Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1895
• Parties: ANDERSON v. MANCHESTER FIRE ASSUR. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

63 N.W. 241

59 Minn. 182

ANDERSON v. MANCHESTER FIRE ASSUR. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota

May 15, 1895

Syllabus

1. Chapter 217, Gen. Laws 1889 (Gen. St. 1894, § § 3200-3202) which provided for the preparation by the insurance commissioner, and the adoption, of the "Minnesota standard policy," is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it attempted to delegate legislative power to the insurance commissioner.

2. Where a policy of insurance provided, "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void if the insured now has or shall hereafter make or procure, any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole or in part by this policy," held, by delivering the policy knowing the existence of other insurance on the premises, the insurer waived the condition, though no such waiver was indorsed on the policy. 60 N.W. 1095, reversed.

On rehearing. Affirmed.

For former report, see 60 N.W. 1095.

S. T. & Wm. Harrison (Kitchel, Cohen & Shaw, of counsel), for appellant.

John Jenswold, Jr., and Bunn & Hadley, for respondent.

OPINION

CANTY, J.

This case was argued and decided in favor of appellant at the last term of this court. See 60 N.W. 1095. It having been then suggested that chapter 217, Gen. Laws 1889 (Gen. St. 1894, § § 3200-3202), which provided for the preparation and adoption of the "Minnesota standard policy," was unconstitutional, for the reason that it attempted to delegate legislative powers to the insurance commissioner, a motion for a reargument was made, on the ground of such unconstitutionality, the motion was granted, and the case has since been reargued. Since the granting of the motion for reargument, the supreme court of Pennsylvania has declared a somewhat similar statute unconstitutional, as being at attempted delegation of legislative power. See O’Neil v. Insurance Co. (Pa. Sup.) 30 A. 943. It is now conceded by appellant that, if the Minnesota statute was the same as that of Pennsylvania, it would be unconstitutional. But, while the statute of Pennsylvania attempted to give the insurance commissioner power to adopt, as the standard policy, any form of insurance contract he saw fit, it is claimed that the Minnesota statute required the insurance commissioner to adopt the New York standard policy, and gave him no discretion, as to the substance of the contract to be so adopted, and that, therefore, there was no such attempt to delegate legislative power to him. So far as it is necessary here to consider said chapter 217, it reads as follows:

"Section 1. The insurance commissioner shall prepare and file in his office on or before the first (1st) day of August, A.D. eighteen hundred and eighty-nine (1889), a printed form in blank of a contract or policy of fire insurance, together with such provisions, agreements or conditions as may be endorsed thereon, or added thereto, and form a part of such contract or policy, and such form when so filed shall be known and designated as the Minnesota Standard Policy. Said insurance commissioner shall within sixty (60) days from the passage of this act prepare, approve and adopt a printed form in blank of a contract or policy of fire insurance, together with such provisions, agreements and conditions as may be endorsed thereon or added thereto and form a part of such contract or policy, and such form shall, as near as the same can be made applicable, conform to the type and form of the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, so called and known. Provided, however, that five (5) days’ notice of cancellation by the company shall be given, and provided, that proof of loss shall be made within sixty (60) days after a fire.

"Sec. 2. The insurance commissioner may call upon the attorney general for such assistance as to him may seem necessary in the preparation of the aforesaid standard insurance policy, and it is hereby made the duty of said attorney general to perform such service."

"Sec. 4. On and after the first (1st) day of January A.D. eighteen hundred and ninety (1890), no fire insurance company, corporation or association, their officers or agents, shall make, issue, use or deliver for use any fire insurance policy or renewal of any fire policy on property in this state, other than such as shall conform in all particulars as to blanks, size of type, context, provisions, agreements and conditions with the printed form of contract or policy so filed in the office of the insurance commissioner, as provided for in the first (1st) section of this act, and no other or different provision, agreement, condition or clause shall in any manner be made a part of said contract or policy, or be endorsed thereon or delivered therewith, except as follows, to-wit: ***"

Then follow provisions which authorize the insertion in the insurance policy of matters of description, and other particulars and provisions peculiar to the particular insurance company or the particular risk, and not inconsistent with the provisions or conditions of the standard policy. It is contended, in substance, that all of this statute above quoted which provides for the preparation and adoption of a standard form is surplusage, except the part of section 1, c. 217, Gen. Laws 1889 (Gen. St. 1894, § 3200), which provides that "such form shall, as near as the same can be made applicable, conform to the type and form of New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy so called and known." If this contention is correct, why were the provisions...