Anderson v. Purvis, 16548

• Decision Date: 01 October 1951
• Docket Number: No. 16548,16548
• Citation: 220 S.C. 259,67 S.E.2d 80
• Parties: ANDERSON et al. v. PURVIS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 80

67 S.E.2d 80

220 S.C. 259

ANDERSON et al. v. PURVIS.

No. 16548.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Oct. 1, 1951.

John D. Nock, Cheraw, for appellants.

Samuel Want, Darlington, for respondent.

STUKES, Justice.

This case was very largely decided in the first appeal of it which is reported under the same title in 211 S.C. 255, 44 S.E.2d 611. It was there held, in effect, that the respondent mortgagor is entitled to offset of the reasonable value of the professional medical services rendered by him to the mortgagee and the other members of his family, in the nature of quantum meruit. Upon trial of the issue of the value of the services the master found $125 per year, aggregating $3,125, to which interest was added, which was confirmed by decree of the court on appeal.

Appellants have argued three questions, the first and last of which relate to the facts, and particularly to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the offset of the value of respondent's professional services. They are faced with concurrent findings of the master and court in equity, which will not be disturbed by this court unless without evidence to support them or unless they are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. We have carefully reviewed the record in the light of the argument and have concluded, without difficulty, that the factual findings should be affirmed under the rule. They represent a substantial victory for the appellants. Respondent's claim on its face amounted to over three times the amount awarded by the judgment. Other physicians testified to the usual and customary charges for such medical attention as respondent had given the now deceased mortgagee and his dependents, and in the light of this testimony we think that the amount found is very conservative. The exceptions relating to the factual conclusions are overruled without need of further discussion.

Appellants' second question is more difficult. It challenges the allowance of interest upon the annual amounts awarded for the professional services of the respondent. The master recommended the allowance of interest at the rate of six per cent per annum which he calculated would total $4,125 on the aggregate principal of $3,125. The court increased the award of interest by applying the rate of seven per cent per annum prior to July 1, 1934, when the legal rate was reduced by statute to six per cent. 38 St. at Large, p. 1243.

Appellants contend that no interest should be added because the judgment of offset is upon an open account for which not even annual bills were rendered; and they invoke the general rule that interest does not accrue on open or unliquidated accounts in the absence of governing agreement or statute. S. C. cases in West's S. E. Dig., Interest, k18. That is a rule of the common law and a court of equity is not compelled to follow it, if found to be against conscience. The judge of the lower court sat in this case as a chancellor and the award or denial of interest upon the implied obligations which gave rise to the offset was within his power, subject to review on appeal. Just as the court of equity is not bound in this case by the statute of limitations, as was held on the first appeal, it is not bound by the general rule of law which denies the recovery of interest on open or unliquidated accounts or demands. Incidentally, the intervening case of McConnell v. Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 S.E.2d 673, now cited by appellants and in which the statute of limitations was enforced, was an action at law and is, therefore, inapplicable here. The rule in equity with respect to the allowance of interest is clearly set forth in the old cases of Brown v. Smith, 3 Rich.Eq. 465, and Pettus v. Clawson, 4 Rich.Eq. 92, in which the West's Reprint syllabi are, respectively: 'Upon...