Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 40062,40062
• Citation: 307 S.E.2d 499,251 Ga. 556
• Parties: ANDERSON et al. v. SOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 499

307 S.E.2d 499

251 Ga. 556

ANDERSON et al. v. SOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE CO.

No. 40062.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 5, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1983.

Thomas J. Mahoney, Jr., Ranitz, Mahoney, Forbes & Coolidge, Clark Smith, Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Joseph P. Brennan, P.C., Savannah, for Michael Penton Anderson et al.

Dana F. Braun, Karsman, Brooks, Painter & Callaway, Dwight T. Feemster, Duffy & Feemster, Savannah, for Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co.

WELTNER, Justice.

Anderson and another were injured when their car was struck by a vehicle operated by Pillsbury, who carried automobile liability insurance issued by Southeastern. It is undisputed that at the time of the collision Pillsbury was engaged in an impromptu acceleration contest with another vehicle, commonly called a "drag race," along a public roadway.

Southeastern denied coverage, claiming a policy exclusion, and was granted summary judgment, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Anderson et al v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 166 Ga.App. 750, 305 S.E.2d 383 (1983). We granted certiorari to consider the scope of the policy exclusion.

The portion of the policy which is in issue reads as follows: "This policy does not apply: (a) Under any of the coverages to any automobile (1) while rented or leased to others by the Insured; (2) while used as a public livery conveyance, unless such use is specifically declared and described in this policy; or (3) while used or operated in any racing event, speed contest or exhibition." The Court of Appeals interpreted the policy to exclude coverage at any time that a vehicle might be engaged in any race, whether pre-arranged, or commercially oriented, or, as here, one which resulted from a casual encounter.

Words, like people, are judged by the company they keep. Noscitur a sociis. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 213. The critical phrase, "any racing event," thus must be gauged by the words surrounding it--and in this case, by the two levels of its syntagmatic framework.

First, subparagraph (3) extends the exclusion to three categories--"any racing event, speed contest or exhibition"--although it is difficult to discern any substantive distinction between a "racing event" and a "speed contest." These terms are associated in the subparagraph with a third term, "exhibition," which might be understood to impart a semantic content to the preceding two terms. That is to say, the juxtaposition to the term "exhibition" can be understood to mean that a racing event and a speed contest are but instances wherein the operation of an automobile in an exhibition will be grounds for exclusion. It should be noted that there has long existed a genre of public entertainment based upon the exhibition of unusual skills--not necessarily involving speed--in driving automobiles. ¹

The final term, "exhibition," can be thus interpreted as one which encompasses the preceding two terms.

Moving to the larger framework consisting of the entire text, supra, it will be seen that subparagraph (3) follows two other instances wherein the use to which a vehicle is devoted will annul liability coverage. The first is where it is leased to others, and the second is where it is used as a "public livery conveyance," which we understand to mean a taxicab.

The common element in these first two provisions is at least some degree of structured deliberateness on the part of the insured, as the lease of the vehicle to others would create possessory rights on the part of the lessees, and the use as a taxicab would doubtless require compliance with local regulations within the police power of the locality of operation.

Neither of the first two exclusions appears to contemplate any impromptu or ex tempore use of a vehicle.

Accordingly, the common element of the first two exclusions can be seen to inform the third, in precisely the same manner in which the third term of the third exclusion can be seen to inform the first and critical term, "any racing event."

Two broader considerations must be noted.

The first is that an ambiguity in a document should be construed against its draftsman. "If the construction is doubtful, that which goes most strongly against the party executing the instrument or undertaking the obligation is generally to be preferred; ..." OCGA § 13-2-2(5) (Code Ann. § 20-704). Of course, this applies to a policy of liability insurance. Alley v. Great American Ins. Co., 160 Ga.App. 597, 287 S.E.2d 613 (1981).

The second is the public policy of our state, enunciated in the advent of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance: that innocent persons who are injured should have an adequate recourse for the recovery of their damages. OCGA § 40-9-1 et seq. (Code Ann. §§ 68C-101, 68C-201, 68C-301--68C-310, 68C-401--68c-404, 68c-501, 68c-502, 68c-601--68c-6...