Anderson v. Moskovitz

• Decision Date: 01 July 1927
• Citation: 260 Mass. 523
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: MORRIS B. ANDERSON v. MAX MOSKOVITZ & another.

260 Mass. 523

MORRIS B. ANDERSON v. MAX MOSKOVITZ & another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 1, 1927

March 24, 1927.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., PIERCE CARROLL, & SANDERSON, JJ.

Unlawful Interference. Equity Jurisdiction, To enjoin unlawful interference. Damages, In suit in equity.

A suit in equity to enjoin a defendant from unlawfully interfering with a contract of employment by the plaintiff of a third person may be maintained if it appears that the defendant with knowledge of the contract intentionally and without justification induced the prospective employee to break it.

The defendant cannot defeat a suit of the character above described by showing that his conduct was due to his having misinterpreted the contract of the plaintiff with the prospective employee.

In a suit of the character above described, it appeared that the employee was under contract to the plaintiff to begin work one week after being called by the plaintiff and not later than January 1 and was so to organize, supervise and manage a shop, to be equipped by the plaintiff, that the cost of production of specified articles to be manufactured would not exceed amounts therein stated. By reason of interference by the defendant, the employee did not begin work for the plaintiff until

February 9, and between January 1 and February 9 the plaintiff's factory equipped for use, was idle. The plaintiff had some of the articles manufactured by others. A master assessed as damages rent of the vacant shop from January 1 to February 9 interest for the same period on the plaintiff's investment in equipment which remained idle, cost of manufacturing goods by outside contractors to fill orders in excess of the cost stipulated in the plaintiff's contract, and losses from cancellation of contracts because goods were not delivered on time.

No recovery was allowed for loss of profits. Held, that (1) The question was not presented whether, if such profits had been allowed, rent of the building and interest on the cost of machinery should be deducted in determining profits;

(2) The assessment of damages was proper.

BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 11, 1926, to enjoin the defendant Max Moskovitz from breaking a contract of employment with the plaintiff and the defendant Trimount Clothing Company "from doing any act and thing to induce him to break" that contract, and for damages.

The suit was referred to a master. Material facts found by the master are stated in the opinion. After the filing of the master's report, the suit by agreement of the parties was dismissed as to the defendant Moskovitz. It then was heard by Wait, J., upon the pleadings and the master's report, and by his order there were entered an interlocutory decree confirming the report and a final decree ordering the defendant company to pay to the plaintiff $1,212.22 and interest and costs. The company appealed.

The case was submitted on briefs. S. Sigilman, for the defendant Trimount Clothing Company.

E.A. Whitman, for the plaintiff.

SANDERSON, J. This is a bill in equity brought against one Moskovitz and the Trimount Clothing Company, a corporation, hereinafter called the company, for an injunction to prevent the company from inducing Moskovitz to break his contract of employment with the plaintiff and for the assessment of damages.

On September 24 1925, the plaintiff, a maker of coats, entered into a written contract with Moskovitz, then in the employ of the company, to install a special system for making pants and vests, and to supervise their manufacture. Moskovitz sought out the plaintiff and asked for this employment. By the written contract, Moskovitz was to begin work one week after being called by the plaintiff and not later than January 1, 1926, and was so to organize, supervise and manage a shop, to be equipped by the plaintiff, that the cost of production of pants and vests would not exceed the amounts therein stated. We interpret the contract to mean that the term of service of Moskovitz would begin January 1, 1926, but that he might be called to work earlier upon a week's notice. There was evidence that it was difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to hire a competent man to handle Moskovitz's special line of work. The plaintiff, after making the contract, proceeded to hire and fit up premises for the new manufacturing business.

On December 13, 1925, Moskovitz handed his resignation to the company and two days later he said to its president that notwithstanding his resignation he would continue to work for the company until January first. On or about December 28, 1925, the company's president, who had seen the contract between Moskovitz and the plaintiff and had consulted a lawyer about its meaning, caused a contract of employment with the company to be drawn with terms more favorable to Moskovitz than those contained in the plaintiff's contract, and presented it to Moskovitz for signature. Moskovitz suggested certain changes in it. Two days later the company's clerk told him that the changes would be made; but the contract was not executed until January 1, 1926.

The...