Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. Of Va.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1910
• Citation: 152 N.C. 1,67 S.E. 53
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ANDERSON v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA et al.

67 S.E. 53

152 N.C. 1

ANDERSON

v.LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 25, 1910.

1. Insurance (§ 44S^*) — Life Insurance — Murder of Insured by Beneficiary — Kioht of Recovery.

The beneficiary under a life policy, having murdered insured, recovery on the policy may not be had by the beneficiary.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1150; Dec. Dig. § 448.*]

2. Insurance (§ 448*) — Life Insurance — Murder of Insured by Beneficiary — Award of Insurance Money.

The beneficiary under a life policy having murdered insured and then committed suicide, and the insurer recognizing liability on the policy, the insurance money will be awarded to the representative of insured.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1150; Dec. Dig. § 448.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Pasquotank County; G. W. Ward, Judge.

Action by L. W. Anderson, administrator of Penelope Barnes, deceased, against the Life Insurance Company of Virginia and N. R. Parker, administrator of Seth Newby, deceased. On appeal from a justice, facts were agreed on, and plaintiff had judgment. Defendant Parker appeals. Affirmed.

The facts formally agreed upon were as follows: "That on February 1, 1909, Penelope Newby, now Barnes, obtained from the Life Insurance Company of Virginia a policy of insurance on her life for the benefit of Seth Newby, her brother; that both Penelope Barnes and Seth Newby died on July 3, 1909; that Seth Newby died by his own hand before Penelope Barnes died; that Penelope Barnes was murdered by Seth Newby; that the Life Insurance Company of Virginia has paid to N. R. Parker, administrator of Seth Newby, deceased, the sum of $110, the amount due under the said policy of insurance, with understanding by all parties that Parker shall hold money to abide determination of this action, and that the policy of insurance hereto attached is an exact copy of the original policy of insurance, and the same is hereby made a part of this statement of facts."

E. L. Sawyer, for appellant.

C. E. Thompson, for appellee.

HOKE, J. It is a principle very generally accepted that a beneficiary who has caused or procured the death of the insured under circumstances amounting to a felony will be allowed no recovery on the policy. Vance on Insurance, pp. 392, 393; Cooley's Insurance Briefs, 3153; 25 Cyc. 153; 3 A. & E. (2d Ed.) p. 1021. This wholesome doctrine, referred by most of the cases to the maxim "Nul-lus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, " has been uniformly upheld, so far as we are aware, except in certain cases where the interest involved was conferred by statute, and the statute itself does not recognize any exception. Such an instance has occurred in our own court, in the case of Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794, where a widow, convicted as accessory before the fact to her husband's murder, was awarded dower under the statute a decision which caused an immediate amendment of the statute (Pub. Laws 1889, c. 499), and this amendment has since prevailed as the law of the state on that subject. The authorities are also to the effect that in cases like the present, where the contract...