Sandeen Good, Clarence Sandeen, and Robert Sandeen, as her children. Iver Sandeen remarried and subsequently died survived by Margaret Newman, as his widow, and by Isabel Sandeen Good, Clarence Sandeen, Robert Sandeen, and Adella June Sandeen, his children. (Note that Adella June Sandeen is a child by his wife Margaret, who later married Arthur Newman).

On April 16, 1915, Merrill C. Gifft, who was a son of the decedent S. N. Gifft, conveyed to Martha L. Gifft, an undivided one-seventh interest in the premises involved for an expressed consideration of $1,250.

On January 30, 1936, Martha L. Gifft died without having remarried. Her will was admitted to probate and her estate administered. Her will provided first for the payment of her debts, and " Second: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, and wherever situated, I will, devise and bequeath to the children of my body who shall be living at the time of my decease, share and share alike. It being my intent that only my natural children living at my decease shall share in my estate."

The will named her son Merrill C. Gifft as executor. At the time of her death she owned, aside from the farm land here involved, two town lots not involved in this controversy. Her living " children of her body" and her " natural children" were Merrill C. Gifft, Robert B. Gifft, Clarence E. Gifft, Prudence Bracklow, and Edwin Gifft.

On May 7, 1936, Merrill C. Gifft died, unmarried, leaving no will, and Howard M. Gifft, a son, was his only heir. His estate was administered in Polk County, and closed on September 6, 1938. The supplemental report filed in the estate of Merrill C. Gifft, deceased, corrects the original inventory and states that he owned an undivided one-thirty-fifth interest in the property in controversy. On September 6, 1938, Howard M. Gifft and wife conveyed their undivided interest in the farm property here involved to Frances Anderson.

On September 8, 1938, Frances Anderson started this suit by filing petition in equity (No. 20939) for the partition of the farm land. The petition also asked for an accounting as to the rents and profits from the said property. On September 12, 1938, a petition was filed by Robert B. Gifft, Clarence E. Gifft, Prudence Bracklow, and Edwin F. Gifft, and their nieces and nephews, except Howard M. Gifft (being all of the living descendants of the deceased Martha L. Gifft, except Howard M. Gifft), and their spouses, to partition the farm land, with Frances Anderson named as the only defendant, which said action is Equity No. 20947. These two suits were consolidated. (Two other suits, Equity Nos. 20938 and 20948, involved other property and, though referred to, they are not involved.)

Under the facts as stated, plaintiff Frances Anderson claims that she is entitled to one-fifth of the real estate, while under defendants' contention she would be entitled to one-thirty-fifth. The issues are concisely stated by the trial court in its opinion: " The question at issue can readily be anticipated; for it is the familiar one of whether or not the will of S. N. Gifft above quoted devised to the surviving widow Martha L. Gifft an estate in fee, or created merely a life estate, subject to which the remainder passed by descent to the then seven surviving children of the testator. Frances Anderson * * * claims that the widow acquired title in fee, but subject to being divested thereof in case of remarriage as indicated in the will; whereas the adversary parties * * * claim that the widow Martha L. Gifft took only a life estate, subject to which each of the then living children (seven in number) took by inheritance an undivided seventh share in fee. In short, plaintiff claims to be the owner of the one-fifth interest, which she claims Merrill C. Gifft acquired under his mother's will; whereas the defendants claim that the only interest held in fee by the mother at her death was the one-seventh interest conveyed to her in 1915 by her son Merrill, and that on her death he in turn re-acquired a one-fifth of the one-seventh, or a final fractional interest of a one-thirty-fifth of said title, which they concede is now held by the plaintiff."

As above stated, the court adopted the theory of defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff urges that the section of the will in question created an absolute title in fee simple in Martha L. Gifft which defendants deny. Numerous citations from our decisions are cited by both plaintiff and defendants, but it is difficult in some instances to reconcile the varying opinions. We cannot, however, within the limits of this opinion, undertake an analysis of all so cited. Many do not relate to the exact question to be determined, as in Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Iowa 207, 207 N.W. 571, 45 A.L.R. 1216, which refers only to a provision in the will as not constituting an undue restraint of marriage. In many of the wills considered, however, and in the endeavor to apply the rules to this case now under consideration, it should be remembered that in some cases, in addition to the particular clause interpreted, there were others which limited or influenced its application, and hence arose part of the apparent disagreement in different cases. The case of Busby v. Busby, 137 Iowa 57, 114 N.W. 559, held that a devise and bequest to the wife, conditioned on her remaining a widow, conveyed a fee title, the holding being based on a construction made to avoid partial intestacy. This case has been cited many times, but an analysis of the holdings therein, in Staack v. Detterding, 182 Iowa 582, 161 N.W. 44, L.R.A. 1918C, 856, throws light on some of the language used. (It was declared in the Busby case that a devise by a testator to his widow, conditioned only against remarriage, carries a fee-simple title.) The Staack case states (page 588 of 182 Iowa, page 46 of 161 N.W., L.R.A.1918C, 856): " It may be thought that this statement is not strictly accurate, in view of our other holdings, in the cases before cited, that it is generally held that such a devise is only a life estate. We think it is true, where, as in the instant case, the will devises a fee-simple title to the widow provided she remains unmarried, it does devise a fee. And such we think was the meaning by Mr. Justice Bishop in his statement just quoted, for he cites, to sustain his propo...