Anderson v. Houston
| Decision Date | 01 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. S-05-1561.,No. S-06-206.,S-05-1561.,S-06-206. |
| Citation | 744 N.W.2d 410,274 Neb. 916 |
| Parties | David J. ANDERSON, appellee, v. Robert HOUSTON, director, Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Kimberley Taylor-Riley, and Ryan Gilbride for appellant.
Michael D. Nelson and Cathy R. Saathoff, Omaha, of Nelson Law, L.L.C., and April L. O'Loughlin, of O'Loughlin Law, P.C., for appellee.
David J. Anderson, an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary in Lancaster County, filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court for Douglas County. In his writ, Anderson requested sentence credit for time he spent at liberty after the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (Department) mistakenly released Anderson long before his sentences were to expire. After concluding that it had jurisdiction over the matter, the district court granted Anderson's writ. The Department appealed and also filed a petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which we granted. We reverse, and remand for reasons set forth below. We also vacate the district court's orders for related legal fees and costs.
Anderson was convicted in Douglas County District Court of a Class III felony, theft by unlawful taking, and a Class IV felony, theft by unlawful taking. The court sentenced Anderson to 3 to 5 years' imprisonment for the Class III felony and 20 months' to 5 years' imprisonment for the Class IV felony. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
On July 8, 2003, the Department mistakenly released Anderson from incarceration a mere 3 months into his sentence. If Anderson had remained in custody, he would have been eligible for parole on July 14, 2004, with a mandatory release date of July 14, 2005. The Department eventually discovered its mistake and, on September 16, 2003, filed a motion for capias and notice of hearing in the Douglas County District Court. The record is unclear, however, whether notice of this hearing was sent to Anderson, nor is it clear whether he received it. Anderson claims he did not receive the notice. Either way, Anderson did not appear at the hearing scheduled for September 24. That same day, the district court issued an order directing any law enforcement officers to arrest Anderson if they located him. Although the record does not explain why, the clerk's office did not issue that warrant for approximately 14 months.
In the interim, however, Douglas County filed a motion for declaration of forfeiture of Anderson's bail bond for the reason that Anderson failed to appear at the September 24, 2003, hearing. This motion, which was filed on March 17, 2004, and an accompanying letter were mailed to Anderson at an address specified in the certificate of service. Had Anderson received these documents, he certainly would have had reason to believe that something was amiss with his status as a released prisoner. It is not clear, however, where the county obtained that address or whether the address was, in fact, accurate. On March 26, the court entered a default judgment forfeiting Anderson's bond.
On January 3, 2005, a little more than 9 months after the bond forfeiture proceeding, police arrested Anderson during a routine traffic stop. Anderson was then returned to the Nebraska State Penitentiary in Lancaster County. After accounting for the time Anderson was absent from prison, the Department found that his recalculated parole eligibility date was January 9, 2006, and that his new mandatory release date was January 9, 2007.
Anderson then filed a writ of habeas corpus in Douglas County District Court. At the initial hearing, the Department waived any objection to jurisdiction in Douglas County. Anderson was then transported from the state penitentiary to the Douglas County Correctional Center by the Douglas County sheriff. Sometime later, however, the Department attempted to quash Anderson's habeas corpus petition on the ground that the Douglas County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction. This conclusion was based on Gillard v. Clark,1 which the district court read as standing for the proposition that jurisdiction in habeas proceedings can effectively be transferred from one county to another. The district court noted that the Department waived jurisdiction at the initial hearing and therefore concluded that jurisdiction was proper in Douglas County.
The court then held an evidentiary hearing to address the merits of Anderson's underlying habeas claim. Here, the court cited our decision in State v. Texel,2 in which we held that prisoners must serve their sentences continuously and therefore may not consent to serving sentences intermittently. As a result, the court granted Anderson's writ. In response, the Department filed a notice of appeal, our case No. S-05-1561.
Shortly thereafter, the district court entered two additional orders. In its first order, filed on January 20, 2006, the court granted Anderson's request that the Department pay court costs. Then, in an order filed on February 10, 2006, the court permitted Anderson to withdraw his request that the Department pay his legal fees. The Department appealed these orders, our case No. S-06-206, and filed a petition to bypass the Court of Appeals. We consolidated both appeals for our review.
On appeal, the Department assigns that the district court erred by (1) finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson's habeas petition, (2) granting habeas corpus relief to Anderson, and (3) entering the January 20 and February 10, 2006, orders after the Department perfected its initial appeal.
A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court's decision.3
It appears that Nebraska case law has not yet expressly identified the exact standard of review on appeal of a habeas petition. Drawing insight from other jurisdictions, we hold that on appeal of a habeas petition, an appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.4
We think it prudent to address the arguments in the order in which they were presented to us. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by addressing whether the district court had jurisdiction and then consider the Department's claim that Anderson was not entitled to habeas relief. We conclude our analysis by addressing the orders of the district court issued after the Department's notice of appeal.
The Department claims that the district court for Douglas County did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson's habeas petition because Anderson was confined in Lancaster County. It is well established that if the court from which an appeal was taken lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction.5 Thus, if the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Anderson's habeas petition, we, too, would have no jurisdiction to review the merits of Anderson's petition.
Before we proceed to the substance of the jurisdictional issue, we pause to note our belief that the Department may have misspoken when it fashioned its argument. The argument that the case should have been brought in the district court for Lancaster County as opposed to the district court for Douglas County is perhaps a challenge to venue, rather than subject matter jurisdiction. The difference is significant. For one, litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a tribunal by acquiescence or consent.6 In contrast, venue provisions confer a personal privilege which may be waived by the defendant.7
In addition, we think it clear that the Douglas County District Court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Under Nebraska law, an application for habeas relief may be made to "any one of the judges of the district court, or to any county judge."8 Because "any" district judge obviously includes the district court for Douglas County, it is beyond dispute that the district court for Douglas County had subject matter jurisdiction over Anderson's habeas claim.
But while the above language makes clear that any and all district courts in Nebraska have subject matter jurisdiction over habeas claims, it does not identify which county's district courts may hear habeas claims. This issue—essentially a question of venue—is the issue which lies at the heart of the Department's argument. To resolve that question, we turn to Gillard,9 in which this court held that
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release a prisoner confined under sentence of court must be brought in the county where the prisoner is confined. [Citation omitted.] And where proceedings are instituted in another county, it is the duty of the court, on objection to its jurisdiction, to dismiss the proceedings.
Relying on Gillard, the Department points out that Anderson was confined in the Nebraska State Penitentiary in Lancaster County, yet sought habeas relief in the district court for Douglas County. In effect, the Department appears to suggest that the district court for Douglas County was not the proper venue to litigate the merits of Anderson's habeas claim.
While the Department would be correct under Gillard's general rule, other language in Gillard provided for a narrow exception:
[W]here application is made for a writ of habeas corpus to the d[i]strict court of a county other than that in which the prisoner is confined, and the officer in whose custody the prisoner is held brings the latter into court and submits to the jurisdiction without objection, the...
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