Anderson v. O'Leary Paint Co.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 3:10 CV 269,3:10 CV 269
• Parties: ROBERTA and KARL ANDERSON, Plaintiffs, v. O'LEARY PAINT COMPANY, AKZO NOBEL PAINTS, LLC d/b/a ICI PAINTS, and RAINGUARD INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

ROBERTA and KARL ANDERSON, Plaintiffs,

v. O'LEARY PAINT COMPANY,AKZO NOBEL PAINTS, LLC d/b/a ICIPAINTS, and RAINGUARDINTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants.

No. 3:10 CV 269

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

Date: September 28, 2011

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant Weatherman Products, Inc., doing business as Rainguard International, Inc., to dismiss certain counts of plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). (DE # 21.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND ¹

Plaintiffs Roberta and Karl Anderson, a married couple living in Plymouth, Indiana, decided to paint the redwood siding of their home in August of 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 7.) Mr. Anderson visited an ICI Paints store in Mishawaka, Indiana, and requested a particular primer from an employee, but was informed that this primer was no longer made. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Mr. Anderson then informed the employee that he waslooking to purchase paint and primer for the exterior redwood siding of his home, and was directed to purchase several gallons of Waterborne Bond Prep Clear Standard ("Bond Prep"), a product manufactured by defendant Weatherman Products, Inc., doing business as Rainguard International, Inc., and an accompanying product, Delux Fortis exterior paint. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)

In reliance upon this recommendation, Mr. Anderson purchased several gallons of Bond Prep, washed the exterior siding of his home, prepared the siding for painting, and provided the Bond Prep to a professional painter for application. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) The painter applied the Bond Prep to the exterior of plaintiffs' home, including all siding and window and door frames. (Id. ¶ 13.) A day later, the Delux Fortis exterior paint was applied to the same surfaces, but about halfway through the process, the paint began to separate from the Bond Prep. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)

Plaintiffs contacted defendant O'Leary Paint Company ("O'Leary"), the owner and operator of the ICI Paint store in Mishawaka, and Akzo Noble Paints, the distributor of the paint products, which was doing business as ICI Paints ("Azko"). (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 17.) Over the course of several months, defendants sent numerous representatives to plaintiffs' home and tried various approaches to remedying the problem, with no success. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) The home remains covered in Bond Prep, but the home cannot be painted without the removal of the Bond Prep, and the Bond Prep cannot be removed without the destruction of the siding. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.)

On June 1, 2010, plaintiffs sued defendants in the Marshall Superior Court in Marshall County, Indiana. (See DE # 1.) Azko removed this case to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and the existence of a federal question in the form of plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Magnuson Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (DE # 4.) Defendant Weatherman Products, Inc., doing business as Rainguard International Inc. ("Weatherman"), moved to dismiss some of plaintiffs' claims against it. (DE # 21.) Plaintiffs responded (DE # 27), and Weatherman replied (DE # 28).² The motion is now ripe for ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Weatherman has moved to dismiss some of plaintiffs' claims under RULE 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As a threshold matter, plaintiffs argue that their complaint should be evaluated according to Indiana pleading standards because it was filed in state court prior to removal to federal court and that the federal rules only apply after a case is removed. (DE # 27-1 at 2.)

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 81(c)(1) provides that the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE apply to a civil action after it has been removed from state court. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 437 (1974) (stating "once a case has been removed to federal court, it is settled that federal rather than state law governs the future course of proceedings, notwithstanding state court orders issued prior to removal"); Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2007). RULE 81 does not demand, however, that federal courts apply state court pleading standards to complaints originally filed in state courts and later removed to federal court.

On the contrary, the Seventh Circuit has held that "it is rudimentary" that pleading requirements in the federal courts are governed by the federal rules. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit and federal district courts have repeatedly applied the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE when deciding motions to dismiss in removed actions. See e.g., Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008); Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 2003); Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1999); Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:10 CV 467, 2011 WL 1792853, at *2-4 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 2011) (Moody, J.) (analyzing this issue at length and applying FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE to RULE 12(b)(6) motion);Caldwell v. Jones, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2007).³ Accordingly, this court will apply federal pleading standards in evaluating Weatherman's motion to dismiss.⁴

The court's analysis of the present motion to dismiss under the federal rules begins with discussion of RULE 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which sets forth the pleading standard for complaints filed in federal court. Specifically, RULE 8 requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8. "The Rule reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy RULE 8(a), "thestatement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

"While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To meet this standard, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond providing "labels and conclusions" and "be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) among other authorities).

As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, a complaint must give "enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together." Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251 (stating that the plaintiff does not need to plead facts that establish each element of a cause of action and that "[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint"). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must construe it in the light most favorable to the non-movingparty, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the non-movant's favor. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 595 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count IV : Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose Weatherman moves to dismiss Count IV of plaintiffs' complaint, which plaintiffs have styled as a claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. (DE # 22-1 at 3.) Weatherman argues that no allegations have been made that Weatherman sold Bond Prep to plaintiffs, much less warranted its use for a particular purpose. (Id.) Plaintiffs concede that privity is required for this cause of action and agree to the dismissal of this claim against Weatherman. (DE # 27-1 at 3.) Accordingly, Weatherman's motion to dismiss is granted as to Count IV of the complaint.

B. Count V : Magnuson Moss Act

Weatherman moves to dismiss Count V of plaintiffs' complaint, in which plaintiffs allege violation of the Magnuson Moss Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (DE # 22-1 at 4.) Under the Act,

a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief.

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d). The Act further states that "[t]he term 'implied warranty' means an implied warranty arising under State law . . . in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product." Id. at 2301(7).

The "unusual jurisdictional clause" contained in 15 U.S.C § 2310(d) permits an aggrieved consumer to sue on certain state-law claims (namely, claims alleging breach of a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract) in federal court, whether or not the parties are of diverse citizenship. Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1998). However, it "does not provide an independent basis for liability; it only provides for federal jurisdiction for [the] state claims."...