Anderson v. Morrison

• Decision Date: 18 November 1875
• Citation: 22 Minn. 274
• Parties: CHARLES ANDERSON, by Guardian, <I>vs.</I> DORILUS MORRISON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 274

22 Minn. 274

CHARLES ANDERSON, by Guardian,vs.

DORILUS MORRISON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 18, 1875.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Vanderburgh, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

John W. Arctander and Benton & Benton, for appellant.

Merrick & Morrison, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

The cause of action set up in the complaint is based upon the following facts: That the defendant was engaged in running a cotton mill; that the plaintiff, a boy of fourteen years, was, with the consent of his father, employed by the defendant as a common laborer to serve and work at and about the elevator in the mill; that after such employment the defendant, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff's father or of plaintiff, improperly, wrongfully and negligently directed and required plaintiff to quit such employment, and serve the defendant in feeding, working and clearing a picking machine in said mill; that working at said picking machine exposed the person employed thereat to very great and unusual danger and risk of receiving personal and bodily injury — to greater risk and danger than service about the elevator — and exposed such person to greater risk than ordinary machines of that kind; that this increased danger was known to defendant, but unknown to plaintiff or his father; and that defendant at all times negligently, carelessly and wrongfully omitted to inform plaintiff or his father of any of the risks and dangers attending work on such picking machine; that the plaintiff, while carefully, and to the best of his then discretion and ability, attending said machine, had his left hand and arm caught and injured in it, so that it was necessary to amputate the arm. A verdict was found for the defendant.

As the case does not show that it contains all the evidence on the trial, we cannot, according to the long-settled practice of this court, consider whether the verdict was sustained by the evidence, nor whether any instruction to the jury was incorrect, merely because it assumed that there was certain evidence before them. This leaves nothing for us to consider but the exceptions taken to the rulings of the court admitting evidence, and its instructions to the jury upon the fundamental principles on which the action is based.

With regard to the testimony of C. M. Hardenbergh, as an expert, the case does not distinctly show whether it was allowed to go to the jury, or was struck out...