MAINE ASS'N OF INT. NEIGH. v. COM'R, MAINE DHS

• Decision Date: 01 March 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-0240-B.
• Parties: MAINE ASSOCIATION OF INTERDEPENDENT NEIGHBORHOODS, et al., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Clayton YEUTTER, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

732 F. Supp. 248

MAINE ASSOCIATION OF INTERDEPENDENT NEIGHBORHOODS, et al., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Clayton YEUTTER, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Third-Party Defendant.

Civ. No. 88-0240-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

March 1, 1990.

Jack Comart, Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Augusta, Me., for plaintiff.

Marina E. Thibeau, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Human Services, Augusta, Me., for Maine Dept. of Human Services.

Michael M. DuBose, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bangor, Me., for Richard E. Lyng.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GENE CARTER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 17, 1988, challenging the "voluntary quit" and "income deduction" regulations that Defendant promulgated in accordance with federal regulations concerning the federally funded food stamp program. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture seeking indemnification should the Court find Defendant liable. All parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment.¹

Plaintiff challenges the voluntary quit regulations that the Secretary and Defendant promulgated. The Food Stamp Act states that when the "head of the household" voluntarily quits his or her job without good cause, the entire household is disqualified from receiving food stamps for ninety days.² 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii). The Secretary's regulation defines "head of household" as the family's principal wage earner.³ 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(d)(2). Plaintiff claims that the Secretary's definition of "head of household" is inconsistent with Congress's intended definition, and that the Secretary thereby usurped the legislative authority required to define the scope of the statute. The Secretary argues that his regulation is reasonable and that the Court should defer to his regulation because Congress did not speak directly on the meaning of "head of household."

Plaintiff also challenges the income deduction rule. The Food Stamp Act states that:

all households with earned income shall be allowed an additional deduction of 20 per centum of all earned income ... to compensate for taxes, other mandatory deductions from salary, and work expenses....

7 U.S.C. § 2014(e). The Food Stamp Act does not define "income." Prior to 1986, the federal regulations considered general assistance workfare as income from which the deduction could be taken. Garrett v. Lyng, 877 F.2d 472, 474 (6th Cir.1989), citing 43 Fed.Reg. 47903 (Oct. 17, 1978). In 1986, the Secretary revised the regulations so that general assistance workfare could not be considered as earned income. Id., 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(i) (1989).

Plaintiff argues that the Secretary's 1986 decision is arbitrary, irrational, and against the clear intent of Congress. The Secretary states that it is within his authority and discretion to change the regulation. The Secretary provides the following reasons for his change of policy: it saves government money; it is in accord with Congress's treatment of workfare in the program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); and it is in accord with the overall purpose of the Food Stamp Act.

The Court finds that Congress's intent in enacting the "voluntary quit" rule is clear; it contradicts Third-Party Defendant's (Secretary's) and Defendant's interpretation of the rule, and thereby entitles Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law as to the voluntary quit regulations. The Secretary's and Defendant's income deduction regulations, however, manifest a permissive interpretation of an ambiguous term contained in the underlying Food Stamp Act, and, therefore, the Secretary and Defendant are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the income deduction regulations. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and Defendant's and Third-Party Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted in part.

Discussion

The Supreme Court set out the basis for proper judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that courts must begin their analysis by determining whether the "intent of Congress is clear." Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If Congress's intent is clear, then the regulation must be fully consistent with the statutory meaning. Id. at 842-43, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, n. 9; National Labor Relations Board v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 413, 420, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987). If the intent of Congress is not clear, courts must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute, provided that it is based on a permissible construction and is rational. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781; National Labor Relations Board, 484 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 420.

To apply the first step of analysis, the Court must employ its traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain Congress's clear intention, if such a clear intention exists. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 9; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1220-21, 94 L.Ed.2d 434. The starting point in any interpretation of a statute is with the plain meaning of the provision itself. Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corporation, 474 U.S. 361, 368, 373, 106 S.Ct. 681, 688, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986). A court must, however, analyze "the language and design of the statute as a whole. K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).

The Court must also analyze the history of the provision and the overall purpose of the statute to discern if Congress's intent was clear. Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 924 (1st Cir.1988), citing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 U.S. 89, 98 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444 n. 8, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 32, 102 S.Ct. 38, 42, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981); Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 790, 800 n. 20, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). When Congress utilizes a phrase that has an accepted definition, a court must infer that Congress meant to incorporate the accepted definition unless the statute otherwise defines the language. See, Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 2929, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978). Furthermore, the issue of Congressional intent must focus on Congress's intent at the time of enactment. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369-70 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).

Voluntary Quit Rule

The Secretary argues that the Court may overturn the agency's interpretation only if the legislative history demonstrates that Congress would not have sanctioned the agency's regulation. Secretary's memorandum at 14. As noted in the discussion above, however, the first issue is whether Congress manifested a clear intent. If, by utilizing the traditional tools of statutory construction, the Court determines Congress's clear intent, the Court must decide whether the Secretary's regulation is consistent with that intent. Thus, the Court will defer to the agency in the manner that the Secretary described only if the terms of the statute are ambiguous or Congress's intent is unclear.

While courts have differed as to whether "head of household" manifests a clear congressional intent,⁴ this Court finds that Congress's clear intent is evidenced by the legislative history and prior accepted definition of the phrase. Congress intended the phrase to refer to the household member in whose name the application is made for participation in the program. Congress further intended that this head of household be a responsible household member. The Secretary's definition and regulation are inconsistent with the statute and, therefore, are invalid.

The Food Stamps Act does not define "head of household." Some courts argue that "head of household" has a plain and accepted meaning; the household member responsible for making decisions for the household. Verna v. Coler, 893 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir.1990) (Hatchett, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Lyng, 644 F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (M.D.Ala.1986). Both the Anderson court and Judge Hatchett found that the phrase's plain meaning, derived from Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, contradicts the definition provided by the Secretary. Verna v. Coler, 893 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir.1990) (Hatchett, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Lyng, 644 F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (M.D.Ala.1986). While this Court is not convinced that "head of household" evidences a common meaning outside the context of the Food Stamp Act, the phrase clearly has a plain meaning when used within the statute's context.

Head of household had a clear and accepted meaning at the time Congress passed the voluntary quit rule: the responsible household member in whose name the household participates in the food stamp program. In fact, the Secretary had defined "head of household" as the person in whose name application is made for the program at the time the original Food Stamp Act became law in 1964, or for approximately thirteen years prior to the passing of the initial voluntary quit rule in 1977. See 7 C.F.R. § 1600.2(s) (1965); 7 C.F.R. 270.2(gg) (1976); 43 Fed.Reg. 18879 (May 2, 1978). When Congress passed the rule in 1977, it utilized the accepted meaning of the phrase. The Secretary's memorandum in support of his Motion to Dismiss notes that Congress "had relied on the historic usage of the term head of household when enacting the 1977 voluntary quit provision."⁵ Secretary's memorandum at 14.

The...