Anderson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 1:03CV290.,CIV.A. 1:03CV290.
• Parties: Patrick ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

367 F.Supp.2d 1061

Patrick ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 1:03CV290.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

December 3, 2004.

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Joseph Y. Ahmad of Ahmad, Zavitsanos & Anaipakos, Houston, Mark William Frasher, Kip Kevin Lamb and Kenneth Leigh Parker of Lamb Law, Firm, Beaumont, for Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth Brandes Pratt of Mehaffy & Weber Beaumont, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, District Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company's ("Goodyear") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 26). Goodyear seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Patrick Anderson's ("Anderson") claims of age discrimination and wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, constructive discharge, failure to promote, and hostile work environment under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-21.556, and interference with an employee benefit plan in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140, et seq. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Anderson, born in 1946, is a resident of Jefferson County, Texas, and began working at the Goodyear Plant in Beaumont, Texas, in 1971. Goodyear is an Ohio corporation authorized to do business in Texas. After taking a year off to attend Sam Houston State University to study law enforcement, Anderson returned to Goodyear in August 1973 and worked for approximately 29 years until he was terminated on May 6, 2002, for allegedly "attempting to defraud the company through a false claim for reimbursement for shoes that were not in fact reimbursable safety shoes." Although he was terminated by Goodyear, Anderson elected to exercise his right to retire, which became effective June 1, 2002.

At the time he was terminated, Anderson worked as an associate in the Plant Protection Department where he was responsible for plant security and responding to medical, fire and rescue, and hazardous materials emergencies. According to Anderson, throughout his tenure at Goodyear, he received several job promotions, raises, and accolades. At age fifty-five, Anderson was the oldest employee in his department at the time of his termination. At deposition, Anderson testified that he "had always received favorable evaluations of my performance and all the evaluations I received were positive." According to Richard McCown ("McCown"), who was the Site Safety and Health Leader and Anderson's supervisor at the time he was discharged, Anderson "did an excellent job on Plant Protection duties and responsibilities and around site security and safety and emergency response, which were my three areas of responsibility." McCown testified that he had no complaints about Anderson's performance and that he was going to give him a good evaluation prior to the recommendation from the Plant Manager and the Human Resources Department that Anderson be discharged. Another one of Anderson's supervisors, Paula Larocca, testified that, while she was his supervisor from late 1999 to early 2002, he did a good job.

Prior to his termination, Anderson was accused of engaging in misconduct on two prior occasions. Anderson, however, contends that he "became the target of criticism even though I was not involved in the conduct." In March 1999, Goodyear conducted an investigation related to employees viewing sexually explicit materials during working hours. In a letter dated March 19, 1999, signed by Anderson and the Human Resources Department, Goodyear concluded that Anderson "utilized company provided equipment to view sexually explicit material during working hours" in violation of company policy. Anderson was put on notice that "any additional inappropriate behavior that occurs after this incident will result in immediate dismissal." According to Anderson, however, his co-worker, Van Chesser ("Chesser"), with whom he shared a computer, had allegedly acquired and viewed illicit material over the computer. Because Anderson and Chesser both had access to the computer, they were suspended for nine days while Goodyear conducted an investigation. Anderson maintains that he never saw or brought any explicit materials to work and that he was reprimanded because he shared a locker or cabinet with Chesser, who was terminated after the investigation.

Another incident of misconduct occurred in November 2001, when Anderson, while on duty, left the plant without authorization for approximately one hour to attend a sheriff's meeting. Anderson had become a certified peace officer in 1989 and was required to attend meetings to maintain his commission as a reserve deputy sheriff. Goodyear conducted another investigation and placed Anderson on a thirty-day leave of absence without pay for unauthorized absence. As a consequence, he forfeited his responsibility for plant locks and keys. Anderson contends that there was no formal policy about leaving the plant and that he had been told that "it was acceptable for salaried employees such as himself to leave the plant for short periods of time (an hour or less) as long as he had a backup." Anderson claims that he asked Randy McCollough of Incident Command for permission to attend the meeting, which he alleges was granted. Anderson also maintains that Doug Jones and McCown remained at the plant and served as backup while he was gone. Nevertheless, after his suspension, he was required to write a "letter of commitment" detailing the seriousness of his violation and acknowledging that any future misconduct would result in termination. Anderson, in his affidavit, stated that "[e]ven though I did not violate any company policy and I felt the discipline was not fair, I did not formally complain but instead took the actions that I was told were required of me to resolve the matter."

After Goodyear's investigation into the most recent incident, the alleged fraud, Richard Pickette ("Pickette"), the Human Resources Manager, and Lou Perfetti ("Perfetti"), the Plant Manager, concluded that Anderson should be terminated. According to Pickette's affidavit, he was alerted by the Payroll/Accounting Department in April 2002 that Anderson had signed and submitted a claim for reimbursement under Goodyear's Safety Shoe Reimbursement Policy ("the Policy") for shoes that were not steel-toed safety shoes and were not reimbursable under the Policy. Pickette, along with McCown, initiated an investigation into the matter and determined that Anderson had submitted a false claim in violation of the Policy. Perfetti claims that he, Pickette, and McCown all participated in the decision-making process. Consequently, Perfetti, who had the final decision-making authority, determined that, in light of his previous misconduct, termination was the appropriate discipline for Anderson's violation of the Policy. Perfetti further stated that his decision to terminate Anderson in May 2002 "was not based at all on his age or upon any intent to interfere with or deprive him of any of his employment benefits, including employment benefits by Goodyear encompassed within any pension plans or welfare benefit plans."

Anderson, however, maintains that because the explicit language of the Policy allowed him to be reimbursed for shoes for his "personal use," Goodyear's reason for firing him was false and pretextual. He claims that Goodyear's "true motive was to fire [him] due to his age and high salary." After his termination, Anderson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights on October 10, 2002, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age. On January 14, 2003, the EEOC issued a notice of dismissal or termination of the charge, stating that the information provided to the Commission was insufficient to establish a violation of the statutes and informing Anderson of his right to file a civil lawsuit.

Anderson instituted this action on April 11, 2003, claiming that Goodyear did not have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him. He asserts that he is the victim of age discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of the ADEA. In addition, he alleges claims of constructive discharge, failure to promote, and hostile work environment under the TCHRA, as well as a claim that Goodyear interfered with his employee benefit plan in violation of ERISA. Subsequently, this action was removed to federal court on May 15, 2003, pursuant to federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Goodyear filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 8, 2004, arguing that Anderson has not established a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the TCHRA, did not work in a hostile work environment, and was not subjected to a violation of ERISA.

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,...