Anderson v. Hart

• Decision Date: 19 March 1886
• Citation: 68 Iowa 400,27 N.W. 289
• Parties: ANDERSON v. HART.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

68 Iowa 400

27 N.W. 289

ANDERSON

v.HART.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed March 19, 1886.

Appeal from Page district court.

The petition states that the defendant published of and concerning the plaintiff the following false and malicious and defamatory libel: “John Hart, being duly sworn, deposeth and saith that a note presented to him by Hiram Larrabee, in favor of J. D. Larrabee, with Alfred Anderson's name and mark, C. J. Gustafson and John Hart's names, is a note he knows nothing about, and the name of John Hart was not written by him or his orders, and therefore is a forgery.” The defendant pleaded a general denial, justification, and that the libel was a privileged communication. Trial by jury, verdict for plaintiff, and judgment. The defendant appeals.Hepburn & Thummell and Jas. McCabe, for appellant.

L. B. Cake and Clark & Parslow, for appellee.

SEEVERS, J.

The libelous communication was introduced in evidence, and there was evidence tending to show that Larrabee, the agent of the holder of the note, spoke to defendant about it, and that the latter informed him that he had never signed it. The affidavit was prepared at the instance of Larrabee, for the purpose of establishing, as he testified, whether or not the defendant had signed the note. Larrabee desired to know this fact. When on the stand as a witness he was asked by the plaintiff a question in these words: “To whom did you understand this affidavit to refer? to what person?” The witness replied: “He did not refer to no particular person as doing it.” He was then asked this question: “I am not asking about him, but about the affidavit. To whom did you understand it to refer?” The witness replied: “Well, I understood it to refer to Anderson, or procured by him; that is, the forgery. That is the way I understood it at the time.”

To the foregoing question the defendant at the time objected, on the ground of immateriality, irrelevancy, and that the evidence sought to be elicited was the conclusion or opinion of the witness. The objection was overruled, and this ruling is assigned as error. It will be observed that the witness was asked to construe the libel, and, in effect, he was asked to look at the affidavit, and state who the defendant meant to charge with the crime of forgery. There was no ambiguity as to the crime charged, and no person was indicated as having committed it. There were no circumstances surrounding the transaction which had any tendency to show who the defendant meant, unless such meaning could be legitimately inferred from the fact that the names of the plaintiff, the defendant, and another person were signed to the note. When a libelous communication on its face directly, or by way of innuendo or otherwise, refers to any person, it is possibly true that a witness may be asked who or what person was meant. Subject to this rule, the decided weight of authority we think is that the alleged libel must be construed by the court and...