Anderson v. McMurry, 21266

Decision Date06 July 1961
Docket NumberNo. 21266,21266
Citation217 Ga. 145,121 S.E.2d 22
PartiesCecil R. ANDERSON v. C. Payne McMURRY et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

It was in legislative contemplation that the DeKalb County Merit System Council should act in a judicial capacity when exercising the power conferred upon them by the act of March 6, 1956, Ga.Laws 1956, p. 3111, which provides that the council should conduct hearings and render decisions on charges preferred against persons employed in the several departments and offices included in said merit system, and to hear appeals from any employee who claims to have been improperly dismissed. Therefore, a hearing conducted in accordance with the terms of a statute of this character and the rules made pursuant thereto is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings and findings of such judicatory body, and not mandamus.

The judgment under review is one sustaining a general demurrer to a petition seeking a mandamus to require that the petitioner be reinstated as a patrolman, effective January 27, 1960, and that the defendants be directed to pay the petitioner his pay retroactive to January 27, 1960.

Cecil R. Anderson filed his petition in the Superior Court of DeKalb County against C. Payne McMurry, Obie T. Brewer, Doctor Wallace Alston, as comprising the Merit System Council of DeKalb County, and C. O. Emmerich, J. R. Almand, J. O. Bowen, Brince Manning, and William M. Evans, as Constituting the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of DeKalb County, Georgia, in which he alleged the following facts: 'That Dekalb County has established a Merit System for its employees pursuant to an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia approved March 6, 1956, Ga.Laws 1956, page 3111; that the Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of Dekalb County has approved rules and regulations pursuant to said Act governing the operation of said Merit System; that he was employed by DeKalb County, Georgia, on January 1, 1956, as a patrolman with the Department of Public Safety and remained in said employment until on or about January 27, 1960, when he was directed by the head of said Department of Public Safety, Chief Brady Knight, not to return to work; and his pay as a patrolman has been terminated by the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues as of January 27, 1960; that he had acquired a permanent appointment as a patrolman with the DeKalb County Department of Public Safety pursuant to Article 3, Section C, of the rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of DeKalb County in accordance with the Act creating the DeKalb County Merit System; that he was placed under the DeKalb County Merit System in his capacity as a patrolman with the Department of Public Safety as provided by Section 1, subsection B, of the Act creating the DeKalb County Merit System; that Article 12, entitled 'Separations', Section D, sub-section 1, of the rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of DeKalb County governing the Merit System of DeKalb County reads as follows: 'The department head, upon notice in writing to an employee stating specific reason therefor, may dismiss an employee for causes as herein defined * * *'; that, at the time of his separation from the Department of Public Safety of Dekalb County, he was not notified in writing by the Department head or any other authorized person of DeKalb County of any specific reason for his discharge; nor has he been notified since said date of discharge to the time of filing this petition in writing of any specific reason for his discharge by any person; that he demanded of the Department head that he be permitted to return to work on or about January 30, 1960, and was advised by said Department head that your petitioner would have to get it cleared through the Merit System Council; and pursuant to said directions from the Department head, Chief Brady Knight, your petitioner appealed to the Merit System Council, and a hearing was had before said Council on or about April 16, 1960; that at said hearing, Mr. C. Payne McMurry was present as Chairman of said Merit System Council, and Mr. Obie T. Brewer was present as a member of said Council, and Mr. Mattox L. Purvis was present as the Director of the DeKalb County Merit System; that at no time before, during and after the hearing set forth hereinbefore was your petitioner advised in any manner of the reason for his discharge; nor was the Department head present to prefer any charges; nor were there present any witnesses on behalf of the Department head to show any cause for your petitioner's separation; that on or abour April 27, 1960, following the hearing set forth herein, he was advised under a letter dated April 26, 1960, from Mr. Mattox L. Purvis as the Director of the DeKalb County Merit System as follows: 'Members of the Merit System Council have completed their review of evidence and testimony developed in the case involving your separation of employment as a patrolman with the DeKalb County Department of Public Safety effective January 27, 1960, and have instructed me as Director of the Merit System to notify you that your release appears fully justified and that circumstances in this instance do not warrant removal of prejudice attached to your separation.'; that upon receipt of the letter set forth in the preceding paragraph was the first time that he knew his separation had any prejudice attached to it; that following the receipt of the letter dated April 26, 1960, he notified the DeKalb County Merit System Council through his attorney at law as follows: 'The above named individual requested a hearing before your Board for the purpose of inquiring into the reason and justification of his discharge from the DeKalb County Police Department. As you recall, i was present with him at this hearing; and he was not confronted with any witnesses or evidence whatsoever to justify the action by the Police Department. We are now advised that the action of the Police Department was found to be justified by your Board, and that in reaching your decision evidence was heard or taken after the above mentioned hearing at a time when Mr. Anderson had no opportunity to be confronted with these witnesses or to refute anything that they may have had to say concerning his discharge. We, therefore, feel that the purpose of his requesting a hearing before the Board has been completely thwarted; and we are now requesting that a hearing be had on the same matter, at which time we shall have an opportunity to be confronted with all of the witnesses and to refute whatever evidence they may have to offer'; that his request as set forth in the preceding paragraph was denied by Mr. C. Payne McMurry, Chairman of the Merit System Council on June 20, 1960; that he again requested a hearing before the DeKalb County Merit System Council on December 2, 1960, regarding his separation as hereinbefore set out, at which time all members of the Merit System Council were present; and your petitioner was not informed at this time in any manner the specific reasons for his discharge or notified of any charges made against him; nor was any testimony or evidence presented by the Department head...

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17 cases
  • Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 1997
    ...purely ministerial and requires no exercise of discretion after the passage of 180 days without action on their part. Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 121 S.E.2d 22 (1961). Under the plain language of OCGA § 48-5-311(e), appellant has a legal right to such procedure. In fact, the trial cou......
  • Lee v. Hutson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • October 11, 1984
    ...Decisions of the state courts of Georgia also confirm that county civil service boards are quasi-judicial bodies. In Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 121 S.E.2d 22 (1961), the Georgia Supreme Court noted that "... a quasi-judicial action ... is one in which all parties are as a matter of r......
  • Morman v. Pritchard
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 11, 1963
    ...to notice and to a hearing, with the opportunity afforded to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure.'' Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 150, 121 S.E.2d 22; and see South View Cemetery Assn. v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d In anderson the Supreme Court concluded that a hearing......
  • Ellis v. Caldwell
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • January 9, 2012
    ...upheld the hearing officer's decision to reverse Caldwell's termination. The County did not seek further review. See Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 121 S.E.2d 22 (1961) (a writ of certiorari lies to review the rulings and findings of the DeKalb County Merit System Council). Despite the a......
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