Anderson v. Lyng, Civ. A. No. 85-T-1350-N.

• Decision Date: 26 September 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-T-1350-N.
• Citation: 644 F. Supp. 1372
• Parties: Hessie ANDERSON and Frankie Martin, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. Richard LYNG, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and Gwendolyn Williams, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

644 F. Supp. 1372

Hessie ANDERSON and Frankie Martin, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. Richard LYNG, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and Gwendolyn Williams, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-T-1350-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

September 11, 1986.

Order and Injunction September 26, 1986.

Lawrence Gardella, Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Montgomery, Ala., Geraldine Turner-Wofford, Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Selma, Ala., for plaintiffs.

John C. Bell, U.S. Atty., D. Broward Segrest, Asst. U.S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for defendant Block.

James Long, Alabama Dept. of Pensions & Sec., Div. of Legal Services, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant Williams.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This class action lawsuit is a challenge to the "voluntary quit" regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2029.¹ The Food Stamp Act provides that an entire household is ineligible to participate in a state food stamp program for 90 days if the "head of household" voluntarily quits any job without good cause. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii). In contrast, the regulation promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to this statutory provision substitutes "primary wage earner" for "head of household" and, accordingly, provides that the household is ineligible if the primary wage earner voluntarily quits any job without good cause. 7 C.F.R. § 273.7(n). Plaintiffs Hessie Anderson and Frankie Martin, whose households were disqualified from receiving food stamps under the regulation, claim that the regulation conflicts with the Food Stamp Act. The defendants are Richard Lyng, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Gwendolyn Williams, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security.

This cause is now before the court on the plaintiffs' request that the court declare that the Secretary's voluntary quit regulation impermissibly conflicts with the Food Stamp Act.² For reasons that follow, the court concludes that the plaintiffs' request should be granted.

I.

The modern food stamp program was started in the early 1960's to address the widespread hunger and malnutrition problem in our society. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011. Most recently, according to Congress, there has been a "significant worsening" of this problem, especially with regard to children. H.R.Rep. No. 99-271, Part 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 1103, 1234-35.

A.

Under the food stamp program, food coupons, commonly referred to as food stamps, are used to supplement the food buying power of eligible low-income households. The program allows an eligible household to obtain from an administering governmental agency a sufficient number of food stamps to provide the household with a nutritionally adequate diet; the household then uses the stamps, along with its own money, to purchase food at retail stores. The federal government later redeems the stamps at face value. 7 U.S. C.A. §§ 2013-2025. The food stamp program is administered by state public assistance agencies under the supervision of the United States Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020; 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.3, 271.4.

Recipients of food stamps under the Food Stamp Act must meet both financial and non-financial requirements. Among the non-financial requirements are various conditions relating to employment. With these employment requirements, Congress sought to limit the program to those who were truly needy by encouraging applicants and participants who were capable of working to do so. As a House Committee recognized in 1970, "it is still desirable for those who can do so to work in order to support themselves and their families." H.R.Rep. No. 91-1402, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 6025, 6034.

These employment requirements have a dual focus: they focus on each participating member of a household as well as on the entire household itself. For example, unless exempted, an individual member of a household may not participate in the food stamp program unless he or she registers for employment and participates in employment and training programs, and accepts certain employment, if offered. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2015(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). In contrast, as already noted, an entire household is ineligible to participate in the program for 90 days "if the head of the household voluntarily quits any job without good cause." 7 U.S.C.A. § 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii). With this voluntary quit provision, Congress sought to place increased emphasis "on providing benefits to those who are unable to provide for themselves and less to those, such as in this situation, who have made themselves `needy.'" Senate Rep. No. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 1641, 1677 (emphasis in original).

In an attempt to implement this statutory voluntary quit provision, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(c), the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated a regulation that, as already noted, defines head of household as the household's primary wage earner. The regulation provides that "No household whose primary wage earner voluntarily quit his or her most recent job without good cause" shall be eligible to participate in the food stamp program. 7 C.F.R. § 273.7(n). Primary wage earner is defined as "that household member age 18 or over who was acquiring the greatest amount of earned financial support for the household at the time of quit." § 273.7(n)(1)(iv).³

B.

In 1985, the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security, the state public assistance agency responsible for administering the federal food stamp program in Alabama, disqualified plaintiff Hessie Anderson's and plaintiff Frankie Martin's households from receiving food stamps on the basis of the Secretary's voluntary quit regulation. The plaintiffs argue that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security violated the statutory provision on voluntary quit by disqualifying their households on the basis that their households' primary wage earners quit their jobs; according to the plaintiffs, "head of household," the term used by Congress, and "primary wage earner," the term used by the Secretary, are not equivalent. Indeed, the plaintiffs argue that, at the time their households were disqualified, the heads of their households were different from their households' primary wage earners.⁴ For example, at the time Anderson's household was disqualified, the primary wage earner in her household was her 18-year-old son. Her household consisted of twenty-five members, at least three of whom were employed shortly before this litigation began. Because the three incomes were not sufficient to support the entire household, the household received food stamps worth over $600.00 each month. Anderson's husband was named on the food stamp application as the head of the household, but the Andersons' 18-year-old son Lindsey was actually earning the most money. Lindsey quit his job in August 1985. After making an initial determination that Lindsey had not had good cause for quitting, the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security notified the Anderson household that the entire household would be disqualified from receiving food stamps for three months because Lindsey, the primary wage earner, had voluntarily quit his job without good cause.

II.

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the Supreme Court succinctly set forth the criteria and the manner in which a court should assess whether an agency's interpretation of a legislative act is permissible under that act:

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

(footnotes omitted).

In other words, absent evidence that Congress has expressly given a statutory provision a particular interpretation, a court must give deference to any reasonably acceptable interpretation by the agency. For reasons that follow, the court is convinced that Congress has expressly given the Food Stamp Act's voluntary quit provision a particular interpretation contrary to the Secretary's, and that, moreover, the Secretary's interpretation is illogical and unworkable and contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory provision.

A.

The first step in determining whether Congress has expressly and unequivocally given a statutory provision a particular meaning is to look to the plain meaning of the provision itself. Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 681, 686, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986). Here, head of household, the phrase that appears in the Food Stamp Act, suggests on its face the most responsible person in the household, the person with primary responsibility for the household. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1046 (1976) ("head" defined as "director, chief," "one in charge"); Black's Law Dictionary, 648 (1979) ("head...